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 Dedication: 
 
And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the 
sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for 
the sake of which he does it. 
  -- Socrates1 
 
This work, this life, could not have been if not for Ann-Ellen Marion and Dr. 
Dan White, my parents and tenders of the fire in the flames of which I was both 
tinder then forged.  Each in their own ways have shown me strength, courage, 
kindness and passion, without the tensions of which I could not have conceived 
this text.  I miss the fireflies and elderberries and the evening crickets in the 
rooms of the house.  From snowshoes on one side of a frozen winter river we 
saw otters sledding the far bank to ramp out into the ruddy water, splash, only to 
run up on a straight path single file shaking dry in the cold to wait and slide again 
on their backs and bellies skidding down and up and out, splayed wet fur in mid-
air, splash.   This text marks the end of such a climb and now, this morning, this 
dedication is a grateful reflection suspended over a long silent surface, like tears 
rippling an slow river, like years rippling a photograph faded in the sun.  I love 
you both, and will always be yours.  Much spills especially for Scott Jeavons, and 
sunsets on the lake, and bicycles, and skipping school and Frisbee and that life 
we should have seen had the world run right.  Good-bye. 
                                            
1 Plato, Gorgias, 1892, page 467. 
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Abstract: 
 
Conscience is frequently cited and yet its mechanism is not understood.   
Conscience is most familiar as a voice protesting against actions which 
compromise personal integrity.  Persons also cite conscience as that which 
directs towards actions such as seeking political office and sending soldiers to 
war.  In order to explain the scope of its influence, this text develops a view of 
cognition in which conscience is foundational. The text melds thousands of years 
of philosophical tradition into the cutting edge of neurological research. The focus 
is a rethinking of the most philosophical of all questions: what is the meaning of 
life?  The result is the ACTWith model of conscience.  The model provides a 
system for the conceptualization of moral problems grounded in a thorough 
understanding of cutting edge neurological research.  It provides a psychology 
which does not treat morality merely as an add-on to a primarily rational animal.  
It does so by uncovering the role of conscience in motivating an individual to do 
the right thing in every situation.  The model is finally tested against the most 
compelling moral problem ever to face humanity: what can I do about global 
warming?  Can conscience and philosophy help to save the world?  This work 
shows that it can. 
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Preface: 
 
Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an 
attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre. 
   -- Heraclitus2 
 
 
When the natural world changes, when objects like the ocean and the 
ozone change, we change.  When the weather changes the science changes, 
never the other way around.  Our stories are simply a series of adjustments over 
long periods of time taken in terms of the always current situation.  Much of our 
situation has always been hidden from us.  Many of our old adjustments no 
longer apply.  The instrument for evaluation however hasn’t.  This is the 
conscience. 
In wondering about the right thing to do, one has three options.  There is 
the consultation of religion.  There is the consultation of others.  There is the 
consultation of one’s self.  As religion is what others say that god has said, the 
first two amount to the same thing.  As every one must consult himself in giving 
consultation to others, the second two amount to the same thing.  In consulting 
with one’s self, there is the conscience. 
A man is different from a rock.  A man has a metabolic potential above 
that of things at rest in the world.  A man may use his metabolic potentials to 
move away from rest and into turbulence, into the unknown.  A man may 
discover.  He may become otherwise.  He may open to the unknown and order it 
in himself through his experience.  He is synthetic.  A rock is not.  This is man’s 
                                            
2 Fragment 45. 
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freedom, to become himself through the exercise of himself.  A rock is not free, 
and insofar as a man does not exercise this freedom, he may as well be a rock. 
You see as we grow, we do not simply embody regularities around us, but 
we have the capacity to take in disorder and order it along the way.  A rock will 
heat and cool, becoming what it is because of its environment.  A rock cannot 
open to some things and close to others.  Persons have a limited capacity to 
open to the world, or to close off from it.  In being open to the world, internalizing 
disorder and ordering it in understanding, we create structures of thought.  We 
build systems of explanation.  We arrange what had otherwise been unarranged.  
We understand.  This is the work behind being able to answer any question that 
begins with “Why…?”  We offer this fruit to the following generations.  This is 
wisdom.  This is a product of conscience. 
To discover effectively we take up and embody what might be called 
transcendental logics or programs of inquiry.  Some might call them search 
routines, methodological tools for finding things.  And by this I do not mean a 
toothpick or even a shovel, or a notebook and an ear to the ground.  I mean a life 
which grows into the world as it is revealed, a life active in the discovery of the 
world.  This life becomes the catalyst of the world that builds bridges from dust.  
The goal of this life is that one may say, at the height of his development, “I am a 
method of discovery.” 
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Introduction: 
 
 It is really very simple.  A person embodies system states relative to 
various objects in the space of his life, and conscience compares these states.  
Some of the objects are chairs and tables, some are gods and love, and birth 
and death.  The system states determined by relations with objects are 
“situations.”  Persons are situated in terms of physical objects like chairs, and 
also in terms of metaphysical objects like gods, or good and evil.  Thus, persons 
are situated in terms of the “space of metaphysics” and not merely in some 
physical space.  Conscience compares situations on these terms, and the 
differences motivate a person to stay where he is, or to move on. 
 Every body gets thirsty.  For every thirsty body, drinking feels good.  When 
thirsty, the situation one is motivated toward is that which has a drinkable object 
in hand.  This relation between situations is common to all beings who drink.  It is 
not so for every situation.  For instance, everyone is constituted to seek pleasure 
and to avoid pain, and to have religious experiences, and to see faces in clouds; 
but of the objects which determine these states, there are differences amongst 
individuals.  Some seek pleasure in love and red hair, others in god(s), others in 
food, others in working with metals and still others in working with words.  All of 
this is beside the point, however.  No matter the terms, the mechanism which 
compares states and motivates from situation to situation, roughly speaking, is 
that of the conscience.  
 This text is motivated by a general principle.  All things in nature seek rest 
in terms of the environment.  Conscience, roughly, motivates to places of rest.  
 ix 
 
  
Conscience also grounds freedom.  Persons are free with the capacity to 
determine, for themselves, in what terms they seek rest.  A free action requires a 
further capacity to act towards that end, but this still presumes an act of 
conscience. 
 Freedom grounds that capacity to apply metabolism to work toward 
resting places other than those in which one begins.  One is free to move against 
the pull toward rest.  One is free to deny pleasure on the promise of an even 
better end, for one’s self and for others.  One is free, in other words, to suffer. 
 This text concludes with a challenge to applied ethics which affects the 
entire globe.  Consider the following tragic irony.  Technology has provided a 
view of the human situation on the planet Earth.  Through its lens, scientists 
responsible for this technology see humanity at the cusp of a global 
environmental crisis.  The irony is that the industries which provide for this 
technology are themselves responsible for the crisis.  The lens reveals itself, and 
the view is not good.  Thus, we must change the terms in which we live.  Where 
are we to look for direction?   
 It is really very simple.  Conscience opens the space between good and 
bad, virtue and vice, truth and deception, fidelity and disparity between god and 
other, man and nature.  Conscience opens the space of life.  It is the 
conscientious amongst us who keep it that way.  This work shows how. 
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1.  Conscience, and why we are awake. 
 
While we are tied to this globe, some knowledge of the beings 
around us and of their operations, is necessary; because, without it, 
we should be utterly at a loss how to conduct ourselves. 
 Adam Smith.3 
 
Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the 
like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear 
by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my 
resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, 
any other way of judging about them. 
 Adam Smith4 
 
 
The focus of this text is the conscience.  Consciousness, not conscience, 
has been the focus of most contemporary philosophical and psychological 
research.  In this section I will investigate the relationship between 
consciousness and conscience.5  I begin by developing a view of consciousness 
which is grounded in feelings of which one may not be aware.  All of which one is 
ever aware is the feeling of being in a situation.  One may be aware of being 
situated and not have a clue as to what to do about it.  For this, there is 
conscience.  Conscience has to do with doing the right thing at the right time in 
the right situation.  On the view which I am developing, here, this evaluation 
proceeds without any necessary consciousness thereof. 
Let me begin with an analogy.  This will help to lay out the relationship 
between conscience and consciousness which is developed in more rigorous 
                                            
3 “Knowledge of Future Events,” page 193. 
4 “Theory of Moral Sentiments,” I.I.29. 
5 My thanks to Professor Herb Tillema for his suggestion, the satisfaction of which filled the better 
part of two years with increasingly peripheral study, and the better part of two hundred pages of 
notes with increasingly peripheral relationships, hopefully to fill a half dozen pages with merely 
passable text. 
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terms in the text that follows.  Consider the writing of a letter.  I imagine sitting 
with paper, pen and envelope at a desk, alone, in quiet.  I imagine that this is a 
letter for someone I love, but with whom there has been a misunderstanding.  
There are conflicted feelings.  It is difficult to come to terms with them.  I put pen 
to paper anyways, and as I write I discover more about the way I feel.  The first 
efforts at finding words fail.  Papers are marked and remarked only to be torn and 
crumpled and thrown away. 
Before this exercise, I found myself writing letters in my mind even without 
the paper and the pen.  Finally, I had to sit down and try to come to terms with 
the situation.  Through this exercise, many things are brought to awareness and 
made explicit which before had simply contributed to a general feeling of being in 
love with a unique girl.  These are the richest feelings in life.  It all starts with a 
blank sheet of paper.  It all ends stuffed in an envelope. 
Even without a mark, the paper holds all of my roiling emotions within its 
margins.  Sitting, staring at that paper, I see scenes play out and dreams 
crumble.  Tears fall.  This is anything but a blank piece of paper.  This is me 
coming to terms with where I am in life, as opposed to where I wish I was.  How 
do I express explicitly all the feelings which need expressing?  How do I spill my 
heart in ink?  There aren’t enough words in the world.  The letter must be read as 
it is written: “between the lines.” 
One word is especially inadequate.  “Love” is such a quick little word for 
such a big lasting thing, but it is the best word she has.  We are aware of this 
deficiency. I add “lots” and “forever” and “absolutely.”  Still, something seems left 
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out, or not quite right, so I crumple that paper and try again.  This is what it is like 
to write a letter.  This is what it is like to try to come to terms with one’s situation.  
This is what it is like to be in love, looking at it from the inside out.  Still, the words 
themselves are nothing without the folding, and the mailing, and the opening up. 
In terms of this analogy, consciousness is the words and letters explicitly 
arranged on the paper.  I am aware that I love her, and that I love her “lots.”  
Underneath this explicit understanding is the paper itself.  Even unmarked it 
stews with emotions.  The blank paper seems to stare back, in mockery.  In order 
to finish the letter, this emotive ground must be marked up, folded, and formed to 
suit its envelope.  In order to finish this letter I must come to terms with where I 
am at, put these terms to paper and move on. 
Conscience is the container for all of this struggle.  Conscience is the 
envelope and the institution of letter-writing altogether.  The envelope is the form 
which the letter fills.  The envelope is the vehicle.  It holds the address.  It carries 
the intention.  It names the place and the time.  It holds this situation apart from 
another for their comparison.  It is a snapshot of life at rest, seen from another 
resting place. 
Conscience is that whereby one situation is understood as the feeling of 
being in a certain place in life.  Without conscience, there would not be one 
situation understood as merely one amongst others.  There would not be this 
letter to stand apart from and to look back upon, from another situation, the 
situation which involves the letter being finished, and stuffed into an envelope.  
There would be ongoing writing; but without an envelope, one would always be in 
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the middle of it.  There would be only an ongoing stream of experiences all 
meshed together in one long series, each indifferent to the last.  There would be 
no unique situation the understanding of which is the purpose behind the writing 
of the letter and reflection on its content altogether.  Conscience is what makes a 
place in life special.  Conscience is what makes being in one situation better than 
another.  Conscience makes another place a position worth seeing, or worth 
leaving behind. 
The letter encapsulates one such experience.  Conscience, on the view to 
be presented in this text, captures the sense of being in a situation relative to 
others.  This is how we know where we are, instead of merely how we are at any 
given time.  The letter captures the sense of being situated in a single dynamic.  
It is enclosed in an envelope which captures the sense of being in a situation. 
Once folded and closed away in the envelope, the content of the letter can be 
held out and examined. 
As situations change, the contents of letters change.  Addresses change.  
Envelopes change.  The reasons for writing letters remain the same.  One must 
come to terms with his situation.  A letter is the product of a rested reflection on 
the place one is in life.  A letter is written for one’s self.  Sometimes, others will 
advise that one write a letter simply to come to terms with how he feels about a 
situation without any intention of sending it.  The envelope is still operative, here.  
One writes the letter as-if it would be put in an envelope and sent away.  It is a 
way of coming to terms with one’s situation.  It is a way of putting a situation 
behind one’s self, to get distance from it.  It is also a way of spelling out 
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anticipations of an uncertain future, against which what comes to pass can be 
measured. 
Without conscience, one may be conscious of things without ever 
understanding how they all hang together as one situation amongst others.  On 
this view, consciousness is not meaningful without conscience to contain it.  With 
conscience, objects of our awareness are meaningfully arranged around a single 
theme, coming to terms with a situation.  On this view, conscience and 
consciousness are necessarily related.  We are conscious of objects which 
determine our situation. 
On this view, consciousness is an extension of other homeostatic 
mechanisms of the body, and the brain is a more or less complex regulator.  Just 
as basic homeostatic functions maintain the integrity of the organism in terms of 
its environment, the things of the conscious world become additional terms for 
homeostasis, things in terms of which we must learn to live, with which we must 
come to terms.  On this view, conscience is what motivates the organism to 
situations whose terms are comfortably met.  On this view, conscience is what 
motivates the organism to environments in terms of which integrity is maintained. 
Most of life proceeds unaware.  Though experienced, most of what we 
know we only know by acquaintance, not by conscious reflection. The pores of 
our skin open to aid respiration, cooling the body when it is warm, and none of us 
are conscious of the dilation of every pore.  Everyone of us, though, is well 
acquainted with, and sometimes even aware of, the effects. 
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On the picture to follow, conscience is the controller of the homeostatic 
system.  Conscience is a record of stable system states in terms of environment, 
the library of which guides the organism by holding the situation and associated 
state ahead for the organism’s motivation.  Conscience also controls the addition 
of new system states by either opening or closing the organism to the chaos of 
the external environment.  New experiences yield new states attuned to different 
situations.  Thus, conscience controls the development of practical wisdom.  It is 
also in the capacity to open to the unknown that we find the loci of human 
freedom.  All of this requires explanation.  There are many pages to follow. 
Consciousness is an aspect of conscience.  This seems contrary to the 
everyday characterization of conscience as a protesting voice, but it is not.  The 
voice of conscience may be that aspect of conscience of which we are most 
aware, but it is merely one aspect of conscience.  Conscience has to do with 
coming to terms with situations generally speaking, and the voice of conscience 
appears to consciousness only in some specific incidents.  Conscience has to do 
with doing the right thing at the right time in every instance, not only those in 
which its startling voice presents itself.6  Therefore, there is more to conscience 
than we are aware.  Analogies aside, all of this still requires explanation. 
So, let’s start with the basics.  What is consciousness and what does that 
have to do with conscience?  To begin with, a focus on consciousness as the 
fundamental object in cognitive sciences may be a bit arbitrary.  Even the word, 
                                            
6 Most letters are written without incident, to continue with the analogy. 
 7 
 
  
“consciousness” is a conjugate, “con-“ and “-sciousness.”  So, the question 
should be: what is sciousness? 
This is not the first time that this question has arisen to philosophy.  For 
William James, for just a moment, in his Principles of Psychology, 1890, 
consciousness appeared to be con-sciousness, where -sciousness, a stream of 
feeling and sensation, seemed to be the fundamental component of experience.  
James discounted this view, but that has not compromised its “strange attraction” 
to current investigators.7 
Thomas Natsoulas describes James’ “sciousness hypothesis” as implying 
that all cognitive processes proceed within a “black box.”  “By definition, we know 
what goes on inside a black box from its outputs, from the external effects that 
the processes within the black box produce, and no more directly than that.”8 
Now, one may object that he experiences his own feelings directly.  This is 
correct; he does know his feelings and sensations directly.  However, he does 
not know everything which goes on in his body, as blood chemistry and 
metabolism change slowly, and regularly, day to day.  He is not aware of every 
sensation.  Those that he is aware of, well, he is aware of; this is true.  On 
Natsoulas’ analysis, sciousness names those processes deep inside the box, 
and no one, not even the individual whose conscious confines are this or that 
box, has an unimpeded view of these internal goings-on.9  Thus, sciousness is 
                                            
7 For instance, the article by this name: Andrew R. Bailey, “The Strange Attraction of Sciousness: 
William James on Consciousness”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34, no. 2 
(1998): 414-434. 
8 Natsoulas, page 53, 1996. 
9 An envelope is much like a box. 
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not easy to talk about, as it is, essentially, those cognitive processes of which we 
are not aware.10 
James dropped his so-called “sciousness hypothesis.”  One reason for 
this may be that the tradition into which he was born supported the view that 
every individual does, in fact, have conscious – read complete, transparent, 
unimpeded - access to all the internal goings-on which matter.  The sciousness 
hypothesis contradicts this presumption, directly.  If sciousness were taken to be 
the fundamental term, and consciousness only a modification thereof, then what 
comes to matter is not necessarily that of which we are consciously aware.  If this 
were the theory, than it would have clashed with the presumption of most of the 
thinkers of James’ era, and of our own, that the phenomena of consciousness is 
the most important focus in theories of ethics, in psychology, or in living the good 
life in general.  All that glitters is not all there is. 
This is important because, in James’ day, there was no instrumentation 
available for the investigation of what processes are at work in the body besides 
consciousness.  What was available was introspection, and this method has 
some limitations.  Unable to have the “sciousness hypothesis” confirmed, and 
with no access to investigate its operation, there would have seemed to be little 
sense in focusing on it directly as a basis for the emerging science of 
psychology. 
                                            
10 On this view, all consciousness is an extension of other homeostatic mechanisms of the body, 
and the brain is a more or less complex regulator.  See remarks to this effect in preface. 
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According to a rough conception of sciousness, the mental cogs and 
wheels which turn as we turn are hidden from immediate awareness.  Think of 
sciousness as a continuous stream of feeling more so than a stream of 
determinate, discrete thoughts.  Sciousness is the felt ground from which any 
thinking both begins and to which it returns.  It is a silent ground, of which only 
certain aspects ever rise to awareness.  Sciousness, thus, is the fundamental 
mode of being in the world, with con-sciousness only arising later, as a sense of 
sensing, a feeling of feeling, a con-jugation of sensed moments, occurrences, 
sciousnesses, which, upon their reflective integration, become, a moment of 
consciousness.11 
What is the con- doing here?  Take sciousness to be the continuity of 
changing bodily states, much of which at any given time we are unaware.12  
Think of this stream of sciousness like the line drawn on an EKG machine, 
except that instead of regular punctuations of heartbeats and relaxations, the line 
of sciousness is not necessarily regular, and not usually so dramatically 
punctuated.  Moods rise and fall, blood sugar rises and falls, hormone levels rise 
and fall, peripheral sensations flow in without demanding attention, yet have 
effects on bodily states nonetheless.  Everyday, the stream of sciousness, for 
persons not living through crisis, may hardly rise and fall at all. 
Next, take this graph of sciousness as indicative of what it is like to be in a  
certain place.  Say, going to the department of motor vehicles.   Waiting in line, 
                                            
11 One can think of this as a process of repetition whereby the stream of sciousness repeats itself 
and in so doing these regularities become present to awareness with the rest cancelled as noise. 
12 This is a whole body state, and includes in my view even the growth of toenails, but with a 
minimal weight attached to such an incidental indication of system stability. 
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one’s moods shift, it is boring, one’s metabolism slows, and all without any 
necessary consciousness of this fact.  Take this graph as a readout of this 
experience.  Now, pretend that the same person returns to the department of 
motor vehicles, and a similar readout is produced.  Here, we have two pictures of 
what it feels like being in the same place, even if one is not aware of everything 
he is feeling.13  What we see here are two pictures of the state of the bodily 
system in terms of the same situation. 
What the con- is doing, here, is overlaying these two graphs.14  What the 
con- is doing here is comparing these two situations as system states.  The 
overlay of the two amplifies the ups and downs which the two pictures have in 
common.  What the con- is doing here is bringing to attention regularities.  These 
regularities, through the con- operation, rise to the level of awareness and are 
those things of which one may be at any given time conscious. 
This occurs as a matter of course, through repetition; recurring senses are 
consciously confirmed in their regularity.15  And, hereby, something seemingly 
magical happens.  As one finds oneself in terms of the regularities of his place in 
the world, the sense of self emerges.  As a self built upon a continuous stream of 
sensations, consciousness of one’s self is the awareness of what it feels like to 
be in a given position, this locus of regularity, mine.  The self emerges as those 
                                            
13 This describes what later in the text is called the feeling of being in a situation.  Situation is 
fundamental. 
14 Think of this as a wave-addition problem wherein amplitudes which reach a certain threshold 
rise to consciousness, while those below remain sensed but of which there is not conscious 
awareness. 
15 The following picture suits early child development.  Regular engagements lead to habits in 
which recurring senses are not necessarily consciously confirmed. 
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regular ways of being in the world which suit one’s situation.16  This sense of our 
selves as situated is originary; beforehand, there is simply nothing which 
answers to our notion of the self as an individuated being in the world, nothing of 
which we are conscious.17  The consciousness of one’s situation constituted on 
the basis of regularity yields “what it feels like” to be in a given place.  The feeling 
of what it is like to be so situated only comes into question when one’s situation 
changes, or a difference between one situation and another presents itself.  In 
short, then, this sense of the “I” can be characterized as the sense that this 
moment, this awareness, this relationship with the world, this position is mine, 
while that space over there, or back then, is not. 
One’s self, so understood, is essentially positional.18  There is always 
place in the time of life. It is this positionality which is the building block of 
conscience. Conscience and consciousness are related in this way.  
Consciousness fleshes out the objects and is the substance for evaluation.  We 
become aware of things and take them in terms of how we feel as we engage 
with them.  Regular affects lead to an understanding of being in the world in 
terms of these engagements.  Regular engagements lead to an understanding of 
                                            
16 This is what comes to be called a person’s “character,” of which we have a great deal to say 
later. 
17 This “I” marks the emergence of conscience.  With a pattern established, there is a science as 
that scene from that point, and this scene is compared with others, and this comparison yields the 
difference which is the felt content of the self.  I try to make this clear in the passages to follow.  
18 There is direct correlation to be drawn, pertinent in this context, with the logic of our own 
memory.  I would point the readers attention to the central role of the hippocampus in the 
processing of memory from short to long term, and its fundamental function – that is its function 
even in critters without the sort of long-term memory humans are famous for – in recognizing 
place as position.  Thus, when an animal approaches a space which has some implication for its 
present individual purposes, say, the space signifies food is nearby, the significance of the 
position is thought to be encoded and retrieved through the functions of the hippocampus.  This is 
consistent with the phenomenal evidence that places are sentimental.  I am simply pointing to the 
essentially spatial nature of all thought, present or recovered, as qualified by an organism’s 
capacities and requirements.  
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various orders of things, and one’s place relative them.  This understanding sets 
one’s self in relation with all the objects of his world, physical or conceptual.  This 
is the scene, the view, as one looks out over the space of one’s life.  It is one’s 
situation.  Physical things stand out, but not merely as physical things.  Physical 
things stand out for their repeated significance, and this often has little to do with 
that material they are made of.  There are crosses, and pyres, and to be far from 
one has sometimes meant to be close to another.  Neither is significant for their 
material constitution.  This relationship is not purely between one’s self and some 
physical object.  There is simply more to the space of life than that.  It is a space 
weighted with metaphysical significance.  I wish to be close to neither crosses 
nor pyres.  These are not positions I wish to be in.  Once understood, however, 
this understanding is not necessarily one of which there is any explicit awareness 
at any given time.19  I understand that I don’t go to church, but I am not 
necessarily conscious of it at any given time. 
Much of life is lived in this mode.  Consider the following brief illustration.  
One must walk through a dark room to get to bed.  If the order hasn’t changed, 
and the furniture is in the same array, then one may walk through the room 
without being directly aware of where the furniture is, but by merely walking 
between the determinations revealed in a prior journey.  Conscience holds the 
bedroom up as a guiding light in the darkness.  The comparison of the two 
situations, before and after navigating the dark room, reveals the path taken 
before in the difference.  This path, laid down in past consciousness, becomes 
                                            
19 Though, we can take it for granted that the terms of these engagements did at one time arise to 
consciousness, these determinations may become habitual, and so fall out of consciousness. 
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the space of navigation through an exercise of conscience.  It is as-if one were in 
a lit room.  One need not be aware of this activity at all, but the understanding of 
the lay-out of the room is effective nonetheless. 
On the other hand, we are acutely aware of what it is like to be far from 
the leg of a table, for instance, when that table-leg may be all that helps us to 
stand upright.  Otherwise, the leg of the table is not an object of attention, and 
there is no necessary consciousness of the space between one’s self and that 
leg, at all.20 
This goes as well for objects whose significance is not physical in the 
common sense. Consider the following personal example.  I imagine that what it 
describes is familiar to many readers.  I can remember struggling with the 
metaphysical weight of the cross, and the feeling of being increasingly distant in 
one sense, and increasingly close in another.  Comparing these two, the distance 
of life between then and now, is what the conscience does, and it does so every 
moment of everyday. 
The feeling of what it is to be in a position extends to all aspects of being 
in the world.  Consider the following example in light of the preceding. One can 
have a sense that a crisis is approaching along with the anxiety which one might 
consciously attach to the phenomenon, and not be consciously aware of the 
                                            
20 This note gets ahead of our discussion, but I will comment.  It is the difference between what it 
feels like to stand and what it feels like not to stand which describes the intensional space, the 
space which must be bridged for the opportunity (to stand).  The comparisons between a table 
leg near or far, in terms of an intension which includes standing, gives a good view of the 
landscape for the infant’s infant conscience.  Here the relation between consciousness of objects 
and space and conscience is explicit.  One is the sense of being in a position, of having a sense 
of place relative objects, the other is a motivating comparison of this material.   
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anxiety or of the crisis.  Perhaps there is a pattern in the present periphery which 
was part of a past situation.  Conscience holds these together, and the feeling of 
the difference causes a tension.  The difference is that presently there is not 
pain, yet.  The painful situation is anticipated.  This is dread. 
Now, I will embellish this bare form with a familiar story.  Imagine that this 
is your own situation.  Consider that you have a girlfriend and she is becoming 
very dear.  The girlfriend has a boy who dislikes you move in as her roommate.  
She then plans to leave with this boy on a month-long musical tour in which they 
will sleep in a van with another boy and his girlfriend.21  As these moves are 
made, your position relative to a most significant part of your life changes.  You 
have an increasing sinking feeling.  Meanwhile you are trapped alone, working 
on philosophy, battling sophistry and trying to make the world a better place.  It is 
imperative that your work is finished on time.  You feel crisis coming without 
looking at it directly, as if a hole opened under your desk, and you are falling into 
your own stomach.  This is dreadful anxiety.  You slog onward, working as well 
as you are able, but each step is harder than the last, as if you are working to 
climb an increasingly steep slope and all that you held dearest is behind you. 
This is the sense of a movement through an affective landscape.  Falling 
into such a depression is not a journey one asks to make.  This is not how one 
would wish his life story to go.  Most of us try to avoid tragedy.  This is not an end 
one seeks.  This is not a situation one wants to come to terms with.  The view of 
conscience I am developing here parses this movement.  What we have are two 
                                            
21 I found out later that this was false; no matter. 
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situations, separated by change.  What hurts is the difference between the two 
situations, before and after.  After is where one finds one’s self as he reflects on 
the transition.  All in the middle is a blur.  Consider the illustration, above.  She 
loved you.  That past situation, that was wonderful.  The present situation is 
painful.  The difference is falling into depression.  What comes next is lots of hard 
work called “getting over it.”  “Getting over it” captures the sense that what comes 
next is crawling out of the depression.  The depression is where one begins and 
in which many remain.  Conscience sets out the highs and lows of life.22  Most of 
the rest comes in between.  It is slogging it up and down the hills and valleys of 
love, loss, and everyday living. 
That one has this feeling is possible on the basis of conscience as I have 
described it.  Conscience holds the feeling of what it is to be in one situation 
against the other.  It is up to the experiencing self to reconcile these two 
positions, and to come to terms with his new situation.  This situation is not that 
situation.  The difference is pain.   
The self-constitutive relation between one’s capacities to feel relative to 
engagements with objects of the world is critical to an understanding of what I 
mean by conscience.  Position is the affective space of embodiment.  One can 
be far from the one he loves and still be in the same room.  These engagements 
are unique.   Not everyone would feel that way in that situation.  One’s position is 
the unique location that is “mine,” or “yours” just as one calls his lover “mine” or 
                                            
22 I neglect to develop herein an account for purely physiological influences on this affective 
ground, say for one who is prone to depression, or to mania.  It is implicit, however, in the model 
of conscience to follow. 
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“yours.” The totality of one’s place in the world is one’s “situation.”  In love, it is all 
yours. 
Situations are shared.  A person is essentially situated and understands 
himself in terms of his position relative to objects.  Persons who share situations 
understand themselves through similar engagements with similar objects.  The 
more significant the object, the more important the relationship.  Coming to terms 
with one’s situation is limited by one’s capacities to engage with the objects of his 
environment.  It is a bad situation if the object one wants to manipulate is in a van 
with another man 800 miles away.  The physical distance between these two 
situations, let alone the emotional distance, is simply too great, and it feels that 
way.23 
Think of coming to terms with one’s situation as a process of 
determination, as the literal de-termination of the space of life.  As we feel our 
places out, we come to terms with the limitations of these spaces; we feel the 
terms of space at the limits of our own sensitivities to it.  Where we find no limit, 
there is an opening, a space which may be further explored, a capacity yet to be 
fully exercised.  So, as we determine the space of life, we find and set our own 
limits.  The limits of one’s own realized capacities, thus, is one’s “situation” 
whose terms are more or less easily come to.24 
                                            
23 The one you love is not an object, this is not what this language is meant to express.  It means 
that you share her situation as-if it were yours.   It is shared in totality.  Love is not simply sharing 
a bed.  The loss of love is likewise more than the loss of a bed partner.  The loss of love calls into 
question the totality of one’s place in the world. 
24 And are thus more or less ideal.  This has a special importance in the section on Diogenes and 
bathtubs. 
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Understanding is limited by, as well as limits, one’s capacities to engage 
with the environment.  Some come to terms not so well, and these are the same 
who understand not so well. Thus, in engaging with the objects of the word, one 
delimits the space where his capacities begin and end, where things begin and 
end, and so determines where objects are aims and where they are obstacles.  
This is one’s situation. 
In the phenomenology of the embodied self, the place of position is 
central.  In the phenomenological tradition, a “situation” involves the 
inseparability of the psychological agent reflexively engaged with his 
environment.  Being situated means coming to terms with the environment, and 
these terms are then taken up as the starting point in further engagements with 
the environment.  As these terms are acted upon, their salience is tested in the 
success or failure of the action.  This process generates new determinations of 
the environment, which are then fed forward into the next series of actions.  This 
reflexive engagement over the course of one’s life describes the space of life in 
terms of one’s own limitations.  One pays attention to, and so values what meets 
the terms of his needs, and discounts or ignores what does not.  In being in the 
world, “organisms (agents) do not interact with the objective world in itself, but 
with their subjective perception of it.”25  In so exhausting our capacities for 
discovery, we delimit the space of life, and so form expectations of life lived in 
these terms.  In being in the world, thus, the world is made.  This is the world of 
our understanding, inseparable from the sense of being situated within it. 
                                            
25 page 169, “The Construction of Reality in the Robot”.  We will return to this notion with some 
force much later on. 
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Think again of walking through the living room in the dark.  One’s situation 
is understood.  This space has been traversed before. It need not be the case 
that this path works again, however.  In reconfiguring the furniture, new paths are 
opened up, and old opportunities for unobstructed travel are closed.  This 
requires looking at the room from a different perspective, and recasting the 
relationships between the objects in the space.  In this way, spaces of 
opportunity26 are revealed.  Thus, trapped, we look not for walls, but for a way 
past them. 
Let us review.  As awareness dawns, the self is realized essentially in its 
relationship with the world determined by its own limitations.  Consciousness is 
that which makes what is otherwise merely sensed into objects.27  This sense of 
location accompanies every conscious moment, and corresponds with the 
positionality of the “I” in the sense of the lived body within the fields of all things 
so determined.  It may then be said that all life is positional, all feeling is the 
feeling of a space, and the situated self is the first, and only thing, of which we 
are ever consciously aware.28 IT IS THE ESSENCE OF THE SELF TO BE 
                                            
26 New modes of being, new routes for travel, new horizons to explore, etc. 
27 The focus of which is, appropriately enough, called "attention" in the psychological sciences, 
pointing to the directedness, or intensionality, of consciousness, and to the relative freedom to 
redirect consciousness to attend to different objects.  This freedom is opposed to the more 
passive sensibility which serves as substrate for consciousness.  A similar distinction will be 
made between -science and con-science in passages to follow. 
28 In fact, our awarenesses just are the felt differences between these positions, so given as self-
reflection.  In this sense, we can accommodate a strengthening of LaTour’s notion of 
“proposition.”  Taken even more liberally than does he, we can allow that people are, themselves, 
“propositions,” understood as pro-positions, or presented places, places put forth, projected, and 
so which must stand as prima facie argument places.  What, then, is articulated in a given 
proposition, understood in its weak form as mere assertion, simply is a claim to a place in the 
world.  Moreover, so understood, no proposition as assertion properly exhausts the content of its 
expression; this is nothing less than the entire felt space of the individual itself.  And, by way of 
this concept, we can begin to make full sense of the import of the as-if comparison that is coming 
to terms with another; this is justice.  The nature of one’s position for another’s in the 
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SITUATED, IN A POSITION, COMING TO TERMS WITH ITS ENVIRONMENT.  
IT IS SIMPLY THIS COMING TO TERMS WITH ONE’S SITUATION OF WHICH 
ONE IS EVER CONSCIOUSLY AWARE. 
So given, consciousness is not the limit of the self; it is only the ripples on 
top of the water in the bucket.  Conscience is the bucket; it is the space of feeling 
of which one becomes conscious.  Conscience frames the situation.  The self 
emerges on the basis of regular fluctuations in one’s situation.  These 
fluctuations arise at the level of sense, with or without awareness.  On this 
picture, consciousness is “the critical biological function that allows us to know 
sorrow or know joy, to know suffering or know pleasure, to sense embarrassment 
or pride, to grieve for lost love or lost life.”29  It is the sense of a sense.  
Underlying all consciousness is the felt ground of experience, the landscape of 
sadness and glee, our position in terms of which we may, or may not, at any 
given time be aware: “-sciousness.”  Consciousness is merely a part of the 
whole. 
Though conscious is how we find our selves, consciousness seems not to 
be so directly related to what’s really going on in the world after all.  There is a 
more basic sense of our integration with the world, one on which consciousness 
floats along, bouncing off objects jarring its attention like a raft for one filled with 
hot air on a sometimes choppy stream of sciousness.  Modern neurology 
                                                                                                                                  
conscientious trade of comparison is always an originally given charitable equality, though 
qualified and dimensionally limited according to the phronetic potential of the conscientious agent, 
himself.  In discourse, what is due the other is that his terms be met and in my mind the most 
significant terms are natural. 
29 Antonio Damasio, 1999, page 5. 
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confirms this picture: consciousness is turning out to be a bit player in the 
movement of human experience.  This understanding is so well grounded, in fact, 
that one contemporary neuroscientist opens his latest text stating that: “Your 
conscious life, in short, is nothing but an elaborate post-hoc rationalization of 
things you really do for other reasons.”30 
The con- in James’ picture of con-sciousness is what pulls objects out of 
the background of our experience and brings them to awareness.  In their 
conjunction, moments of sciousness bring to consciousness an object of which 
one has a feeling in particular, and towards which one has a relationship.  
“James explains that the prefix con serves to describe the stream of 
consciousness as being reflexive, in addition to being directed outward, beyond 
itself.”31  The con- is what makes sensing the sensing of being with things in the 
world. 
We may, through the lens of consciousness thus presented, look at 
conscience as con – science.  Con- plays a similar role in the analyses of 
conscience.  Consciousness has to do with different objects of which we become 
aware. In con-science, con- does not signify the comparison of fundamental 
sensings which present objects to awareness through con-sciousness.  This is 
                                            
30 V.S. Ramachandran, A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness, Pearson Education, Inc., NY, NY, 
2004, 192 pages,  page 1.  Of course, this brings us back to mechanisms and explanations.  He 
says reason here for the same reason I say situation otherwise. 
31 Thomas Natsoulas, "The Sciousness Hypothesis - Part 2," The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 
Volume 17, Number 2, Spring, 1996, pages 185-206, page 189.  James entertained the so-called 
"sciousness hypothesis" before settling on a more conventional account maintaining 
consciousness as the atomic unit of the mental, preserving, in so doing, the common sense 
conviction that we have immediate and continuous awareness of our mental states, and not only 
derivative awareness on the basis of a more fundamental sciousness.  It is believed that James 
makes this move at least partly to satisfy the terms of fellow researchers, but takes great pains to 
modify the convention to account for the role of sciousness without overturning it altogether. 
 21 
 
  
consciousness built on the base of sciousness.  Conscience is all of this, and 
more.  It signifies the comparison of fields of these objects in terms of one’s place 
therein.  Conscience has to do with situations.  One is always situated in terms of 
objects.  What I feel is the difference between situations.  Each field of objects 
compared describes a certain situation in terms of these objects.  Each field is 
thus understood by way of a corresponding view on the array of the objects in the 
field.32  What I am conscious of is some aspect of that field; so, consciousness is 
an aspect of conscience, not the other way around. Each place in the field, 
furthermore, finds different objects in different relations. Each person’s 
perspective, even on objects nearby, is unique.  Each person’s conscience, thus, 
is his own, but that it is his is a universal condition. 
Consciousness is that of which we are aware.  Conscience is the source 
of its evaluation, the logic explaining why there are these things and not other 
things, and why any of it matters at all.  Its content is the feeling that is the 
difference between two positions, for instance before and after the break-up and 
before and after stubbing a toe on a rocker. 
As we shall make much of this later on, these differences cause strain, 
tension.  The difference between here and there, good and better, is what makes 
this better place than that, and becomes the reason to go there.  We wish to 
avoid situations which require painful engagements with hard things, and wish to 
seek comfortable arrangements, instead.  All of this will become clearer as I 
develop this preliminary notion of conscience in the passages to follow. 
                                            
32 The "as-if" of the as-if model of conscience is best understood as an as-if where, and what it 
shows is what it is to be in some position, related in a certain way with a certain world of objects. 
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We will change speeds in the next section.  Where in this last section, the 
issue has been the role of conscience relative to consciousness, the issue in the 
next is the role of conscience in bringing things to consciousness.  We will look at 
the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. for some insight into what motivates the 
conscientious man.  The power of conscientious examples will remain important 
throughout the rest of the text.  In King’s life, we will find conscience at work 
through a look at the sorts of situations with which he was confronted, and with 
which he had to reconcile. 
We will see a man who does the right thing at the right time, even though 
others found his efforts “untimely.”  This will prepare for the section to follow.  
Therein, we will look at an ancient notion which indicates the objective 
constraints on right action.  In our review, we will find that practical wisdom is 
crucial for meeting these objective constraints at any given time.  Before moving 
further, then, I will clarify the relationship between conscience and practical 
wisdom.  In this way, by the end of this text, the reader may see clearly enough 
the relationship between conscience and doing the right thing at the right time so 
that he might aspire to do similarly, himself. 
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2.  Conscience, and why we live at all. 
 
Nothing dismayed, Gilgamesh set out on the road through the 
mountains, and the darkness increased in density every hour, but 
he struggled on, and at the end of the twelfth hour he arrived at a 
region where there was bright daylight, and he' entered a lovely 
garden, filled with trees loaded with luscious fruits, and he saw the 
"tree of the gods." 
 --Epic of Gilgamesh, 9th tablet. 
 
It has been written about Martin Luther King Jr. that “one of King’s great 
achievements as a leader was to give the nation “a vocabulary to express what 
was happening in the civil rights revolution.””33  In his work, King not only had a 
vision of a better world, he developed a set of terms which characterized that 
view.  He expressed his view in these terms, and the use of the language helped 
others to come to share his perspective.  I think that this is the work of 
conscience.  I will attempt in the following text to show that this is the case. 
King took the established terms of his times and bent them to fit within the 
space of a new time, an unrealized future, when the past promise of the United 
States is realized, and “all men are created equal.”34  The vocabulary of 
segregation does not name the same things as does the vocabulary of equality, 
just as the vocabulary of war does not name the same things as does the 
vocabulary of peace.  One speaks of violent ends and oppression, the other of 
peaceful ends and tolerance. Men grow up learning these vocabularies, and 
come to understand their positions in life according to the use of these terms.  
Men grow up speaking of violent ends and oppression, and live accordingly, 
                                            
33 Berry, 112. 
34 Point made in Berry, 123.  In this text, “men”, “man”, and “mankind” are intended neutrally. 
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making the world a violent and oppressive place.  King wanted to change that.  I 
want to change that. 
In King’s times, as is the case today, world affairs are punctuated by both 
war and inequality, oppression and anxiety.  This is a world in crisis.  Crisis is 
hard to come to terms with.  This is a world which needs the vocabulary for 
change.  It was looming crisis which originally spurred King’s efforts, 8 years 
before his famous Letter from the Birmingham Jail: 
As early as the initial mass meeting of the Montgomery 
Improvement Association, on December 5,1955, King had 
expressed his anxiety that the times were in crisis, and that local 
and national catastrophe were just around the corner.35 
 
King was far ahead of the curve on this count.  This explains his role as a 
leader.  He saw ahead, what was coming up, and expended much of his life in 
understanding the terms of those critical times.  He expended the rest of it 
recasting these terms to fit times yet to be.  King understood that the world had to 
be seen differently, had to be determined as a different world, in order for its 
opportunities to be realized.  
What King does is to see around the conventional order of things.  He 
then takes the vocabulary which represents the conventional order and molds it 
to fit his vision of a new world.  He does so in a way in which the recast 
determinations open a space of opportunity to see the world in a positive light. 
“He takes conventionally negative terms, like “crisis,” “tension,” and “extremism,” 
and invests them with creative potential.”36 
                                            
35 Ibid, 111. 
36 Berry, 113. 
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Let’s look at one passage, in particular.  The following is an excerpt from 
the charges brought against King by the clergymen, and which prompted his 
response, the Letter from the Birmingham Jail.  This excerpt gives an indication 
of the tension King was saddled with reconciling, all alone in a jailcell: 
Just as we formerly pointed out that “hatred and violence have no 
sanction in our religious and political traditions,” we also point out 
that such actions as incite to hatred and violence, however 
technically peaceful those actions may be, have not contributed to 
the resolution of our local problems.  We do not believe that these 
days of new hope are days when extreme measures are justified in 
Birmingham.37 
 
Notice the tension between the terms, here.  Terms like “hatred and 
violence” are coupled with “technically peaceful” to describe the same activities 
of the same man.  These terms are polar opposites, and Dr. King was to have 
been responsible for both prongs of their complaint.  He would have to answer 
from both positions, however incommensurate.  It was up to him to reconcile 
these poles within himself.38  This excerpt shows us that his Letter is intended to 
defend the nonviolence movement against charges that it sidesteps truly 
peaceful channels of negotiation. 
This is one of the most compelling images in all of history.  Dr. King, sitting 
in a jail cell in Alabama, crafting his response on the side margin of a local 
newspaper, the same paper reporting his sitting, there, in his jail cell.  Even as he 
was writing his response, the public read of his incitement to “hatred and 
violence.”  Here he sat intent, in tension, a man suffering a cruel irony.  Though 
                                            
37 Statement by Alabama Clergymen, April, 12, 1963. 
38 From circa 1300, from Latin reconcilare "to bring together again."  From re- "again" + concilare 
"make friendly".  From circa 1565, meaning "to make (discordant facts or statements) consistent." 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=reconcile&searchmode=none 
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his actions were “peaceful,” he still sat in jail.  This is a source of tension.  He had 
not come to incite violence, but because “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere” and “in Birmingham because injustice is here.”39  Meanwhile, the 
injustice was that he sat in jail.  This was a cruel irony.  King does not write about 
that. 
King opens by recalling the “recent statement calling [his] present 
activities ““unwise and untimely.””40  He then questions whether there could ever 
have been a good time to call for change.41  Answering the clergy’s charges of 
taking “extreme measures,” King writes: “Lamentably, it is an historical fact that 
privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily.”42  The implication 
here is that anything like involuntary change must come by way of force.  Forcing 
change is clearly an “extreme measure.”  Any change is clearly forced for those 
who wish the situation stay the same.  It is by this logic that King is jailed.  It is in 
this logic that I find King trapped. 
King escapes.  He does force change; he escapes through the margin of a 
newspaper.  He forces change by circling both poles of the attack.  He skirts 
these bounds by finding the common grounds for so many conflicted terms.  In 
his Letter, it is in the word “tension” that he reconciles his nonviolent activities 
with charges of inciting violence. Through it, he comes to terms with two contrary 
positions at once.  In this statement, we also find a defense of his method, and 
                                            
39 M.L. King, Jr., Letter…, page 2. 
40 Ibid, page 1. 
41 Not simply a better time, but is there ever a good time for change at all on the clergy’s view. 
42 Ibid, page 3. 
 27 
 
  
philosophy.  Non-violence does not mean without force.  It means without 
violence: 
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster 
such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to 
negotiate is forced to confront the issue… Just as Socrates felt that 
it was necessary to create the tension in the mind so that 
individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to 
the unfettered realm of creative analyses and objective appraisal, 
so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create a kind of 
tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of 
prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and 
brotherhood.43 
 
When we see King in jail, forced to reconcile the tensions between 
contradictory determinations of himself, we see him dealing with the same sorts 
of tensions through which he himself forces change in others.  King’s method is 
consistent.  He believes that through this work, men can reach their highest 
potentials.  For King, this is peace and wisdom.  We will look more deeply at the 
role of tension in the conscience in the sections to come.  We will end the text 
with a look at the role of conscience in reconciling tensions between the 
individual and his objective world.  We will see the role of conscience in 
generating wisdom, and in providing for peace.  For the moment, however, I wish 
to focus on the fact that King changes the world by changing the words which 
determine it. 
King taking words to represent the way the world is, is not unusual. 
Everyone does this.  It is called language.  It is what he does with his language 
that makes the difference between this hero of conscience and the everyday man 
on the street.  King developed a language which opened a new perspective on 
                                            
43 King, Letter…, page 3. 
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the world.  Anyone can take any term to mean anything, and in terms of his life 
this is its role.  But, that doesn’t mean that these invented terms permit another to 
see his place in the world in a different light.  Some invented terms do the same 
work as do already established terms.  They don’t determine a different situation, 
they describe the same one, differently.  Ruth Chang has written that: 
If you stipulate that ‘glog’ means ‘less than a millimeter in length’, 
there is a sense in which this is what ‘glog’ means. By sheer 
stipulation, you can create a normative standard for the use of the 
word so that if you say ‘Pencils are glog’, you will have made a 
mistake.44 
 
What is of interest now is that King does what he does with a higher 
purpose in mind.  He had a calling, a dream of a better place, and it lay beyond 
the vocabulary of the given world.  The determinations of racist America and the 
American war machine did not characterize this space.  The inherited 
expressions were not useful tools, these expressions no longer named useful 
things.  These old determinations were obstacles to King’s dream of peaceful 
coexistence.  They had to be overcome.45 
 King did not stick to the conventional uses of terms.  He saw a different 
situation, and recast old terms in order to capture the order of things in that 
space.  We now live in a space of opportunity championed by King.  Our world 
was the work of his life.  We still reside in the space of his determinations.   Our 
current situation is a product of King’s new vocabulary for equality. 
                                            
44 Ruth Chang, “Personal and Impersonal Reasons,” delivered at the University of Missouri Kline 
Conference on practical reason Spring 2006, unpublished, page 3. 
45 In approaching this text, I took a similar tack.  I have taken terms given and have recast them in 
light of a great deal of new information.  I think that in doing so, what results is a view of 
conscience which is useful in terms of a changing world.  What results is a view of conscience 
consistent with today’s neurological inspection and the philosophical introspection of ages past.  I 
ask the reader to take my redefinitions in this light.  If he sticks to the conventional uses of these 
terms, the view I am describing will not line up.  Our objects will not be the same. 
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 We may ask, preliminarily: how did King come to this understanding?  
Conscience.  Picture King, again, the locus of such contrary accusations as 
“violent” and “peaceful,” working to free others from oppression while sitting 
jailed, indicted by the clergy while doing what he took to be the work of Christ.  
King had to reconcile these opposites, he had to come to terms with two contrary 
positions at once.  This is conscientiousness. 
 What does it mean to be conscientious?  It means taking up contrary 
positions and feeling the space of their difference.  Conscientiousness is opening 
one’s self to be torn apart or to reconcile these differences.  Often, contraries to 
one another evidence themselves in logical contradiction.  In King’s case, he 
must come to terms both with the situation seeing him as “violent,” and that of his 
own professed non-violence.46  How is it that he is both violent and non-violent at 
the same time?  In another case from King’s example, he must come to terms 
with the Vietnamese perspective as well as the American perspective in order to 
speak for peace between these two opposing forces in war.  This is an exercise 
of conscience. 
 If the difference between two contrary positions can be commonly 
grounded in the understanding of one life, then there is the opportunity for the 
conscientious man to express this understanding. Conscientiousness means 
understanding what may appear contrary in a way in which it is not. 
Conscientiousness here signifies a putting back together, a putting together of 
things which had come apart. Conscientiousness here means recasting the order 
                                            
46 The particular form of his reconciliation, his subjective understanding met with the objective 
understanding of himself, is the subject of the concluding movement in chapter 13. 
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of things through the determination of a new situation, a situation which makes 
sense of opposites. Conscientiousness here means doing so in order to provide 
for non-violent opportunities for the good life, for others, for their futures. 
Conscientiousness here means doing the right thing. 
 Conscientiousness is a special mode of conscience.  I think that this is 
also the mode in which philosophy is done.  I have in life tried to emulate a 
similar mode.47  I hope in this work to open a similar opportunity for others by 
detailing the modes of conscience which provide for reconciliation.  This 
conscientious way of life is, for my money, the only life worth living, but it will take 
some work to see this clearly. 
                                            
47 For all appearances otherwise. 
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3.  Conscience, and the different faces of the right thing to do. 
 
 
 
It is the consistency with which the terms of one’s situation are maintained 
which points to the apparent continuity of our conscious lives.  It is the regularity 
of the world which invites habitual modes of engagement with the objects of the 
world.  Habit, the regularity of being in the world, depends on a world whose 
appearances are also regular.  In times of crisis, for example, habits tend to fail 
to deliver their regular results.  Persons tend to avoid crisis.  Why?  It is the 
smooth play of habit which protects us from terminal distraction, from anxious 
uncertainty, and from existing as selves not constant enough to constitute that 
sense of “I” with which we are more or less familiar. 
Crisis also calls into question what we call “virtue.”  Depending on the 
situation, different virtues seem to fit.  Bravery in battle, temperance in daily 
affairs, honesty in discourse.  But, when these fields are torn in crisis, things look 
differently.  What is brave in a route.  What is temperate in a drought.  What is 
honest in uncertainty?  Once the order to which a virtue is suited crumbles, it is 
not a virtue.  Virtues are the right thing but only in the right contexts.  Persons 
tend to construct and to stick in those contexts which suit whatever it is they take 
to be their virtues.  This is a sort of bondage, being stuck in a given situation. 
One mode of conscience, however, gives insight into a virtue which suits 
every situation.  This virtue is practical wisdom, and the mode of conscience 
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which generates practical wisdom is that in which one is open to meet the terms 
of any given situation.  One does not become wise by simply doing the same 
things in the same situations.  One becomes wise by doing different things in 
different situations.  As conscience has to do with doing the right in any given 
situation, conscience depends on wisdom to see its way through to the right thing 
to do. 
Our discussion on these two meets in the universal structure of every 
situation.  There is a universal structure to each and every moment, every 
beginning and end of every unique action.  It is in this universal structure that the 
search for the virtue which suits every unique situation begins. 
There is a long tradition of qualifying an action, good or bad, right or 
wrong, according to a principle, kairos.  Kairos may be translated as “time, place 
and circumstance.”48  Kairos names the ancient Greek daimon of opportunity.49  
The term is also translated as “opportune moment.”50  I understand it to mean, 
generally, the situation which calls for action, and in terms of which an action is 
evaluated as either good or bad.  For example, if it is raining, and the situation 
calls for action, the right thing to do is to wear a raincoat.51  If it is not raining, 
however, wearing a raincoat simply doesn’t fit.  If one holds open the door, that is 
the opportunity to pass.  If she closes it, then that action no longer fits.  Every 
moment, raining or not, big or small shares this kairological constraint.  The 
                                            
48 Definition from Lanham, 1991. 
49 http://www.theoi.com/Daimon/Kairos.html 
50 http://english.ecu.edu/~wpbanks/rhetoric/ra4_kairos.html 
51 Another translation of kairos is “weather.” 
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situations which call for action range from epic to instant.  That opportunities are 
present to do the right thing in each is universal. 
Kairos describes that at which all actions aim.  The understanding 
required to meet the terms of any given situation that calls for action is called 
practical wisdom.52  If there is a house fire, and a kitten needs rescuing, the 
practically wise man understands how to save the kitten and in the right way 
depending on this unique situation.  Practical wisdom is the “capacity to arrive 
each time at something new, namely, the correct logos for the current 
situation.”53  By logos, what is meant here is the form of the practice which fits 
the situation requiring action.  The logos is not the action, but the terms which 
define the action which fits the moment.  The practically wise man does not have 
to do the saving.  He must only have the understanding to determine which 
action is the right action at the right time.54 
Stanley Rosen characterizes logos in this context as the product of a 
decision.  On Rosen’s view, one chooses to do the right thing at the right time.  
To be able to make this choice, however, one must recognize the opportunity to 
do so.  “But, this decision is itself dependent upon the general knowledge of 
human nature, and so of human affairs.”55  This simply means that doing the right 
thing is dependent on practical wisdom.  Practical wisdom, thus, is what informs 
                                            
52 See Brickhouse and Smith for a compelling argument to the effect that wisdom is the single 
highest virtue, of which all others are some modification depending on context of application. 
53 Rosen, 252. 
54 If the practically wise man finds a solution to a problem that has yet to arise, and dies before 
his solution is utilized, he is still practically wise. 
55 Ibid. 
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deliberate action, and that which makes doing the right thing at the right time a 
possibility, in the first place. 
Kairos indicates, and for some persons primarily indicates, a situation 
whose appropriate action is required by god(s).  In these persons’ minds, god(s) 
is(are) the objective constraint on right action, and the source of the motivation of 
conscience to meet these constraints. Kairos, thus, denotes an intersection 
between the instantaneous and the eternal.  Kairos is where a man meets his 
destiny.  Kairos is the space of the Moment with a capital “M”.   
Conscience, on this view, is a “seat of judgment” that is divinely inspired to 
meet the terms of these Moments.  Some situations are so special as to call for 
acts whose purposes remain hidden from the agent, though which remain 
presumably clear to the mind of his god(s).  Practical wisdom would appear to 
have limited benefit in such instances, as there is only the divine command to be 
pursued. 
The commands of a higher power are expressed in religious systems.  
Religion, on this view, takes the place of practical wisdom in providing the 
grounds for doing the right thing at the right time. Common religious rituals are 
intended to represent the conditions of such a situation and take the place of 
practical wisdom as the “capacity to arrive each time at something new, namely, 
the correct logos for the current situation.”  Indoctrinated accordingly, the agent is 
prepared so that he may seize the opportune moment, so that through him his 
god(s)’s will is done.56  For the ecclesiarch, kairos refers to that moment of 
                                            
56As Andrew Newberg writes: “In this case, the transcendent experience is more than just space-
time oriented; it is related to a creative and immanent force to which one can respond through 
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fulfillment which is an instantiation of the will of god.  The rituals of prayer and 
congregation simply prepare the individual conscience to be the site for god’s 
agency. 
 Even the most mundane moments have a similar shape as do the 
mystical.  There is a kairological structure in little “m” moments, too.  Simply 
recall the cases of a pen found or lost on the chance of a late bus, or a dog found 
or lost on the chance of a speeding truck, or a pizza hot or cold on the chance of 
heavy traffic.  There is no need to recruit a deity to account for the temporal 
structure of objective requirements of right action in these cases.  The pizza 
delivery driver does both that of which he is able and that which is required.  As 
the light changes, and the traffic swells and slows, he moves toward his end, 
your hungry house.  Good or bad is merely late or early.  There is always the 
right thing to do and the right time to do it.  Sometimes, people simply miss the 
opportunity.  Some pizzas seem destined to arrive cold. 
This aspect of the temporal structure of kairos, where man or pizza meet 
destiny, is preserved in every moment from answering the call of god(s) to the 
most mundane, from saving the world to reading a map well enough to ring a 
doorbell. There is a culmination, a moment when everything adds up.  In the little 
“m” instance, it is the guy who ordered the pizza who evaluates whether the 
terms of the moment are met or not.  In the capital “M” instance, if it is god, then I 
must meet the terms of the great thin-crust orderer in the sky.57  In either case, 
                                                                                                                                  
religion and religious experience.”  Newberg, page 506.  Though, not necessarily through religion.  
ACTWith conscience captures the essence of this “force” without recourse to supernatural or 
mystical devices. 
57 And we, we are just delivery drivers. 
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kairos names an essential feature of every moment.  It simply doesn’t seem so 
significant with its everyday face on. 
What is most significant about everyday moments is that each becomes 
another and another and another.  Each has a predecessor, a presence, and a 
progenitor.  Because of their everydayness, however, this series is often 
neglected.  The most significant moments of a person’s life arise less often.  Yet, 
it is these that become the most significant in the course of a life.  It is these 
which become the rolling drama of one life’s story.  When caught in reflection, 
recounting the story of life, persons tend to remember being at weddings, and at 
funerals, and not at the coffeepot.  Furthermore, it is the big moments, the 
moments with the capital “M’s” which persons dread, or become anxious about.  
Here, there is climax, and catharsis.  Amongst these are the moment of death, 
the moment of birth, and the moment a loved one will be leaving forever.  All of 
this happens in the space of a moment, and then it is gone.   The powers to avert 
it, or to avoid it, or aver it, are beyond that of one’s mortal coil.   It is no wonder 
that these moments leave many calling after a god.  This is the character of 
kairos. 
Kairos has traditionally been understood in epistemic and in rhetorical 
terms.  The temporal structure of every moment in either case is retained. 
Epistemically, kairos points to the context dependency of what epistemologists 
call knowledge and moral theorists call the right thing to do.  This implication is 
implicit in our discussion above.  I repeat it here in these terms because it leads 
to a second epistemic implication.  It is in terms of one’s situation that one comes 
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to know the world, at all.  Knowledge, itself, is context dependent, and only 
comes by way of coming to terms with one’s situation. 
For instance, in a world of honest persons, it might be counted as 
knowledge that lying is a bad thing to do.  In a different context, say, one more 
like today’s society of business in our latter-day capitalism, lying is a good thing, 
and one is more knowledgeable if one lies well, and less knowledgeable if one 
lies poorly.58  Together, these two epistemic implications imply that meeting the 
terms of the moments of one’s life shapes the person one becomes.  All in all, 
this not a surprising result.  Hard times lead to hard men with heavy hearts and 
broad shoulders.  Hard times lead to men who have known hard times. 
Rhetorically, the temporal structure of kairos offers three different 
perspectives, and three different modes of delivery.  The mode corresponding to 
the past delivers a judgment, or a report of information.  The future oriented 
delivery seeks to persuade the audience that some thing is upcoming, or that 
some practice or action will meet the terms of approaching times better or less 
well than others.  The third mode captures each of the three temporal aspects 
more explicitly.  This is the mode of demonstration.  This mode takes place in 
“real-time,” “live” so to speak.   
                                            
58 In these terms, we can easily invent the following exchange: 
 Real-Estate Rookie- I figured if I tell the truth about the homes I represent, then I will build 
better relationships with customers, and this will help business. 
 Real-Estate Veteran- You’ll learn your lesson. 
Sadly, this sort of exchange is so common as to be expected.  Here, what one knows prescribes 
what is counted good or bad.  After a few experiences, the rookie will have to come to terms with 
the situation; everyone else is a liar.  And, to succeed, even in the short term, he may learn the 
lesson that it is good to lie, too. 
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A very simple example of a demonstration which displays all three aspects 
of the temporal structure is that of a chemical demonstration.  I am thinking of 
that common demonstration in elementary chemistry, an iodine clock.  With 
starch and iodine, a color change can be demonstrated to occur at a specifiable 
time all within the scope of the demonstration.  In such a demonstration, there is 
a beginning, a middle, and an end.  The beginning state is clear liquid swirling in 
a flask.  The middle is a transition from an ionic to a molecular form of Iodine in 
solution signaled by a swirling cloud of purple color first forming and then filling 
the flask.  The end is this saturated color, with the reactive ingredients spent, and 
the swirling slowing to a stop.  The demonstration is over. 
The entirety of a life can be seen in terms of this structure, as well as 
every moment along its way.  Its details are not as tidy as are those of the iodine 
clock.  However, we can imagine a person’s life beginning in the beaker of the 
womb.  In the middle, out of the womb and then out into the world, he changes.  
The beaker changes. He mirrors others, and their reactions, and their reaction 
vessels.  He changes to suit the beaker or changes the beaker to suit himself 
and others.  The reaction takes off, and slows, spurting along in the swirling 
course of life.  This is one’s self, a living demonstration of enduring change in 
situ.  As change slows, the reaction comes to a stop, and life ends.  This is the 
time of one’s life. 
Understanding that this describes a necessary structure is critical to 
understanding the conscience.  As a fundamental structure of demonstration, this 
structure holds for any demonstration including that of a human life.  There is an 
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endpoint to the reaction.  Persons are motivated to find a comfortable situation.  
Conscience motivates by holding out situations as ends.  In the case of the entire 
lifetime, conscience holds out the best situation as that toward which one is 
drawn.59  This situation orients the person, when he is in the middle of his life.  It 
draws him on to his own end.  Conscience thus holds out the situation at the end 
of reaction.  It is in terms of this end that the middle has any meaning.  This is a 
life with a purpose. 
Let’s look further into the relation between kairos and conscience.  Where 
kairos seems to indicate objective constraints, conscience appears to differ in 
that it is most familiar from the first person perspective.  A conscience is always 
some unique person’s conscience.  A persons’ conscience is what motivates an 
individual person to do the right thing. Kairos points to the fact that the right 
action is contextually dependent, and every context has a temporal structure.  In 
terms of conscience, kairos indicates contextually dependent objective 
constraints on right action.  For every instant there is a right thing to do, no 
matter how minimal and no matter how distant.  The trick is getting one’s self in a 
position to do it. 
                                            
59 Global attractor defined by basic system states determined discretely by terms of experience. 
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4.  Conscience, and how to do the right thing at the right time. 
 
 
“Only he who understands is able to listen” 
  -- Martin Heidegger.60 
 
In this section, we will begin to better realize what we mean when we say 
“conscience.”  Also, in this section, I will add to our vocabulary of conscience by 
reinterpreting certain terms in light of their supporting roles.  Taken altogether, 
these terms should begin to fill out the new view of conscience which is our 
focus. 
We have just seen that every opportunity for action has a common 
temporal structure.  I take the common object of every action to be that it meet 
the terms of the situation calling for action in the first place, and this means the 
right thing at the right time.  If it does so, the action is successful in meeting the 
terms of the situation at which the action aims.  
All ends and all beginnings of actions are situations, which provide 
opportunities to move to other ends.  Every situation is a position within a world 
of objects.  Conscience holds these situations in comparison, opening the space 
of difference between them.  It is the differences between these situations which 
provide the motivational force of the conscience.  I will now briefly describe a 
view of intension which elucidates the motivational force of these differences, 
and thereby the directing force of the conscience. 
                                            
60 Being and Time, page 154(165) 
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I had indicated above that persons with particular virtues tend to seek 
those situations in which their virtues are, well, virtuous.  Being so motivated, 
however, is nothing special to human beings. In my view, conscience is a basic 
operation of any organism in the world with the capacity to retain and then to 
compare what it feels like to be in a given situation relative to another, whether 
these be ends of fairy tales or simple meals.  All organisms are essentially 
evaluative; each has a sense of the good place and the bad.61  Some fish stay in 
warm waters, some in cold, some bacteria in reductive environments, some in 
oxidative.  Some persons stay safely sunbaked even within failing traditions, 
while others set foundation stones for new philosophies in the rain. 
Conscience motivates according to one’s capacities to meet the terms of 
the situations held up for comparison.  This is because, if one attains some end, 
he will have to live there, and moreover he will embody the experience of having 
come to terms with that situation.  When ends are uncertain, or unselfish, only 
some modes of conscience are open to the risk. 
Consistent with this view of conscience as embodied source of motivation, 
I analyze motivation in terms of intension. First, let’s consider the easy case; the 
case of an individual intension.  By intension, I mean “in-“ “-tension”, an internal 
feeling of unrest, like a spring stretched out from one point to another.62  
Consider this.  When we are satisfied, say like Socrates sitting, we are at rest.63  
                                            
61 See Rolston, page 97. 
62Kant uses the notion of a spring to describe conscience much as I intend it, herein, as we will 
see in greater depth later on. 
63Rest is classically illustrated as Socrates sitting, and for later Plato in the form of a chair.  Both 
of these indicate low-energy resting states; the chair is merely the form in which sitting occurs.  
Anything sittable is a chair, though not the ideal chair properly speaking.  The ideal chair is the 
most comfortable place to rest. 
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Satisfied with where we are, we are without tension.  Now, when we feel some 
need, and its source of satisfaction is not here with us, we have to get up and get 
it.  A gap appears between the thing we need and the position at which we were 
at rest.  To get there, to this better place, we must expend energy. 
On my view of conscience as spring, the spring must stretch to an end 
and pull oneself up to it.  The end to which it must stretch is that which it reveals 
as a situation up ahead to be reached.  Ends which are distant, or difficult, are 
themselves a source of strain, especially when energy is scarce.  It is not a 
comfortable feeling when one must be in some situation, and be at once unable 
to be there.  So, persons tend to move to ends which alleviate tension with the 
least effort to themselves.  Often enough, this leads to habitual modes of being in 
convention and routine.64  For example, there is no sense walking out of one’s 
way to turn the lights on if one navigates the dark room well enough to satisfy his 
needs.  The extra effort, from this perspective, seems senseless.  We will have 
more to say about this in the following pages. 
Picture Socrates walking, talking, and setting the course for the ideal 
Republic, for example.  Unsatisfied with where he’s at, with the situation at the 
beginning, he moves toward rest, towards a place in which he is satisfied and 
may again find rest.  This basic picture works for every case:  The hungry man 
wants a bologna sandwich.  A tension develops.  He walks to the fridge and 
builds one.  Then he eats it, moving in this series from dissatisfaction to 
                                            
64 Slavery for instance can be explained in this way: it’s easier to make someone less powerful 
suffer than to suffer one’s self. 
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satisfaction, empty to full.  The feeling, internal, of the tension between 
dissatisfaction and satisfaction, I call “intension.”6566 
This gap of intension is both spatial and temporal.  It takes time to close 
the distance between a here and a there, and, together with the mass moved 
across this space, these are the measure of the energy required to do this work.  
Again, picture a spring, first at rest at point A, then stretched from points A to B, 
then at rest again at point B.  In other words, there is a certain energetic 
expenditure involved in the closure of the gap; this is the tension in an intension, 
to my thinking.67  Tension is the difference between unrest and rest.  Generally, 
in plotting the course across such spaces, people take the easiest road their little 
minds can imagine; nobody wants their spring over-sprung.  What persons and 
springs both seek is rest.  The more tension, the more forceful the movement. 
Consider this.  It takes a number of calories to do anything from getting up 
to change the television channel to pushing a button to reach that same end.  In 
either case, we intend to close a gap between this programming and some other.  
Considering the on-the-spot energetic expenditure of getting up to change the 
channel – after all, couch potatoes are heavy! - it is not surprising that most 
people use a clicker to eliminate the tension.  In any event, this gap, and the 
                                            
65 So, a space of intension which will not close is addiction, or incontinence, or love. 
66 This view is Socratic.  One’s body feels “empty” while his memory of past satisfactions 
motivates him to find something to fill his emptiness.  I am reminded of the following passages 
from the Philebus: 
Socrates: Do we mean anything when we say "a man thirsts"? 
Protarchus: Yes.  
Soc: We mean to say that he "is empty"?  
Pro: Of course.  
Soc: And is not thirst desire?  
Pro: Yes, of drink.  
Soc: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink? 
Pro: I should say, of replenishment with drink. 
67 In other contexts, I call this what it is, a “work function.” 
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feeling of needing to close it, I call “in-tension,” or, intension, and the feeling of 
tension is proportional to the energetic requirement of getting from here to there.  
All that is left is figuring the path to closure, and this has to do with practical 
reason, not conscience per se.  Conscience simply provides the grounds for the 
motivation to have the channel changed by comparing the present situation, in 
which the show is a rerun, and another situation, in which something new and 
exciting is playing.68  The felt difference between these two situations motivates 
the man to change the channel.  The man needs to be entertained. 
What I am describing here is the way in which spaces between situations 
open up.  I have described how this happens on the basis of a feeling of need.  
This is not a feeling of which one must be conscious.  As the gap between 
situations opens in terms of need, then, persons move to close it as efficiently as 
they are able.  The feeling of being in need is the internal tension that is the felt 
ground of intension.  Of course, some gaps are more difficult to close than 
others, and it feels this way.  It is harder to ride 20 miles than it is 10 for a cup of 
coffee.  Unless it is 10 uphill and 20 down, or the 10 is ridden standing up and 
the 20 lying down, or the 10 with higher speed, and the 20 lower.  In the Tour de 
France, for example, each rider rides the same distance and the same hills; each 
rider intends to finish the race, to cross the distance, to close the gap between 
beginning and end.  The winner rides fastest of all; he closes the gap between 
                                            
68 However, even practical reason depends on the experience of being in different situations to 
figure how best to meet the terms of any end of action; this experience in meeting the terms of 
different situations is practical wisdom.  To say much more will take us far from our present 
course, however this matter bears one additional comment.  Smart critters may bridge gaps with 
minimal energy, but practically wise critters open gaps between more ends which are more fully 
determined. 
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start and finish in the least time.  He pays the energetic cost of closing the gap 
before any other rider.  It is good to win. 
Now, all organisms are essentially evaluative, they move from places of 
need to places of satisfaction, or move satisfaction into them, where this 
satisfaction is the good.  The good motivates, unless it is already realized.  For a 
professional cyclist, it is good to win, until he has won and then it is good to rest.  
One may even refer to some especially consistent cyclists as “pedaling 
machines.”  Yet, there is a potential difference between a cyclist and a machine, 
at least insofar as there has been presumed any difference between a man and a 
machine whatsoever.  A machine, an automaton, is one for whom the good, and 
so motivation, is already given. 
Persons, however, appear to have a capacity to do otherwise.  This is 
what philosophers call freedom, or free-will.  I believe that conscience is the 
source of this freedom.  Let me explain. 
Freedom is evidenced by a sense that things could be otherwise.  In 
human beings, this capacity is pronounced.  Persons routinely imagine what it is 
like to be in a better place, or a worse one, to be another person, a winning 
cyclist or a supermodel or a superhero.69  Persons routinely imagine what it is 
like to be another person, and even emulate them, and become alike to them.  All 
of this begins with a comparison of places, positions, or perspectives, views, or 
scenes.  All of these are situations, recalling that they are defined as those 
spaces in which lives are lived and lost, spaces in which beings of all sorts are 
                                            
69 This capacity extends beyond one’s own race, and includes putting oneself in the place of any 
other being, a bug, bat or a stone. 
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situated, that is, in which they come to rest, to sit, at the beginning and end of 
every action in life. 
If ends are fully determined by needs, then there is no freedom that things 
could be otherwise.  Necessary ends are simply that: necessary.  There are 
instances in life, however, when the needs which require action are met.  
Imagine what it must be like to have a dissertation finished.  Imagine this from 
the perspective whereby for as long as can be remembered there has been only 
writing, incessantly, and editing all day everyday.  From the perspective of the 
work finished, the work needed to be done.  There was simply no getting around 
it.  In this case, when what needs to be done is finally finished, there may be an 
opportunity to deliberate over ends which are not necessary.  One may think 
about jumping from a bridge, for example.70  With needs met, there is an 
opportunity to deliberate over ends unattached to any object of need.  One may 
make it an end to simply stand and wonder at the way that butterflies fly, for 
example.  For Socrates, this opportunity is where philosophy comes in, and 
where practical wisdom is so important.  Where there is the time, there is 
opportunity. 
Socrates stresses the need for a certain leisure in Philosophic thought, 
and by this he means being unbound, free to think of any thing because he is not 
tied by need to any particular end. In free deliberation, in leisurely thought, no 
action is required. Thus, Socratic leisure is liberation from need.  Likewise, 
without any need requiring action, whatever ends appear in deliberation are not 
necessary. A man is free to deliberate insofar as he is at leisure, and insofar as 
                                            
70 With a bungy cord, of course.  Clearly not a necessary action. 
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he is able.  That is, insofar as he is not tied to some end of necessity he is 
through philosophy able to consider others.  The determinations of these others 
are constrained by his own understanding, at first, and by the other’s if one is 
open to it.  In opening to other situations, one comes to have more practical 
wisdom about what ends are possible, and what ends are good.  If one has a 
great deal of practical wisdom, he is able to deliberate over more ends, and find 
the value in others’.  The capacity for Socratic philosophy can be developed 
through an increase in practical wisdom.  Should someone wish to be a Socratic 
philosopher, opportunities for practical wisdom are to be sought after.  We shall 
return to this theme as the text closes. 
Let’s review this picture for a moment.  Picture Socrates walking to get a 
drink because he feels a need for water.  The tension between one situation, 
thirsty, and another, satiated, motivates him to bridge the gap between these two 
positions.  Having had his drink, Socrates is now standing.  He has no pressing 
need.  He is, so to speak, free from need, liberated.  Here, in the space of this 
moment, he has an opportunity to deliberate.  Beginning with where he had 
been, he thinks of where he is, and wonders what to do next.  Hereby, he opens 
himself to the opportunities of the moment. 
Practical wisdom thus bears on kairos.  Not everyone recognizes the 
same opportunities in the same space of time.  It is as if these persons live in 
different moments, altogether.  They do take different perspectives, and are 
differently situated.  It is the practically wise man who sees the opportunities in 
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the situation when others do not.  This is a valuable skill, as opportunities tend to 
rush all too quickly by. 
For the Greeks, Kairos was signified in human form.  The daimon Kairos, 
minor deity of opportunity, is depicted as a sprinter.  He has no hair and no 
clothes but for a single lock hanging forward over his face.  This figure is 
intended to capture the elusive nature of the opportune moment.  If he is seen 
coming, at all, he may be grabbed by his forward lock and the opportunity seized.  
He is only there for a moment, and then he is past.  From behind, there is nothing 
to hold onto, nothing to grab.  This signifies the fact that, once an opportunity 
passes, the moment is gone, and there is no way of bringing it back. 
It is the practically wise man who sees the opportunities coming when 
others do not.  It is practical wisdom which is the “capacity to arrive each time at 
something new, namely, the correct logos for the current situation.”  It is the 
conscience which holds the situations which result from these opportunities and 
compares them, as if one had taken this or that action.  It is the conscience which 
compares these ends of opportune action, and evaluates their relative worth. In 
order to gain practical wisdom, in the first place, however, one must be 
conscientious.  This is being open to coming to terms with others’ and upcoming 
situations.  In understanding another’s situation, one comes to terms with things 
in other ways than those which suit his own routines.  This is understanding that 
can be brought to bear in coming to terms with onrushing situations, and in 
helping others to do the same.  This is especially important in critical times, 
changing times, when one’s own limited understanding lies in question and one’s 
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own future is uncertain.  This is when practical wisdom is most valuable, and 
when conscience is the guide.  Thus, to discover opportunity in the world to do 
the right thing at the right time for one’s self and others alike requires both. 
In the following section, I will present a game which demonstrates this 
relationship.  Through this illustration, I will present the basics of the ACTWith 
model of conscience.  This model will be enriched through the sections to follow.  
We will rejoin the following game in the final section of this text. 
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5.  Conscience, and the limits of experience. 
 
“Why, haven’t you learned anything in your time with me?” 
“No sir.  I have learned that a man will do anything for a potato.” 
    -- The Empire of the Sun 
 
 
Persons, at their best, have the hardest time doing the most basic calculus 
while at once having a great and under-appreciated genius, to see and to feel as 
if some other, more or less like themselves, in spaces of life of which they have 
had no actual experience, and without consciously directing their attention to the 
task.  The native ease of this conscientious exercise explains why there are so 
few who profess to be mathematicians, and so many who profess to know what 
is right, for themselves, for now, and for everyone else at every other place. 
Nonetheless, what the following text develops is a calculus of the good, a 
logic of conscience. The idea is a simple one.  Conscience is “con-” “-science”, 
the motivating comparison of fields of objects arrayed according to purpose.  
One’s purposeful relation with objects determines the value of the position in 
which those relations hold. Persons are positional.  Positions are that in terms of 
which things like persons live, in which (and through action) they are (and 
become) situated.  To be situated is to be in a position. Conscience, roughly, 
compares positions. 
The ACTWith model operates through two essential movements.  The “as-
if” is a taking up of a perspective or an adoption of a point of view.  The as-if is 
putting one’s self into a situation.  It is a function of mirroring another situation.  It 
has two basic modes.  One is either open to another situation, one’s self or 
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another’s, or closed to it.71  Adam Smith captures the sense of openness to 
another situation, which may be our own different situation, in the following 
passage: 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into 
his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, 
and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel 
something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike 
them. 72 
  
This is the “as-if” of another situation.  The “coming to terms with” is 
coming to an understanding of what it is to be in that position.  It is determining 
what it is like to be in a certain situation.  This has to do with enduring the 
limitations and enjoying the opportunities of any given situation.  One comes to 
terms with another situation by opening to it, instead of imposing a prior 
understanding on the situation.  The terms to which one comes are those which 
he then brings to his next situation.  These determinations he employs in his 
conscientious comparison of different situations.  Adam Smith captures this 
aspect of the operation in the following lines: 
His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when 
we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to 
affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what 
he feels.73 
 
In coming to terms with a situation, one feels it out, perhaps actively searches for 
clues, and comes to an understanding of what it is like to be in that position.  One 
                                            
71 I draw an explicit connection between closure and disgust in the appendices, and introduce this 
talk in the section on Kant. 
72 Adam Smith, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” page I.I.2.  There are very interesting results 
from neuroscience which empirically confirm this picture.  See especially the work of Gallese, 
Kohler, and Ochsner amongst others as cited in bibliography. 
73 Ibid. 
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is “brought home,” as-if it were his situation, and in his residence he comes to 
understand his place.  The more terms one has come to, the more terms can be 
brought to bear in understanding other positions.  The fewer terms he has come 
to, the greater danger there is in imposing these limited terms on any given 
situation.  To come to terms with a situation, in either case, one must relax his 
prior understanding in order to take the situation as it presents itself.  There can 
be no new understanding if a prior understanding is merely imposed on the 
moment.  This goes no matter how wise one becomes. 
There are four fundamental modes of the ACTWith model of conscience.  
These correspond with the open or closed modes of the two constitutive 
operations of the model, “as-if” and “coming to terms with”: 
As-if (closed) = one’s own situation, insofar as one has prior 
understanding thereof, is at issue. 
As-if (open) = one is open to another situation as the issue: “we enter, as it 
were, into his body.”74 
Coming to terms with (closed) = one’s own understanding is imposed in 
evaluation of the situation. 
Coming to terms with (open) = one is open for clues to another 
understanding to be adopted in evaluation of the situation: “and we then tremble 
and shudder at the thought of what he feels.”  By “the thought of what he feels,” I 
see Smith noting coming to terms with the situation.75 
These simple operations lead to four possible permutations: 
                                            
74 In most basic terms, I see this mechanism as one of disgust/love. 
75 This has to do with taking situation modeling offline from bodily updates. 
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As-if (closed) coming to terms with (closed) 
As-if (open) coming to terms with (closed) 
As-if (closed) coming to terms with (open) 
As-if (open) coming to terms with (open) 
Now that I have described these modes of the ACTWith model of 
conscience, I will describe the attitudes they bring with them.  To facilitate the 
illustration, I have invented a simple game involving scarce resources which 
makes explicit the moral implications of these basic modes of conscience. Think 
of the following simple case.  Two hungry persons are in a bare room and one of 
them has a potato.  The potato is freshly baked and salted, ready for eating. The 
potato will completely satisfy one of them, and in this game can be split.  
However, only one of these persons, call him 0, has ever missed a meal.  The 
other person, call him 1, does not know what it is like to be hungry, and to remain 
hungry.   He has never had to come to terms with unsatisfied hunger, and he 
hasn’t ever seen anyone else go through it either.  So, he has had no opportunity 
to know what it is like to have hunger go unsatisfied. 
1, when hungry, always has had a potato fresh and ready to eat so as to 
satisfy the hunger; he stays filled up, so to speak.  0, however, knows what it is 
like to stay empty.  However, he also knows what it is to eat.  He has come to 
terms with either situation, and brings this understanding into the game. 
The game as described is a one-off game.  This only happens once, so 
the understanding generated in this run does not affect what the agents do with 
the potato.  A one-off game involves players who are not interested in learning 
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anything, or in teaching each other any lessons. The agents themselves expect 
not to gain understanding in playing this game, or at least nothing useful in 
further life.  It all happens once.  They act only according to prior understanding. 
We will look at what any of the four modes looks like when habitually applied 
after we discuss the one-off situation.  The focus on a single transaction allows a 
glimpse at a critical moment, where the rubber of wisdom meets the road of life, 
so to speak. 
Now, consider what happens if 1 begins with the potato. 0 is present and 
hungry.  1 has four basic perspectives available on the model given, above: 
1) c/c.  Closed to the perspective of the other, closed to the terms of the 
other’s situation.  Having never come to terms with hunger, and having no 
experience what it is like to have hunger unsatisfied, 1 eats the potato blissfully 
ignorant of what it is like to be affected by the terms which he imposes on the 
other, unabated hunger.76 
2) o/c.  Open to the perspective of the other, closed to the terms of the 
other’s situation.  Having never come to terms with hunger, and having no idea 
what it is like to have hunger unsatisfied, he eats the potato understanding that if 
the other were in his shoes, he would eat the potato too!77  Though he may 
wonder why the other is getting so upset, he has no terms to begin 
understanding that condition. 
                                            
76 If the 0 resorts to force, imposing his own terms to secure ½ of the potato, 1 faults him for doing 
the wrong thing [remember the clergymen’s indictment of King while he sat in jail] and returns or 
preempts attack when possible.  Likely, over many iterations, perhaps over many generations, 1 
extracts a rule such that anyone without a potato cannot be trusted to respect the property rights 
of the potato bearer.  Not because they are hungry, but because they have no potato, is the issue 
for the agent whose experience is deficient in the relevant way. 
77 If the agent were to learn from the game, he likely extracts a rule such that whoever has a 
potato should eat the potato. 
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3) c/o.  Closed to the perspective of the other, open to the terms of the 
situation.  Though having never come to terms with hunger, and with no idea of 
what it is like to have hunger unsatisfied, he eats the potato while witnessing the 
other come to terms with his situation, which is unsatisfied hunger.  1 thus comes 
to terms with hunger, but he is “brought home” to it in a limited way.  Hunger is 
still something he has not felt, but has only understood as a difference between 
himself and the other without the potato.  By the expression on 0’s hungry face, 
he begins to understand the value of the potato.   
4) o/o.  Open to the other’s perspective, and open to the terms of the 
situation.  Though having never come to terms with hunger, and with no idea of 
what it is like to have hunger unsatisfied, he gives the potato to the other.  
Coming to terms with unabated hunger generates an understanding of what it is 
like to have no potato. 
What this description is intended to illustrate is the role which prior 
experience plays in the determination of the right thing to do.  On the basis of this 
prior experience, 1 had no understanding going into the game of the real value of 
the potato, for he had never gone without one.  On the basis of the terms 
available to his evaluation, he only shares the potato in the open/open mode.  
This is the mode which invites doing the work of enduring changing situations, 
and coming to terms with them.  The fruit of which is an understanding of another 
situation in the fullest possible light.  In going hungry, if he were to learn from his 
experience, 1 becomes wiser.  In the other modes, the result is variable. 
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Let us consider this same set of options from the perspective of agent 0.  
0 has four basic perspectives from the model given, above: 
1) c/c.  Closed to the other’s perspective, and closed to the terms of the 
situation.  Though having come to terms with hunger, and with a good idea of 
what it is like to have hunger unsatisfied, he eats the potato closed to the other’s 
suffering intent only on filling the nagging hole in his own empty belly.78 
2) o/c.  Open to the perspective of the other, and closed to the terms of 
the other’s situation.  Having come to terms with hunger, himself, and with this 
understanding of what it is like to have hunger unsatisfied, he shares the 
potato.79 
3) c/o.  Closed to the perspective of the other, and open to the terms of 
the other’s situation.  Having lacked a potato at some point prior and with the 
resultant understanding of what it is to go hungry, 0, open to the hungry situation 
of the other, shares the potato.   
4) o/o.  Open to the perspective of the other, and open to the terms of the 
other’s situation, with an understanding of what it is to go hungry, 0 shares the 
potato if he does not give it away completely.80 
What this description is intended to illustrate is the role which prior 
experience plays in the determination of the right thing to do.  On the basis of this 
prior experience, 0 had understanding going into the game of the real value of 
the potato, for he had gone without one.  On the basis of the terms available to 
his evaluation, then, he only fails to share the potato in the closed/closed mode. 
                                            
78 Think responsive to the body, as-if one’s bodily needs were the situation. 
79 Likely expecting the other will do the same in reversed situations. 
80 This is the mode of the martyr, of selfless charity and love. 
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 The agents in the preceding illustration are what is called “ideal.”  That is, 
they are not very realistic.  Realistically, persons learn from experience.  Further, 
there is a great deal to be said about the ways in which feelings of others are 
mirrored in the brains of human beings, especially important in the development 
of the infant into the adult form of the organism.  But these discussions would 
take us far from where we need to be next. 
 What if this were more than a one-off game?  What if the agents didn’t 
simply share potatoes?  What if these were real people who simply adopted 
certain modes in certain situations habitually throughout life?  Then, we would 
have a picture of a more realistic conscientious agent.  These agents have a 
character.  The following short discussion will introduce themes to be reckoned 
with through the rest of the text. 
We can make a bit more of the four basic modes to represent the dynamic 
whereby an agent comes to terms with a situation.  The first two permutations 
represent modes which are closed to the world, and the latter two modes which 
are open to the world.  Openness implies taking the world on the world’s terms. 
This openness appears variously as charity, giving the benefit of the doubt, and 
the mode of genuine inquiry.  Closedness, on the other hand, implies going on as 
if one’s own determinations were adequate to assess the situation.  This is the 
space of habit, routine, and prior programming.  This is the space of egoism. 
 It is through being open to the world that one comes to new 
determinations of different situations.  This openness leads to increased 
understanding, and this is brought with the person into his next situation.  But 
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there is a price to pay for an understanding that comes by way of remaining open 
to the changing terms of other situations, and not closing off to the world, instead 
of proceeding simply on the basis of one’s own prior understanding.81  This price 
comes in the form of turbulence.  This mode of conscience is open to the terms 
of the situation even if these appear, on the basis of past experience, chaotic.  
The price lies in exposing one’s self to crises, and in the anxiety that comes with 
uncertainty, especially when that uncertainty attaches to where one is going to 
end up next!  Staying open to the world is hard work. 
This points to a crucial asymmetry in the relationship between the “as-if” 
and the “coming to terms with” parts of the model.  This is that terms which have 
been come to in past experience become definitive of the self in further 
experience.  So, prior experience is pushed forward in this mode.  One is as-if 
what one has come to terms with.  However, in being open to the world, prior 
experience is not taken to determine the new situation.  For instance, in the 
mode of o/c, one feels as-if another only insofar as his past experience allows an 
insight into his situation.  This is characterized as caring about some one without 
actually caring for them.  In this mode, one may give a gift of one’s own favorite 
candy to a diabetic friend.  In the o/o mode, this asymmetry appears differently.  
One can remain open to another situation and in effect mirror what it is to be in 
that other situation, and await for clues to present themselves as to what it is to 
be in that position when there is no prior understanding of that situation to begin 
                                            
81 This is simply prejudice. 
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with.82  It is as-if one were in that position experiencing what it is to be so 
situated.  This is the work of conscience.  I call this mode conscientious. 
Of the four, it is this mode of being open to another and open to the terms 
of another situation which, as we shall see, characterizes conscientiousness, 
goodwill, and sensitivity to the necessity of the moment. 
 So understood, these basic ACTWith attitudes are not merely transitory.  
Habitual adoption of any one in any given sort of situation becomes a 
characteristic mark of one’s personality. One becomes used to being in given 
contexts in certain habitual ways.  These four modes, thus, not only signify 
context dependent conscientious being in the world, they indicate different sorts 
of personalities which seek those contexts in which their habitual modes are 
effective. They indicate expectations of the situation one takes with himself even 
as comes into that situation.  They describe different types of people, and 
different types of people make different sorts of things happen.  Out of habit, 
these persons bring their characteristic modes of being in the world with them, 
wherever they go, and in so doing bring their world with them, too. 
 For example, think of a tyrant who runs a faculty meeting.  This mode of 
conscience will raise different issues in different ways to different ends than will 
its opposite mode.  Where the first may stress rules and regulations, and work at 
pushing contrary opinions out by showing them false, the latter stresses flexibility 
and care, and works at finding consensus whereby the best efforts of each 
                                            
82 In the case of realistic, embodied agents, many experiences are basic to the organism, and the 
fact of a shared constitution in a shared world leads to universal experiences amongst all such 
beings in the world.  In these cases, all such agents understand what it is to be others alike.  For 
example, humans have experience of pain, and so each have an immediate clue into another’s 
pain because of common pained responses and common objective engagements leading to pain. 
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diverse member of the department can be realized.  When we return to the 
ACTWith model explicitly in the final chapter, I will make more of the fact that 
different habitual modes lead not only to characteristic types of personality, they 
also lead to characteristic ends.  We will conclude the text on this note. 
Of the four modes, it is the first and fourth which stand out in experience.  
Consider the person whose conscience operates in the first mode, c/c.  This 
person is tuned to his own needs, and understands nothing past the limits of his 
own situation.  This person is not happy unless he has it all because, after all, he 
already knows everything he needs to know to rationalize its appropriation: it is 
already his.  Dealing with this mode of conscience is like looking for a soft-spot in 
the proverbial brick wall.  This mode of conscience is dogmatic, selfish, and takes 
the world on his own terms.  He is closed to the world and to the persons in it.  
Unable to understand a situation beyond his own, he holds all others to the 
standards he brings to bear as-if these were objective.  In fact, this is the first 
personality to claim some privileged insight into objective truth.  After all, he can 
see things no other way.  This is the conscience of a sociopath, a sadist, and a 
bigot.  It is also the conscience of the evangelist, the inquisitor, the prosecutor, 
and the oppressor, as well, I suspect, as that of a few contemporary politicians.  
This mode is the mode of imposition and dominance, commonly known as not 
having a conscience.  This person “without a conscience,” so to speak, bases 
evaluations of situations on his own terms, forces his terms on the moment, and 
preserves claims to reason through broad, self-serving platitudes. These rigid 
generalizations are likely constructed in order to overcome an essentially selfish 
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sense of locality in the face of diversity.83  Inflexible, forcing the issue, he is 
interested in universals and in absolutes, as these stand in for a certain contract 
with the world whose terms are static and enforceable.  This is his situation. 
 The fourth is the opposite.  It is the conscience of a saint or an angel, of 
mercy and grace. This is the positive mode of morality, when one sacrifices one’s 
self for what another needs. This mode of conscience is open to the world and to 
the terms of others in it.84  Dealing with this mode of conscience is like finding a 
soft-spot in a proverbial brick wall.  This person is tuned to the needs of others, 
and understands his own situation in terms of those of others more or less alike.  
This is the mode described in the passage from Adam Smith, given above in two 
pieces, and reproduced here in its original form: 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into 
his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, 
and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel 
something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike 
them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, 
when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last 
to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of 
what he feels.85 
 
This person is happy with less if things are fair for others.  He bases 
evaluations of goodness in terms of how things turn out for others as much or 
more than how they do for himself.  Flexible, at the right place at the right time, 
he is ready to meet the terms of the moment.  He is interested in universals and 
absolutes as well, but for other reasons, as these constitute a contract binding on 
                                            
83 We will see much more of this in the section dedicated to bias, prejudice, and partiality. 
84 Universally, this is the conscience of an infant.  It is pure subject, absolutely impressionable.  It 
is also the aim of many eastern religions to return to this state in age. 
85 Adam Smith, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” page I.I.2. 
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him.  These are the terms to which he must come, not the terms to which he 
holds the world to account.  This mode of conscience is tolerant, selfless, and 
takes the world on its own terms. 
 The other two modes of conscience are hybrid modes.  In one, conscience 
is as-if another, coming to terms with one’s own situation.  For example, think of 
when one cares about another without really caring for him.  This sense is 
captured by the phrase “If you were me…”.  This person, perhaps, can’t 
understand why the poor spend so much time outside in the summer because he 
cannot understand life without air conditioning.  He may be heard saying “If you 
were me, you wouldn’t sit outside so much in the summer” or “you sure would 
love air conditioning!” 
 The other hybrid is the mode of conscience as-if one’s self, coming to 
terms with another situation.  This sense is captured in the phrase “If I were 
you…”  This person understands why the poor spend so much time outside in the 
summer, he just can’t understand why they don’t get an air conditioner.  He may 
be heard to say “If I were you, I couldn’t live without an air conditioner” or “aren’t 
you hot?  It’s too hot out here.” 
 One thing to bear in mind is that these modes are all regularly engaged by 
all human beings.  There may be some truly psychopathic or saintly persons who 
are more or less incapable of their opposite modes in life.  The ACTWith model is 
inclusive of all of these modes, and presumes that most agents move from mode 
to mode as a fact of the dynamic of everyday discourse with self, world and 
other.  During a day, one may say “why don’t you do what I did?” as well as say “I 
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should do what you did,” even though, by the ACTWith model, these are two 
disparate modes of conscience.  The fact is simply that through experience and 
as persons age, certain modes become characteristic of certain persons.  One 
becomes more or less apt to adopt certain attitudes as life becomes routine and 
engagements with the world matters of habit or office. 
Certainly, the reader has noticed in the space of their own lives that 
different persons characteristically engage the world and hold themselves up to 
account for their actions in different ways.  Philosophers call theoretical accounts 
of these modes of operation the study of ethics, and in this field persons who 
hold to certain attitudes are said to be “x”-ists or “y”-ists or to act under the rubric 
of “x” or “y”-ism.  Thusly, through the first mode above, c/c, is expressed the 
views such as Egoism, Fascism, Evangelism, Imperialism and Political Tyranny.  
The fourth, o/o, is found in Christian charity, Pacifism, Communitarianism, and is 
the mode which might permit the sort of anarchy which is only possible when 
everyone is a saint, or perhaps, as hinted at early in the Republic, a natural 
philosopher.  The hybrid modes are more difficult to categorize. 
All are modes of conscience, and all possible permutations thereof are 
explained in terms of the ACTWith model, though, the proof is in the pudding, 
and the final course, hungry reader, is still a long way off.  What we are 
confronted with now, however, is the possibility that we may have some power 
over who we become.  Shall I be a tyrant, or a martyr?  That is a question which 
we shall pursue through the rest of the text. 
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I have mentioned that conscience works to reconcile conflict through 
finding common grounds for contradictory determinations.  I have indicated that 
this happens at least in part through the medium of language.  The meanings of 
words must be changed in order to represent the new situation, that is the one 
without contradiction.  For example, King finds common grounds for his own and 
conflicting positions.  He then casts this understanding in terms of a revised 
vocabulary.  In this way, conscience does what otherwise may have seemed 
impossible.  On the basis of the understanding of one standpoint, the other is not 
even a possibility.  It is impossible, a thing to be denied.  Conscience finds room 
for both.  Of course, this all requires further explanation.  We shall see in greater 
detail that to which I am pointing in the sections to follow. 
Conscience also bridges the gap between another very special sort of 
contradiction.  Conscience opens the possibility of a special relationship within 
one’s self.  This relationship holds between who one’s self is and who one’s self 
always already is not, that person one will be.  This is a difficult issue.  I wish to 
focus on this movement as the movement from the subjective to the objective 
perspective.  This may not appear clear to the reader, but I will lay out the issue 
as I see it in brief here. 
 Let me introduce the issue of the subject coming to an objective 
perspective of himself.  The following points will be developed in the sections to 
follow.  I introduce them here to give the reader a heads up. 
As-if has to do with subjectivity.  It is the feeling of being a self in a 
situation.  This self is constituted by having come to terms with prior situations.  
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This is understanding.  Practical wisdom is that understanding which can be 
brought to bear in meeting the terms of any given situation.  It is being already 
able to come to these terms.  The terms to which one comes are those of the 
objective situation. 
Coming to terms with has to do with objectivity.  It is feeling out the 
situation in order to meet its terms.  Meeting the terms of the situation generates 
understanding.  Understanding is terms met and processes generative of those 
terms, i.e. search routines.  Applied to the moment, understanding is practical 
wisdom. Socrates has a method in seeking truth which works; he is practically 
wise.  In coming to understand that this method works, a routine is generated.  
Socrates is practically wise in that his routines succeed in discovering truth at 
any given moment, even moments where others’ do not.86 
 Together, the as-if and coming to terms with aspects of the ACTWith 
model represent the role of conscience in “transcendence” or the realization of 
one’s subjective experience from the objective perspective.  I will only venture a 
short comment on this here.  More will be said in the final chapter, after this 
movement from subjective to objective is laid out in the sections to follow. 
 One begins life as an infant subject.  One ends life as a corpse object.  
The infant is purely subject to the world, and as he comes to terms with it he 
becomes self determined by a unique situation.  As one comes to terms with his 
situation, he experiences himself in terms of the objects of his world.  It is the self 
enriched by this experience of objects which enters the next situation.  He comes 
to terms with this situation through its objects, then the next, and so on.  He 
                                            
86 “Socrates is easily refuted, the truth is not.” 
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comes to understand himself increasingly in terms of the objects of the world.  
This movement from experience as subjective to experience in objective terms I 
call “stitching one’s self into the world.”  This image carries with it the sense that 
coming to terms with one’s situation essentially fixes one’s self in terms of that 
space.  In stitching one’s self into the world, one creates himself.  This is a 
synthetic process.  As synthetic, the self is the shape of the space of life in the 
world. 
We will begin the next section by looking at a seeming anomaly in this self 
synthesis.  Conscience opens the space between one’s self and the self up 
ahead.  Sometimes, however, conscience closes that space.  Conscience forbids 
one from moving to certain situations, from becoming a certain person.  This is 
called “conscientious objection.” 
But, waiting for conscience to forbid becoming that man up ahead is no 
way to plan a life.  In the section to follow the next, Socrates will help us to 
understand how philosophy works to get a clearer view of the sort of man one 
should become.  He then will show us how he guarantees for himself that he 
becomes that man.  He shows us how by specifying that situation in terms of 
which a good man lives a just life.  In his philosophy, Socrates does not use the 
language of conscience, but that doesn’t mean that it isn’t at work.  Thus, the 
discussion will proceed on Socratic terms, and then I will conclude with a short 
review which puts what we shall see in terms of the view presented here. 
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6.  Conscience, and the everyday. 
 
Though divided in the expressions and forms of their faith in the 
ideal, men who are eager to fulfill to the end their destiny as human 
beings are united in the inmost aspirations of the conscience. 
       -- Emile Boutroux87 
 
 
In this section, we will confront another universality of every situation.  
This is that, wherever one goes, he takes himself with him.  Conscience, in its 
most recognized form, is a voice which forbids moving to certain ends.  
Consequently, if certain ends are forbidden, it motivates to others.  In this 
section, we will review the common understanding of conscience in these terms, 
and then look at the sorts of situations which person have conscience have 
gotten themselves into.  Hereby, we shall begin to realize that acting according to 
one’s conscience is often difficult, even risky.  Living with a clean conscience is 
not an easy road to hoe. 
 It has been said that life is a journey.  If it is a journey, it is a journey 
whose end is always one’s self.  Whatever lies ahead is always met by one’s 
own mortal self.  It has also been said that life is a story, a story written and 
rewritten as it jerks along.  In the beginning, older persons asked "What do you 
want to be when you grow up?"  Impulsive, a child latches onto whatever image 
springs to mind.  Often enough, I remember simply saying what was 
conventional, and believing that I meant it.  The instances are characterized by a 
feeling that I had not the conceptual resources to fill in all the blanks which an 
answer for such a question required.  Yet, the question gets the mind moving in 
                                            
87 Boutroux, page 67. 
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the habit of generating such an account; it will come up again, that much was 
understood. 
 Though I had answered often enough "fireman," or "doctor," or "lawyer," I 
had no determinate notion of just what ways of life these occupations required.  
Even though my father was a doctor, I had no idea what it feels like to live a day 
in the life of a doctor.  I had no idea what a Doctor’s situation demands.  This 
knowledge might not be necessary.  People make decisions based on 
incomplete information often enough, if not all of the time.  Perfect information is 
the sort of thing attributed to omniscient things, like gods, not persons.88 
Incomplete information is simply one’s own complete understanding, brought to 
the moment.  So, I would say “fireman.”  That person, up ahead, that “what do 
you want to be when you grow up” asks one to envision is often difficult to see 
clearly.89 
 The point is that conscience sets up a most important view with which a 
present position is compared.  It is the substance of this comparison which 
constitutes what it feels like to have a conscience.  This is the comparison 
between one’s self, here and now, and one’s self ahead in life. 
 Where do we go, however, when what lies ahead is one’s self, and one 
simply cannot go there?  What is the next chapter in life when the story cannot 
go on in the same terms as it has?  The feeling of being trapped between a past 
and a future, with no way to reconcile the two, is the phenomenon known as 
“conscientious objection.” 
                                            
88 We see this same point arise regarding Kant's ethics in another section. 
89 Never more so than in Angst, to be explored under Heidegger in another section. 
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We often describe a good conscience as quiet, clean, and easy and 
refer to this state of affairs as one of peace, wholeness, and 
integrity...90 
  
Things feel radically different when conscience throws itself in the way: 
Agents who appeal to their consciences to explain and justify their 
conduct often indicate that they would suffer a severe sanction--the 
loss of integrity or wholeness--if they violated their moral limits. 
They frequently express this fear in dramatic ways: "I couldn't live 
with myself if I did that." "I have to answer to myself first." "I must 
protect my sense of myself." "I could not look at myself in the 
mirror." "I would hate myself in the morning." "I couldn't sleep at 
night."91 
 
 The way that conscience works, according to Childress, is as a 
counterfactual; if I were to commit some act in question, I would violate my 
conscience, impugn my personal integrity, and “not be able to live with myself.”  
“This violation would result not only in such unpleasant feelings of guilt and/or 
shame but also in a fundamental loss of integrity, wholeness, and harmony in the 
self.”92 
 The conscientious agent, thus acts upon having made a “prediction about 
what would happen to him if he were to commit such an act,"93 a prediction 
based on past experience.  “Conscience is personal and subjective; it is a 
person’s consciousness and reflection on his own acts in relation to his 
standards of judgment.”94 
                                            
90 Childress, 1997, page 403. 
91 Ibid, 404. 
92 Childress, 1979, page 318. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Childress, 1979, page 318. 
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 Not surprisingly, conscience objects in critical times, when the value of 
one’s past experience is called into question.  During the Vietnam War, for 
instance, there were many conscientious objectors, as there have been at all 
times during crisis.  In the winter of 1972, one pilot captain refused to fly further 
bombing missions over Vietnam because “a man has to answer to himself, 
first.”95  This was simply not a journey this man could again take. 
  Conscience does not merely object during war, and against violence.  
Conscience says "no, do not do this" in discursive contexts, as well.  The 
following illustration involves Arthur Miller, play-write and suspected "un-
American" agent under the pressures of McCarthyism to violate his conscience. 
 Arthur Miller was called before a panel investigating communist activities 
in the United States during the so-called "red scare" post World War II.  He was a 
very famous man, and some of the people under anti-communist attack were his 
friends.  He was commanded by the authorities to name his friends, thereby 
exposing them to the same hostility under which he was suffering.  His 
cooperation in this regard would have guaranteed him kinder treatment.  He 
refused to incriminate his friends on the grounds that his conscience would not 
allow it.  Mr. Miller cited his conscience as protective of his sense of personal 
integrity. 
 Interestingly, the convention of law recognizes the right of persons to not 
testify when their testimony would incriminate themselves; one has a right to 
maintain personal integrity.  This is captured in the language of the Fifth 
                                            
95 Ibid, 317. 
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Amendment: “No person shall be… compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.” 
  To testify against one's self would be to represent two opposite views at 
once, defendant and prosecutor, as if one person were really two, one acting 
against the other.96  Acting against one's self represents a violation of personal 
integrity, and one should not testify where testimony violates one's personal 
integrity. 
 Even though he was called to incriminate others, these others were his 
friends.  Bringing them the same trouble as had befallen himself, or worse, would 
have violated his own sense of personal integrity.  It is as if he were acting 
against himself in incriminating these others, as if he would have suffered in their 
stead, and so avoided that end as if it were his own.97  We have come to 
understand this feeling as-if another as the open mode of conscience.  So, Miller 
refused to testify against these other persons, as if he was being commanded to 
testify against himself.  Miller’s refusal was not well received.98 
 Miller's actions, in the interest of his own personal integrity, make sense if 
the interests of the others were somehow his own, part of his own self.  How 
though, is this possible?99  The ends to which they all would have been brought 
                                            
96 Imagine one’s self, looking ahead to one’s self, indicting one’s self, and carrying these warring 
selves into the future as-if they were one. 
97 In ACTWith terms, o/o.  As-if others, open to the terms of their situations. 
98 Childress, 1979, page 316. 
99 Neurology makes this very clear.  In witnessing some other experiencing some feeling, say 
pain, much of the observer’s brain mirrors the suffering person’s brain in just the patterns which 
indicate a pained state.  That is, unless that other is an object of disgust, or the observer is 
autistic.  The first thing that people do when they want to hurt someone else is to cast their status 
as somehow less than human, or otherwise different from one’s self in ways relevant to a lack of 
sensitivity.  These two conditions represent the difference between closed and the open modes of 
the ACTWith model. 
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had he testified against them, just as the ends to which they were brought as he 
did not testify against them, were shared.  No matter his decision, he was to be 
responsible for their ends.  In his estimation, these others’ situations were as 
important as was his own.  Had he sent them to suffer the indignities and 
possible imprisonment which he himself faced, he would have been responsible.  
Had he not, he also would have been responsible.  Each of these paths of action 
lead to ends, ends from which either Miller himself would in good conscience be 
able to respond, or not.  Conscience reveals an end as if it were taken.  It shows 
what it would feel like to be in that situation.  The voice of his conscience, then, is 
a voice from the future, asserting that, should personal integrity be maintained, 
some futures are impossible.  For Miller, another’s unhappy ending was simply 
not a life’s story he could write for himself. 
 An even more poignant American story of conscience is that of Thoreau.  
Thoreau was famous for his civil disobedience and became a singular figure in 
our American history, even though his old teacher, Emerson, predicted that his 
objection to convention and his minimalist isolation was a waste of his talents.  
Arrested, and in jail, Emerson visited, reportedly asking "What are you doing in 
here?"  To this, Thoreau replied "What are you doing out there."  In trouble with 
the law, conscience was on Thoreau's side. 
 His communion with nature, and rejection of the corruptions of 'civil' 
society, drew attention in his day.  His example has served as a model for 
conscientious Americans, and hippies, ever since.  Regardless of the age, 
Thoreau embodied the intellectual free spirit of the country.  The spirit of the 
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American law, perhaps, was always on conscience's side. Since Jefferson and 
Madison, conscience has been everyman's private purview; its freedoms were to 
have been guaranteed.  “Conscience is the most sacred of all property.”100 Sadly, 
in the contemporary age, this property has no market value. 
 Recently, the death of Rosa Parks drew a great deal of popular attention.  
Parks famously disobeyed convention, in her famous picture resolutely staring 
out of that bus window, as-if in another world, perhaps a just world.  Unlike 
Thoreau who was able to go out and find a world that suited his terms, a natural 
rather than a conventional situation, Rosa Parks was unable to escape 
oppressive men so easily.   
 Instead, she stood apart and simply refused to live in terms of the world as 
given, even though she would surely suffer for her disobedience to unjust 
convention.  Only weeks before, a black passenger died after arrest from that 
bus line due to police mistreatment.  Her act was courageous, especially with this 
information.  This was her situation.  This was her seat on that bus.  She did not 
choose to be this person in this seat, she chose against being another person in 
another seat.  She chose to no longer be the oppressed person.  On this 
decision, her seat was not chosen, it was assigned. 
 By ignoring institutional discrimination on the basis of her race, she shows 
other people how to live in the face of injustice.  This is her role.  I imagine that 
                                            
100Madison, 1792, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s23.html.  Madison 
continues: “other property depending in part on positive law, the exercise of that, being a natural 
and unalienable right. To guard a man's house as his castle, to pay public and enforce private 
debts with the most exact faith, can give no title to invade a man's conscience which is more 
sacred than his castle, or to withhold from it that debt of protection, for which the public faith is 
pledged, by the very nature and original conditions of the social pact.” 
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picture, resolutely looking to a just world out of a black and white bus window.  
She showed that it could be done.  Parks is a hero of conscience, and her 
example is a singular one, as unique as the life she lived but with global impact.  
Though we cannot see through that photograph and into that woman’s heart, we 
see her conscience at work through the terms of her situation.  She denied an old 
one, only to be caught in black and white in another. 
 The West doesn't have a lock on the hero of conscience.  Contemporary 
conscientious objectors pull forward the unfolding histories of other nations as 
well.  Consider the lasting effects of the uprising in Tiananmen Square, the 
famous photo of the young student standing before the tank, stopping its 
progress.  After standing before a line of tanks, this anonymous man stepped up 
onto the lead tank of the column, and appealed to the conscience of the driver: 
"Why are you here?  My city is in chaos because of you."  His world's order 
disrupted, a space opened up, and conscience filled this space with an heroic 
appeal to close the gap: give us back to order.  Give us back our world. 
  All too often, in standing out over convention, the conscientious objector 
distinguishes himself.  This individuation is seen as deviance, and the self 
appears to the conventional world as an enemy of that conventional order.  In 
terms of the conventional way of life, it is the conscientious person who 
represents the breakdown of order.  Instead of being recognized as a clue that 
the conventional order is in need of re-evaluation, these persons are recognized 
as being in error.  In standing apart, these persons are an easy target for the 
masses.  Why are they targeted, though?  If they are merely in error, what is the 
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threat to the conventionally minded masses?  The conscientious persons are a 
clue to one thing in particular.  They are individual in their individuation, and 
exemplify the freedom that each and every other holds deeply in their own hearts 
though it is silenced in shrouds of convention and habit.  They who are 
conscientious confront the conventional with the fact of their own untapped 
freedom.  They are often killed for it.101 
 With this in mind, it makes no sense to call the conscientious objector 
“they” at all.  Individual, how can “they” be alone?  Individuated, “they” are no 
longer part of the crowd, but stand resolutely apart from it.  In his individuation, 
the conscientious man is no longer one of “them.”  How can “they” be “they” and 
“not-they” at the same time? 
 In one’s self-standing, one becomes a target, a target who is often 
destroyed for his example, for his self-determination, for obeying the voice of 
conscience, for denying injustice.  In being open to the world, one loves the world 
enough to let it in, and so becomes as much a product of it as anyone else.  
What this person represents in his difference in not just his different experience 
of a conventional world.   The conscientious man represents another world.  
These persons represent a world in which the conventional no longer holds.  The 
conscientious objector, for instance, represents a world in which all others can 
equally live.  In objecting to war, for example, the conscientious man 
demonstrates a way of life which suits a peaceful world.  It is this world and not 
the objector’s different experiences of the same world which is denied.  This is 
                                            
101 In the case of the student’s resolve demonstrated at Tiananmen Square, we hope that this is 
not the case.  This hero was recognized by the crowd, by his city's friends, who took him into 
itself where he blended, faceless again, and was spirited away. 
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how these individuals become a “they.”  “They” are over there.  “We” are over 
here.  This is our world.  If they do not want to live in our world, then they must 
find another.  It is this reasoning which leads to the following result.  “They” must 
leave this world.  “They” must die. 
 Martin Luther King suffered such a fate.  Socrates did, too, and, perhaps 
most famously, Christ himself was put to death for exercising the just authority of 
his conscience.  These men struggled to open the opportunity for others to live in 
another world, a just world.  Moreover, this just world is simply this world, seen 
differently.  Others denied their vision.  Champions of the conventional order 
refused to see the world this way.  So, King Christ and Socrates all are destroyed 
rather than to have their examples provide a perspective from which the 
conventional ways of things appear in need of rearrangement.  These men came 
to these positions because they were open to the world and to the needs of 
others in it.  It is hard to believe the end for which these men set out, to be 
marginalized and then executed as public pariahs.  Yet, it is easy to see how 
their life stories could have come to be written this way. 
 In the next section, we will look in on Socrates to see more clearly how 
this might have happened.  Socrates will give us an insight into a process which 
has been touched on throughout, “stitching one’s self into the world.”  Socrates 
helps to flesh out how it works. He describes a process of inner discourse by way 
of which a man comes to see his situation more clearly.  This inner discourse 
proceeds on the basis of two aspects of the mind, one which feels out the 
situation and another which determines it.  One’s situation is most critical when it 
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is that to which one moves in life. 
 Socrates will help to illustrate the value of this process in reaching for 
one’s highest potential.  It is in stitching one’s self into the world that a man 
comes to be the man he comes to be even as his world comes to be the world he 
lives in.  From a basic understanding of this process, many things in the sections 
to follow should be clearer for the reader.  Socrates’ philosophy influences both 
Kant and Heidegger, for instance, and this brief introduction is intended to prime 
the reader for these sections to follow. 
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7.  Conscience, and the way of the world. 
 
Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give 
thyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be 
whirled around. But then thou must also avoid being carried about 
the other way. For those too are triflers who have wearied 
themselves in life by their activity, and yet have no object to which 
to direct every movement, and, in a word, all their thoughts. 
   -- Marcus Aurelius102 
 
 
 
So, life is a travelogue, often punctuated by conscience warning against 
tragic stops along the way.  It pays to have good examples to follow after.  What 
we need now are examples for our examination. 
In other fieldwork, the convention is to take a specimen, and dissect it, 
analyze it, and “carve it at the joints.”  This is how anatomy is done: with dead 
animals.  Now, I disagree with this approach.  Although we are not here to do 
anatomy, per se, I have always figured that the best way to study an animal is to 
study one in action.  For instance, to study a philosopher at work, find a good 
one, and watch.103 
However, in the case of philosophy this is especially hard to do.  
Philosophers think.  Thinking takes place in the mind.  “Anyone’s body and brain 
are observable to third parties; the mind, though, is observable only to its 
owner.”104  Arguably, delivering pictures of what is in one’s mind is what 
philosophy is good for: this is the fruit of Philosophic thought, introspection which 
                                            
102 The Mediations, Book 2. 
103 Although, I have tripped over some philosophers who have tested my perseverance over this 
paradigm. 
104 Antonio Damasio , “How the Brain Creates the Mind” Scientific American, December, 1999, 
volume 281, number 6, page 112. 
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makes all the pictures of brains and bodies significant in the first place.105  But, 
philosophers take no pictures or use instruments directly, besides stylus and 
card, voice and box.  Philosophers talk.   So, maybe it is better to listen, for now.  
What does philosophy sound like? 
Luckily, Socrates had something to say about what he was up to when he 
was philosophizing.  In Plato’s dialogue, Philebus, Socrates tells us that 
philosophy is important because truth is important, and truth is important 
because taking the wrong thing for right often leads to bad ends.  In other words, 
philosophy is not some ivory tower mental manipulation, but it matters in a 
practical sense; thought matters because life matters, because we matter.106  
And the truth sometimes means life, or death. 
To ease into the demonstration, Socrates takes up a deceptively simple 
question: is that a man standing, say, is it Socrates, over there, or is it a 
scarecrow, put up by farmers to keep the blackbirds from robbing him of his 
crop?107 
                                            
105 However, philosophy has an equally significant lesson to learn. Consider the following from 
Kevin Ochsner: “Brains have limited processing capacities because they are part of a biological 
system. Therefore, there can be no “optimal” or “logically correct” solution to a computational 
problem without reference to available hardware and resources; each computational step 
requires metabolic energy and must interact with the resource requirements of other processes.  
In addition, the brain was not engineered to perform optimally all computations; rather it is the 
product of thousands years of selection pressures that have added particular functions to those 
already present … if such functions enhanced the reproductive capability of the organism (but 
also sometimes even if they did not…).  Thus any theory of the computation, algorithm, or 
implementation that does not take into account these limitations may make unfounded 
assumptions about what is possible, and therefore risks biological implausibility.” Ochsner and 
Kosslyn, www.columbia.edu/~ko2132/pdf/Ochsner_CNS_App.pdf, page 3. My emphasis.  
106 Matter matters and personal matters matter most.  Props to Ruth Chang. 
107 Plato often introduced his dialogues with his interlocutors citing their versions to be second-
hand recounts long after the actual dialogue took place. 
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Well, the answer to that is easy, right?  That can’t be you, Socrates; you 
are here with me! 
Nope.  Socrates’ question is, itself, only a façade.  Underneath these 
particular facts, there is a certain form of question that concerns the philosopher, 
a form which fits our needs, now, as we search for the conscience: “An object 
may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may want to 
determine what it is which he sees.”108109  This object, from our last section, is 
one’s self.110  What do we do when we do not see clearly if this or that form is 
one’s self ahead, in the future?  This is a difficult way of asking: Who shall I 
become? 
Feel familiar?  So, let’s follow in Socrates’ footsteps for a bit; here, I will 
recast some of them the way that I remember the story: 
How are we to ascertain better the object of our inquiry, Socrates? 
Through a process of interrogation.111 
How does this work?   
Well, in short, one part of us has the sensitivities of a writer of a book, 
setting out plots and burying intensions, though doing so determinately, pointing 
out this and that thing and its relations, and the other has the sensitivities of a 
painter, open to the movements and colors of the world, and instead of working 
to contain this dynamic field between periods and flattened to pages and pressed 
                                            
108 Philebus, 1892, 38. 
109 In our case, we want to focus on the dimensions of this seeing – distance is temporal (far 
future) as well as spatial (far left). 
110 An object, remember, is an obstacle, as well as an aim.  Interrogate thusly: What is this thing 
in the distance, this object?  Is it obstacle or is it aim? 
111 Heidegger calls this process of seeing better according to a metaphorical getting closer “de-
distancing,” bringing the appearance to understanding through inner discourse, only later testing 
the product, an assertion, against the new-found practical familiarity. 
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in the binding of a book, the painter works to capture the world in all its dynamic 
and fluid totality.112  This one, the sensitive painter, feels out the situation and is 
sensitive to its curves and colors, the other, the scribe, determines it and sets 
these in figure and fugue.  And these two interrogate each other, until either 
accounts cohere, and this is inner discourse whereby a philosopher interrogates 
himself about his situation. 
He interrogates himself?  What if the philosopher is with friends? 
Then, his voice expresses what is disclosed in his inner discourse, 
articulating the situation from his position in terms which carry both affect and 
conviction, painter and writer, and we call this expression a proposition.  When 
someone holds his position as the right one, we say that his proposition is taken 
as “true.”  His situation reveals his discoveries to others through the medium of 
his voice.  And this expression is held to account in terms of the inner 
determinations others have come to in their situations.  If these others share his 
determinations, these others call his expression also true.  In determining alike, it 
is as-if they share situations, as all men should see the same way from the same 
position in the same world.  The trick is getting there. 
So, what is proposed is truest if it remains the same for now, and for 
everyone else at every other place? 
Yes, but even this doesn’t guarantee that we will not name “real” what is 
only illusion, thereby giving voice to untruth.  After all, we all agree that voice is 
infinite in that its tones take forms to fit any situation, and that it is also finite in 
                                            
112 That this parallel specialization holds water to this day is simply an amazing fact and 
testament to the power of Philosophic introspection 
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that it expresses only my own determinations, limited by my own experience and 
sensitivity to all that may be in the space of life.  So, to find truth in words, we 
must seek to express the sense in which these aspects meet, and that means to 
take up the ends in which they are realized, wherein the truth is disclosed. 
But, what ends are those? 
Not necessarily pleasant ones, surely, for the objects of pleasure change, 
do they not?113 
Yes: the thirsty man seeks water as the good, until his thirst is quenched. 
Exactly. 
For what then? 
For the good as determined through an understanding of the nature of all 
things in general, and of one’s self most of all. 
But, again, in every situation, for every person, there appears to be 
different goods which fit? 
Yes; and in discourse with others, terms will be met and then discarded 
until all find truth expressed in terms of the common good, this is the nature of 
discourse and its end is consensus. 
Couldn’t this go on forever? 
It does.  That is our condition. 
Socrates, you speak as if we had all the time in the universe! 
No, in all places and at all times, what is true is that which fits the 
situation.  Some things are true of every situation.  In our case, are there not 
                                            
113 One’s own, of course. 
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some aspects of every situation which stand out in our minds, some ends to 
which we always move? 
Yes, Socrates.  I for one am most concerned for my own future, and those 
of my friends, and family, and my city.  I wish to move to the ends in which all of 
these are taken care of. 
What about them concerns you most? 
In fact, I am most concerned about the signs of pleasure on the persons’ 
faces, for I feel pleasure when they feel pleasure, health when they have health, 
and wealth when they have wealth.  I am also concerned that they should hold 
me in high esteem as if I had been some great benefit to them. 
Yet, you must agree that these signs can be deceptive?  Just as the figure 
in the distance, can it not appear that a man feels pleasure even when what he 
enjoys is killing him?  A man sick on wine may often be grinning. 
Yes. 
Then, what you must mean to be concerned about is that yourself, and 
others, be able to discern what is truly pleasant and good, and what is not?  
Otherwise, we may move to tragic and not to happy ends, alone, with close 
friends, or altogether. 
Why, yes. 
And what is this condition called, this capacity for discernment? 
Why, that is what we call practical wisdom… 
And how would you suppose we are able to come to such a situation? 
Why, by interrogation of self and others with discourse toward the truth! 
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Exactly, through philosophy… 
 
Let’s review: according to this third-hand recounting of one small portion of 
one Socratic discourse, one aspect of mind feels out the world, the other 
determines it, and these two aspects carry on in an inner discourse.114  As the 
one reflects on the other, the writer’s determinations come to capture the details 
of the space insofar as the painter reveals it.  If we have friends, we express the 
content of this inner discourse in language, and others like ourselves see if our 
view checks out with their account.  In this way we come closer to seeing the 
figure for what it is, philosopher or stand-in, without moving our bodies closer, but 
only through the expression of this essential character of thought, inner 
discourse.115  This is the form of every philosophical question, and presents us 
immediately with the form of a gap, the space between what appears and its 
reality.  This is the form of the space which philosophy explores, and 
philosophers express.  This is also the space which conscience opens within 
one’s self, between a one’s present situation and another up ahead. 
This space is felt in two essential ways, spatially and temporally.  A figure 
can be spatially distant, or temporally distant.  Likewise, some gaps are more 
compelling than others: those which are spatially near and temporally pressing, 
demand attention before those more distant in either dimension.  Opportunities 
approach, they meet us, and if not seized depart forever.  What is clear is that 
                                            
114 Language is an aurally adapted translation of this discourse, and works because human 
beings have similar physical constitutions tuned to a similar dynamic natural world. 
115 Voice as vocalized is this same self-reflected space expressed as articulated.  This notion will 
come more clear as the text moves on. 
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every situation has this structure in common.  They differ only in their 
determinations.116 
Left to free thought, what seems to grip me most at any given time are 
those aspects of the past which bear on the immediate future: is it too late to do 
this or that, to find him or her, where did I put my keys, will it rain?  These are the 
sorts of questions which come to the front of my mind at any given time upon a 
moment’s notice.  With these concerns taken care of I am free to open up to 
more distant possibilities.  For instance, personally, I may begin to recount what 
Hegel means by ‘pure intuition,’ or what could compel anyone to think that truth is 
intrinsically valuable, or what does Socrates’ famous slogan, that philosophy is 
learning to die well, mean in terms of my own life, right now.  With a chance to 
rest, I tend to dwell on the latter. 
In coming to terms with these uncertainties, I initially take the terms of my 
current understanding as a measure.  I try to make sense of these in terms with 
which I am already familiar.117  The painter goes back to old paintings, checking 
the writer’s books on method and recollections of poetry.  Where I cannot 
account for all that the space presents, I can either hold myself open to future 
determination, and live in some anxiety, or I can pass judgment in terms of my 
own prior understanding, and so close myself off to any further determination and 
testing of limits.  Thus, again, I can adopt one of two modes; hold the future open 
to be felt out, interrogated, and taken on its own terms, or close off from 
                                            
116 Frustrated, relieved, reticent, resentful, and more. 
117 In such reflection, I only uncover what I already expect from prior experience. 
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uncertainty according to prior understanding.118  The latter case, clearly, is 
neither conscientious in the common sense, nor philosophical. 
But, philosophy and all this introspection seem to go on and on and on.  
To what end is all this self-examination pointing us? 
Oftentimes the situation calls on us to act, without time to reflect, on the 
question: “WHAT AM I TO DO?” “Find the truth” seems too empty a 
proclamation.  What is the benefit of self-determination if we have no resolution 
of the proper terms for action?  That figure up ahead is one’s self after all.  This 
question is especially weighty in adolescence.  Short on experience, yet fully 
capable, this place in life is especially precarious.119 
Here we find the real treasure in the right example.  Each of us only has 
one opportunity to determine for himself who he shall become.  It is in such 
uniquely irreversible processes that another’s example is so valuable.  If 
Socrates went that way, and that way can still be gone, then his way is an 
opportunity for others alike to follow.  In answer to the question “What am I to 
do?” one may answer “as he did.” 
Still, examples come with a lot of baggage.  One’s situation is one’s own, 
and no other’s determines completely the space of one’s own life.  In defending 
his own way of life, Socrates is famous for saying “The unexamined life is not 
                                            
118 The first is charity, the second prejudice. 
119 As the organism reaches adolescence, the operations which it has taken up from convention 
and prior example are challenged, tested to see if they are still viable.  In taking up a different 
mode, and then embodying the results, the adolescent is essentially differentiating himself from 
the others. 
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worth living.”120  He didn’t mean that constant reflection is good all on its own; 
that would be sophistry, and he wasn’t such a big fan of that activity.  He meant 
‘think for yourself on important things and often because what you come up with 
determines that for which you live our life.’  Socrates provides a good example of 
this way of life, but it isn’t a way of life that many fellow Athenians practiced.   
Still, it pays to appear wise, even if one isn’t committed to actually 
becoming so.  This is where sophistry came in.  One of the more famous 
sophists of Socrates’ day was Gorgias.  Gorgias thought that the best thing about 
all this examination was the power it added to persuasion; the more you appear 
to know, the more convincing you can be. 121 
Sophists were primarily interested in selling their services to wealthy 
families so that they could teach their children to be compelling political agents.  
Young persons had to know enough to be able to persuade other people that 
they were right.  This way, they could convince other people that they deserved 
what they wanted, and didn’t deserve what they didn’t want.  It was supposed to 
help a man get where he wanted to go in life, so that when he got there, he could 
be happy.  All too often, of course, this isn’t the case, but that is beside the point.  
Increased powers of persuasion were what made knowledge valuable for the 
sophists like Gorgias. 
Sophists already knew the way of life they wanted, and it had nothing to 
do with anything new or anything true.  It had to do with power over others.  The 
                                            
120 Apology, 38a. 
121 As revealed to us in the Philebus; lots of these players show up in various places over and 
again in the Platonic library.  After all, Athens was sort of a small town, on today’s standards.  
People knew people, and circles were tight. 
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persons they wanted to be were the powerful persons.  Their strategy was to 
manipulate others into thinking that they knew what they were talking about even 
when they didn’t.  So, they would appeal to the terms which the audience was 
most willing to accept.  Sophistical discourse is not directed at coming to terms 
with the situation, but only at meeting the terms of the audience.  Sophists win 
arguments and gain power by saying what others want to hear in a way which 
makes one’s self look good.  Socrates was opposite, both in method and often 
enough in effect. 
In the dialogue named after the pretender to philosophy, Gorgias, 
Socrates meets an impasse with a young man named Callicles.  Their discourse 
circles around the following question, here given in two forms in which it appears: 
“What ought the character of a man to be, and what are his pursuits, and how far 
is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth?”122 and “how a man may become 
best himself, and best govern his family and state...?”123  These are various ways 
of asking “what man shall I become?” 
Callicles is a product of entitlement and a sophistical education, and is 
certain that he will get what he wants by doing what is convenient for himself.  
What he wants is power and influence in his life.  This is most telling in that he 
holds up a certain sort of man as the exemplar of the good man.  He praises “the 
men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires…”124    
Against this opinion, Socrates warns that: 
                                            
122 Gorgias, 487d. 
123 Ibid, 520d. 
124 Ibid, 518d. 
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…people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the 
swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to 
these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbors 
and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no 
room for justice and temperance.125 
 
Socrates challenges Callicles to account for the fact that the man he takes 
as an example of the good man in fact brings others to bad ends.  Callicles 
cannot, yet still wishes to be this man because he is powerful, influential, and 
does what he wants.  He isn’t interested in bringing anyone else to good ends 
unless this means he himself becomes more influential by way of it.  This is no 
problem for Callicles. 
Socrates argues that this is not the man one should become.  He argues 
that the good man helps others to become just.  He tells Callicles that there is a 
single art which is like a combination of two others which does this work.  This art 
is a combination of medicine and gymnastics, representing deliberating over and 
attaining the good, respectively.126  We are left to presume that this is philosophy. 
Socrates argues further that all of the city’s industries besides making 
good men better are at best unnecessary and at worst wasteful luxury.  A healthy 
society is measured by the goodness and justice of its members.  When a state’s 
health is measured by its wealth, and not its justice, then it is not a healthy 
society.  A good man helps others do the right thing, not become fat and rich.  He 
does so not for the other’s good, but for the common good.  The men whom 
                                            
125 Ibid. 
126 The conscience is the physician, understanding healthy states and recommending exercise (of 
practical reason) to attain them. 
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Callicles had held up as great men were leaders of Athens, but they were leaders 
of Athens to bad ends for their own power.  Socrates has a better man in view. 
Callicles is unimpressed.  He just wants to take it easy.  The quickest way 
to that end is to gain favor with others through politics, and the quickest way to 
lose it is to offend the politicians.  Callicles reminds Socrates that he shall be 
punished if he continues to speak the way that he does about the powerful men 
in government of Athens.  Finally frustrated, after trying for a good while to meet 
the boy in honest discourse about what is really good and just and not simply 
about what is expedient and pleasant for himself at the expense of others, 
Socrates replies that “no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of 
death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong.”127  For Socrates, it would have been 
wrong not to do all he could to help a man be the best man he could be.  To this 
end, Socrates has one more thing to say. 
Let the painter in your mind loose to picture this.  Head down, exhausted, 
demoralized, distraught for the future of Athens, Socrates, aging, throws down 
his gloves, sits heavily, sighs, and simply tells Callicles why he lives the way he 
does.128  Socrates tells us that he has chosen to believe a certain myth, a myth 
that he will be better judged on the planes of the dead than in man’s halls and 
porticos.  He has chosen to live in terms of this myth during his every waking 
day.  In this way, he is the best man he can be.129 
                                            
127 Gorgias, 522d. 
128 He didn’t wear gloves, likely, but I add this for dramatic effect.  What a tragic picture! 
129 Philosophy still is governed by fables.  We shall look at one such myth, the rationalist moral 
fable that is Kant’s moral philosophy in the next section. 
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Socrates holds that he will be brought before three judges, Minos, 
Rhadamanthus and Aeacus.  These three were known for ruling justly and for 
having laid the legal grounds which became the model for Athen’s own laws. 130  
He is to be naked, that is free from the vestiges of social life.  These judges shall 
not judge him on fame and wealth.  They will judge him for having been just or 
unjust throughout his life.  Then, he confesses: 
Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I 
consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before 
the judge in that day. Renouncing the honors at which the world 
aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, 
and, when I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my 
power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your 
exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great 
combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other 
earthly conflict.131 
 
“Renouncing the honors at which the world aims,” Socrates takes 
satisfying universal conditions to be his object.  He takes the terms of this myth 
for true, and we have already seen that this means that he takes them to express 
what is real.   He takes the terms of the story as definitive of his own situation.  
He exhorts others to take these terms as definitive of their own situations, as 
well.  Why would he do that?  
Taking this explanation to be his ultimate situation is a perspective from 
beyond the end of life.  Living conscientiously in terms of this myth means 
                                            
130 I make a good deal of there being three points of view.  It takes three points to make a plane, 
and through this device I see the poets of old painting the picture that justice arranges all things 
on a single surface together.  Socrates, in his story, places himself on that plane, then testifies 
that it is on these terms that he evaluates his everyday actions. 
131 Gorgias, 526d. 
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holding each moment and their opportunities to a timeless standard.132  Socrates 
lives as if these great judges of history were with him then.  In so doing, he lives 
everyday as-if the story were true and thereby holds himself to the standards set 
out in its terms, and not those of fat and happy commiserates.  Instead, Socrates 
lives as-if he were in a different world, a just world.133  He speaks to satisfy these 
terms, not to tell the audience what it wishes to hear.  He wishes to satisfy a 
universal audience, not the whims of some drunken crowd. 
In taking this final field of justice to be his ultimate aim, Socrates merely 
commits himself to do the right thing, the just thing, every day along the way to 
that end.  Actions which do not lead to this same end are to be avoided.  
Socrates, living this way, provides all persons alike with a striking example of the 
power of philosophical self-determination. 
What we have stumbled on in our seemingly drunken rumble into this new 
dawn is a basic movement, which I will characterize here in review. 
Socrates chooses to do the right thing, but he does not have to do so at 
every instance, as-if he had the time at every instant to deliberate over the 
options.  And, he isn’t simply bound to some given pre-determination, though he 
confesses that the story he has decided to give is not original to himself.  He has 
set his own bonds, and may unbind himself.134  He takes this story to be true, 
moment to moment.  In so doing, he takes his freedom with him, deliberately. 
                                            
132 All things appear in the plane of the world at once. 
133 Earlier in the dialogue, in fact, Callicles says to Socrates “you seem to think that you are living 
in another country, and can never be brought into a court of justice.”  521a. 
134 This ends up being a great irony.  Conscience isn’t the opportunity to do the right thing, it is 
the opportunity to do wrong. 
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Socrates lived as a just man in an unjust world.  I will restate: Socrates 
acted justly as if he lived in a just world because, so far as he was concerned, he 
did.135  This is the only way we can make sense of his character; his situation 
was different than was everyone else’s because he made it that way.  He held 
himself to a different set of terms, as we have just seen.  He was open to 
exposing opportunities in terms of others’ situations because this was his 
moment to help others to become the best men they could be.  He always began 
with the other’s determinations, with the other’s situation, and he always worked 
toward resolution of the good.  This work was for THE eventual good, if not for 
HIS eventual good.  This is how it is he can come to claim that he is “the only 
Athenian living who practices the true art of politics.”136  This art is helping men to 
become just, not fat and drunk.  Let’s see if we can make a little more sense of 
this. 
Those others whom Callices named as good men were historical leaders 
and erstwhile benefactors of Athens under whose influence great works were 
done.  The people were fed, and order was kept at home for a while at least.  
Two in particular, Pericles and Cimon, were rivals whose contest for power 
caused the people of Athens problems.  They each wished to be powerful, and 
so formed policies and enacted public projects to promote their own reputations 
and to cement their influence.  Yet, what is good for their power – to have a 
contented public – may not be good for the people of Athens.  Socrates argues 
that it is not, and that these men are not good men, after all.  For one, they take 
                                            
135 Which makes the argument for the laws in the Crito all the more compelling, and 
heartbreaking. 
136 Gorgias, 521d. 
 94 
 
  
what is good to be what is good for themselves, and use their influence to direct 
others to ends which serve theirs.  For another, they provide an example that 
others should live similarly, for their own power and influence in life.  In either 
case, others do not become more just by their lives and works.  In fact Socrates 
maintains quite the opposite: 
Callicles: Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness? 
Socrates: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or 
horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor 
butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? 
Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, 
and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do 
you say? 
Callicles: I will do you the favor of saying "yes." 
Socrates: And will you also do me the favor of saying whether man is an animal? 
Callicles: Certainly he is. 
Socrates: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men? 
Callicles: Yes. 
Socrates: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who 
were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become 
more just, and not more unjust? 
Callicles: Quite true. 
Socrates: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says? -- or are you of another 
mind? 
Callicles: I agree. 
Socrates: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, 
and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have 
been very far from desiring. 
Callicles: Do you want me to agree with you? 
Socrates: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth. 
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Callicles: Granted then. 
Socrates: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust 
and inferior? 
Callicles: Granted again. 
Socrates: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman? 
Callicles: That is, upon your view. 
Socrates: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted.137 
 
How is Socratic philosophy the genuine political art, succeeding where 
these other men fail?  In the same ways that they fail, he succeeds.  He holds all 
men’s ends equally on a single plane for universal evaluation, including his own.  
The end in sight is justice for all in whose terms all men are equal.  He remains 
oriented to this end, and not to his own fame and reputation, everyday along the 
way of his life.  In this way, he succeeds as a leader where these others fail.  The 
ends to which he directs others are good for all in common. 
In living with this end in mind, he does more than remain open to revision.  
He seeks out new and varied determinations of the world, and in this posture 
begins in professed ignorance.  He is actively open to the terms of others, 
instead of imposing his own terms on the discourse from the start.  Socrates 
provides an example of the conscience at work.  He sets up the common good 
as his own ultimate end, and starts walking, one moment at a time.  Along the 
                                            
137 Gorgias, 516a-d 
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way, he remains open to the terms of others in order to help them orient their 
lives similarly.138 
Socrates was able to begin with the terms of the other because he had 
some sense of the universal significance of these terms.  Without this 
understanding, he could have nothing of their situations to share, and the 
conversation could not begin. He generates this understanding, I believe, by 
remaining open to other situations along the walk of his long life.  This is the 
philosophic, conscientious exercise over a life-time which results in what the 
Greeks called “phronesis.”  Socrates exemplified this capacity, and he began by 
listening.  Only in this way could he ever have come to see himself on that plane 
of all time as if he were any other man, dead or alive.  He would do nothing in 
this world that he would not do there.  This was his situation, and the ends to 
which he would have all others travel. 
In many ways, this entire text is built on the Socratic example.  Socrates is 
philosophy’s greatest hero.  Some said he was the most just man they had ever 
known.139  He did irritate people, maybe on purpose, and he didn’t always do as 
                                            
138 Move. 
139 Before I start getting letters, there is no evidence that Socrates took part in any physical 
relationship with any young man, as was the custom amongst some of the very elite Athenians 
during his lifetime.  Socrates, for one thing, was not of this class, though he did have a suit of 
armor which indicates a certain self-sufficiency.  For another thing, there is at least circumstantial 
evidence to the contrary.  During his time with Alcibiades, Socrates failed to satisfy Alcibiades’ 
expectations that Socrates would, well, make a move on him, so to speak.  Alcibiades was, by all 
accounts, desirable in this regard.  Therefore, no need for concern; and all the more reason to 
count Socrates a hero for not satisfying yet another convention.  
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the legal authorities commanded; but, he was a sentimental man, and certainly a 
man motivated by conscience to do the right thing.140 
In Socrates’ example, we see the ACTWith model in action.  It is operative 
in inner discourse, discourse with others, and the discourse which leads one to 
his objective self.  In inner discourse, the feeling of being in a space is that 
function of the painter.  The coming to terms with that space is the function of the 
writer.  Together, one comes to terms with the situation.  Others proceed in the 
same process.  In discourse with others, one interprets the expressed 
determinations of the other by taking up his position as-if, and checking to see if 
these determinations hold at this position.  In reaching for that situation which is 
one’s object, conscience opens a perspective as-if from this end.  All action along 
the way can be held to the determinations of this situation.  In his example, 
Socrates shows how he comes to terms with his situation in a way which 
guarantees that he will act justly.  In doing as he does, Socrates stitches himself 
into a just world instead of into the world of corrupt men.  As this inner discourse 
is the condition of a man’s life, Socrates lives as-if he were in a just world.  He 
lives in terms of the just world, reaching out and meeting those terms.  
Holding himself on a common field with all others means that he holds 
them in equal esteem with himself, and that as he comes to terms with his own 
situation, he comes to terms with theirs. The space of his life is shared with 
others universally.  Socrates is as-if open, coming to terms with open, and he is 
in this mode habitually.  He begins discourse from the determinations of the 
                                            
140 His motivating daimon is essentially what we mean by conscience when we use the term in 
our everyday. 
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other’s situation, as-if the other.  He moves from this starting place toward the 
situation which is good for all.  He is open to others, and seeks their own ends 
as-if these were his own.  He puts himself in, and so comes to terms with, no 
situation which is not determined by this equality.  Thereby, he does nothing 
unjust.  He acts as-if this other were himself, philosophizing toward that other’s 
realization of the good life even as he does his own. 
Let’s quickly contrast this situation with that of Socrates’ old foil, the 
musician.  The musician does not begin with the terms of the other, but with her 
own terms.  She is able to express what appear to be the terms of the other, but 
she does so without any necessary discovery of a universal truth.  Her 
expression is of her own subjective experience.  Moreover, the musician does 
not strive for an understanding of the universal, per se.  She seeks inter-
subjective recognition of a subjective expression and takes this to be objective.  
This may happen through an appeal to the universal human condition – i.e. 
broken hearts hurt, being on the road is lonely, that sort of thing – but it only 
seeks to have her subjective determinations reinforced through the applause of 
the persons present and hearing her plea.  This has nothing to do with objectivity, 
it has to do with ego.  The musician does not seek to meet the objective terms of 
her situation, but with inter-subjective terms instead.  141 
Finally, the musician does not provide an example of a life lived in terms of 
just ends shared by all.  She does, however, provide a powerful example.  This 
                                            
141 This does not draw into question musicality as a virtue, or music as a thing to do.  It only 
makes suspicious the character who fails in hearing what he wants from musical audiences, and 
seeks reinforcement instead in the halls of philosophy.  This points to the methods of the failed 
guitar player turned philosopher, for example. 
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goes with the territory.  To be a good performer is to appeal to others.  She must 
be sensitive to the other.  But if the other cannot come to her terms, he is free to 
see another show.142  If the musician is taken as an example way of life, then the 
city is in real trouble.  There may be lots of loud parties, but Athens still needs the 
philosopher to see where the whole thing’s headed.  Otherwise, everyone is 
open to others only insofar as these reinforce one’s own situation.  This is a city 
of vice. 
To be clear, though the musician is the subject, here, other ways of life are 
equally insufficient to ensure that the right thing is done at the right time in the 
interest of all persons universally.  It should be apparent that the musician has a 
great deal in common with sophistry. Both are motivated to the subjective 
reinforcement of others and mistake this for an objective realization of their own 
situation and that of the audience.  Instead, the situation the terms of which the 
sophist must meet is determined by the selfish desires of the audience, itself.  
That said, it is obvious that in this mode of life there is no view from the “outside” 
in, there is only the view from the inside upon one another.  
The sophistically trained leader is equally guilty of doing things in order to 
please the populace, and to maintain power and influence, and these things have 
little to do with what is good for the society as a whole. Leaders in this mode 
judge their leadership by the fat and happy faces of those nearby.  They are not 
concered with citizens to come, and less with citizens past.  What goes for 
leaders does not necessarily apply to musicians.  It is not that musicians are 
                                            
142 I am thinking o/c here. 
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necessarily bad.  They make for a good party.  It is simply that they do no good in 
healing the sick society. 
In fact, their example, when lauded, makes things much worse.  The real 
trouble comes when persons aspire to be leaders and do so in this mode.  
Musicians, thus, do not train leaders, anymore than do sophists.  This is a deep 
issue in Socratic philosophy.  I will say more to say on this particular point later.  
First, I want to clear up the role of conscience in moral theory since Socrates.  In 
so doing, we will shed some more light on the mechanisms at work in its 
operations.  However, we will stick with the theme that is Socrates’ most 
important question throughout the rest of this text: who am I to become?  We will 
eventuate to asking “in terms of what objective situation does anyone become 
that person?”  We shall find this question laid out, instead of in terms of Greek 
mythology, full of gods and daimons, in terms of a more modern fable. 
The next section will find limits to conscientiousness in Kant’s later 
writings.  The section after will apply these limits to the universal human situation 
through a thought experiment.  The section following that will confront further 
pressures universal to the human situation.  In this way, our thinking about the 
role of conscience in living life will be enriched and will become more realistic.  
Conscience, we will see more clearly, has as much to do with living the right life 
as it does with doing the right thing. 
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8.  Conscience, and the way we live. 
 
But look ye, the only real owner of anything is its commander; and 
hark ye, my conscience is in this ship’s keel. - On deck! 
-- Captain Ahab143 
 
 
 
 Nothing fills me with greater awe than the natural order, and nothing 
troubles me more than man’s practical abstinence from it.  Even as Kant looked 
to the perfect movements of the newly relativized heavens for a guiding moral 
principle, his time was not ready to receive a truly relativized ethic. 
 Kant famously claimed his moral theory to be a Copernican revolution of 
sorts.  Copernicus, rejecting the Aristotelian model wherein our imperfect planet 
is circled by increasingly perfect things, maintained that Earth is not the center of 
the universe.  Kant, rejecting the imperfect model that “man is the measure of all 
things,” manufactured a moral theory wherein man is not the center of the 
universe.  Pure reason is. 
 Kant assumed that all men live together in an absolute space, a rational 
universe.  Kant’s ethical theory rests in man’s rationality.  A person has a moral 
“rational” will which must administer the moral law over the “empirical” will.  The 
crux of the relationship rests in autonomy. All animals have an empirical will.  
They are driven by their senses and desires to do certain things, and there is no 
sense blaming them for it.  Lions kill Christians, snakes kill rats, and squid kill 
krill.  We do not call this murder.  These are simply animals following the laws of 
                                            
143 Section 109.  At this point the ship is leaking the whale oil which is what the fishing trip is 
ostensibly after, and Ahab is intent on traveling on instead of salvaging what can be salvaged.  To 
this command the mate Starbuck protested.  Ahab threatens him with a rifle.  Starbuck exits 
saying “let Ahab beware of Ahab.”  Ahab relents.  
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their natures.  People are different, however.  They have a rational will which 
may rule over their sensual drives.  Kant presumes that man not only follows 
universal laws, just like rocks and squirrels do, but he also makes them.  When 
he makes rules for himself, he governs himself.  This is how Kant accounts for 
man’s autonomy. 
 The trouble is that, in so doing, he still takes man to be the measure of all 
things.  This is still an Aristotelian universe.  Man is the rational animal.  Reason 
makes rules.  All men have rules.  All rules have contradictions.  This much is 
universal but the rules themselves are not.  This is a problem for Kant’s ethics in 
at least two ways. 
 For example, consider the rule “do not kill.”  This is a universal law which 
appears given by a rational man to himself.  Its application is evidenced while 
restraining one’s impulse to kill someone.  This involves a rational will 
overcoming a bodily desire to end someone’s life.  So far, Kant’s system seems 
to fly. 
 But, what if this other is himself a murderer, certain to kill again?  What if 
this other is a brilliant but clumsy scientist certain to end the world with a killer 
virus?  What if it is Hitler, while he is only a painter in jail?  How does the rational 
will rule, now? 
 The other problem is that the rules of some men conflict with those of 
others.  For example, there is nothing necessarily irrational about eating the 
dead.  Healthy, undiseased meats are perfectly nutritious.  Likewise, there is 
nothing necessarily irrational about a convention which requires that some 
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segments of a population wear certain uniforms.  In the west, women must wear 
shirts.  If a woman were to walk the streets topless, in most of the United States, 
she would be arrested and jailed.  If a woman were to walk the streets of some 
Muslim nations without their traditional garb, they too are subject to sanction.  
Rationality alone cannot dictate which rule should hold. Who, after all, is to 
judge? 
 Even Einstein’s relativity does not imply the sort of radical relativity of the 
oft caricaturized cultural relativist.  Planets and stars do not careen willy-nilly on 
the relativized Einsteinian vision of the dynamic universe.  In fact, it all revolves 
much as it always appeared to, perfectly, only we have come to realize the terms 
of the trajectories in ever finer significance.  There is no contradiction in the 
movements of the stars.  But stars have been known to collide, and while 
standing on one it is sometimes difficult telling up from down.   
Consider this example.  For many years, the Boy Scouts have taught their 
students that a compass can be constructed in an emergency with a dry leaf, and 
a light, thin piece of metal like the minute-hand of a watch. The leaf is placed in a 
very still pool of water.  The metal sliver is rubbed against clothing, and the static 
charge taken up by the metal causes the crystalline matrix of the substance to 
orient in a polar alignment, thereby creating a (rather weak) magnet.  This sliver 
is then placed on the leaf floating in the still water, and the result is supposed to 
be a working compass. 
That this is in fact possible, and within the reach of any literate person 
exposed to this account, is fascinating.  But, what is more fascinating is that we 
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are coming to a point where this mechanism will no longer work.  The polarity of 
the Earth, itself, is changing, and thus so is the attraction between the sliver of 
metal and north.  Where, at one moment in history a literate man with a watch 
could find his way, this era is quickly fading.  In fact, there may be a time when 
no compass, no matter how strong the magnet, will work.  For now, at least, the 
capacity of traditional methods to direct our way through the so-called objective 
world is in doubt. 
Even more primitive than the magnetic compass in finding one’s way is 
the conscience.  Much as the poles of the material globe are diffusing, so are the 
poles of the ethical globe.  Neither judgments most men had ever figured to have 
to make twice.  Once such rules are established, there is no provision for their 
revision.  North is north, there can be no contradiction in that!  Few anticipate a 
day when a compass does not work.  In fact, however, the reasoning behind the 
Boy Scouts’ compass will simply stop working, altogether, and many honest men 
with a bad recipe for direction in a crisis may come to very bad ends. 
Reasoning is important but it fails.  Rules are important, but they fail.  
Their original purpose is to express ways of being which lead reliably to certain 
ends.  When the situations change, however, so will the rules need to change.  It 
is the conscience which directs such change. 
Let’s look at this through the Kantian lens.  The compass point of Kantian 
ethics is Kant’s categorical imperative.  The categorical imperative is the form of 
the voice of conscience for Kant.  The most commonly discussed form of the 
categorical imperative is: “Act according to that maxim which thou couldst at the 
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same time will an universal law.”144  The maxims in question are rules for action 
which would motivate all rational beings in all situations.  Thus, the maxim of any 
moral action is an imperative, or a command, which is not context specific.  The 
only specificity is that the agent be rational so that the maxim is rational.  It is in 
the autonomy of rationality, after all, whereby the maxim is universalized to all 
other moral agents. 
The categorical imperative is a method for coming to terms with the 
objective implications of one’s own actions.  There are subjective and objective 
constraints on right action, and both must be met in order for the action to be a 
moral one.  For example, I wish to be seen in a grand chariot, so I buy a 
HUMMER.  Thinking in terms of the categorical imperative, however, means that 
this opportunity must extend to every rational being.  This means envisioning a 
world in which buying a HUMMER is the right thing to do and everyone who is 
doing the right thing in that situation is doing it.  But, this result contradicts my 
original wish to be seen in a grand chariot; in this situation, everyone has a 
HUMMER.145 
The compass point of Kantian ethics directs me to ends of action.  It 
directs to ends the attainment of which can be universally prescribed.  It directs 
away from those which can not.  The general form of prescription is: do x.  The 
universal laws which are tested are the reasons for doing that action as opposed 
to others.  The test is a rational one in that it tests reasons.  Because of the prior 
                                            
144 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, page 43. 
145 Besides that, it’s getting very warm.  This is not the universe I wanted to be in, originally.  This 
is not the happy ending for a rationalist’s moral fable. 
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resident wish, the categorical imperative, through the voice of conscience, simply 
tells me to stop. 
This view gels with that of David Velleman.  Velleman reads Kant as 
asserting that conscience does the work of forbidding actions which arise to 
consciousness insofar as they lead to a contradiction according to the categorical 
imperative: “conscience tells us that the reasons we thought we had for doing 
something couldn’t be reasons for doing it...”146  Wanting to be seen in a grand 
chariot is not a moral reason to buy a HUMMER.  If everyone acted on the same 
rationale, that reasoning fails: no more grand chariot.  Thereby, on this account, 
conscience doesn’t provide reasons to act, but reasons not to, and it does so as 
an aspect of consciousness.  It tells you so. 
Herein lies the rub.  Consider the following example.  At position A, a 
person looks at end B and conscientiously determines that B is moral.  Now, on 
the basis of the preceding view, the only terms which can be brought to bear in 
the evaluation of B are those present to the consciousness of the person still 
situated at A.  So, the person moves to B. 
Let’s say that upon arriving at B, something strange happens.  Our person 
learns something.  Some aspect of B was not determined prior to his situation at 
B, and this aspect would have forbidden B as a moral end. 
Now, in such a case, ubiquitous as it is, Velleman’s formula no longer 
makes sense.  It cannot be that “conscience tells us that the reasons we thought 
                                            
146 Velleman, page 74.  Interestingly, here is one possible form of the Imperative so read: man is 
free to choose those terms by which he arrives at a logically consistent account of his ends.  Or, 
he is free to choose rational ends.  See Velleman, page 75, especially.  In either case, still limited 
to the notion that conscience is only a punctuating voice. 
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we had for doing something couldn’t be reasons for doing it…” unless conscience 
does so after the fact!  If this is all that conscience does, then it no longer 
resembles the common sense picture with which we and Velleman have all 
begun.  Conscience must work from the perspective of situation A.  Otherwise, 
what use is it?  How are we to solve this problem? 
It is important to note that Kant places the locus of the moral act not in the 
action, but in the agent.  It is the agent who considers the action, and the agent 
who then must consider the morality of the action.  Without this aspect of agency, 
there is no moral action.  The morality of the action consists in its universal 
applicability, but it begins from the standpoint of the subject.  Kant’s categorical 
imperative is “framed in the first person, and so it - the maxim itself - can ‘hold’ as 
a universal law only if first-personal thoughts can somehow be universal.”147  We 
may make sense of the demands of the categorical imperative by understanding 
that its conditions are those of all moral agents. On Velleman’s reading this 
universal condition is rationality.  A moral agent for Kant is a rational agent; he 
must have a capacity to realize the immorality of an action and to do otherwise, 
else there is nothing right or wrong about the action, it is just the way it is done. 
Most reviews of the demands of the categorical imperative tend to rest in 
an assay of rationality and its demands.  I think that this is a mistake.  I think that 
the conscience, and so the categorical imperative, has nothing necessarily to do 
with rationality at all. 
                                            
147 Velleman, page 68. 
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Kant’s illustrations do appear to place emphasis on the role of reason on 
the formation of maxims which represent that motivation for action.  For instance, 
in analyzing the institution of promise keeping, Kant points out that breaking a 
promise works against the institution of promise keeping on which the persuasive 
weight of the promise depends.  To break a promise is to act on the maxim that it 
is ok to break a promise.  If everyone acted on this by this reasoning, there would 
not longer be an institution of promise keeping.  This leads to a contradiction.  
How can you make a promise if you can’t make a promise?  In this case, one 
presumes he is free to keep his promise or to fail to keep his promise.  In this 
analysis, it appears to be the contradiction between the maxims “promises must 
be honored” and “promises need not be honored” which makes breaking a 
promise the wrong thing to do.  In discussions on Kantian ethics, generally, it is 
this rationalization which judges in the immorality of the action. 
This result seems to ignore a fundamental aspect of conscientious human 
beings.  Agents of conscience are not simply moral agents; they are learning 
agents, as well.  There is no correction without error, and the question of the right 
thing to do with perfect information never arises in making actual decisions.  The 
categorical imperative as commonly understood does not capture this fact of the 
matter.  As has been presented, here, it assumes an agent with perfect 
information and no investment in the outcome of his actions besides the 
coherency of this perfect information.  In other words, under this understanding 
the categorical imperative is a moral principle not for a man, but for (a) god(s).  
Thus, for clarity, I would amend this formula: conscience tells us that the reasons 
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we thought we had for doing something couldn’t be reasons for doing it... from 
the position of the agent who has come to terms with every possible end. 
What the categorical imperative demands is nothing less than a 
explanation for an action prior to undertaking that action, and prior to coming to 
terms with the results of that action.148 It demands that whatever terms by which 
that end is to be evaluated must be open to the view of the agent before he 
undertakes the action to achieve it.  This is a very conservative demand.  
Typically, when deliberating over the right thing to do, that some end or other is 
ever realized, is yet a question.  Yet, the categorical imperative takes these to be 
exhaustive.  This is unrealistic.149150 
It appears than any action whose ends are not pre-determined is to be 
denied by this principle.  This could be what conscience does, consistent with 
Velleman’s interpretation.  This constraint does exhibit the conservative essence 
of rationality.  One acts morally when one acts rationally, and this is a matter of 
reasoned determination of ends.  Yet, persons do not act rationally, and if the 
present analyses is correct, this is a very good thing.  Otherwise, noone would do 
                                            
148 By explanation here I mean exhaustive account. 
149 Here, I am reminded of the Kant who, in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason, Alone, asserts 
that one should not do any thing of whose ends he is not certain.  There is one possible 
interpretation of this assertion, one which denies – realistically speaking – any action at all, and 
that is: only act towards ends whose reasons are grounded in terms whose values are 
themselves certain even as the action is undertaken.  This appears to make moral action 
impossible. 
150 To some degree, however, this view holds water.  For the most part, the way things have been 
done are presumed to be the right way to do things.  Mill makes explicit recourse to this fact of 
life, quite famously, in meeting objections to his Utilitarianism.  Arguing, in essence, that the 
wealthy are best off giving to the poor, as there is more utility in a healthy happy educated 
society, than a divided and co-dependent form of the same, Mill reminds us that though we have 
no time to calculate, we begin with what practices we are given, and conscience is the final judge. 
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anything new, or novel, or creative, or for that matter would ever learn anything, 
ever. 
Kant should have understood this problem, and we can assume charitably 
that he did.  I think that the focus should lie in the terms of the maxim, and less 
on the form of the categorical imperative itself.  If an end is evaluated in universal 
terms, then the maxim which results will also hold universally.  Moreover, such 
an interpretation permits new and novel actions whose ends are not completely 
certain, and so actions for which one has no reasons per se.  A person should 
seek ends which are universally determined to be worthy, and not to act on the 
basis of rules no matter how well construed. 
What terms are these which should enter into the moral evaluation of 
actions before they are undertaken?  To my mind, these are natural terms.  
These are terms of natural necessity.  These are needs universal to all human 
beings at every place and time whose satisfactions are universally good.   Every 
other will always be constrained by these terms.  Every other will always be 
bound by these terms.  Every other aspires to meet these terms.  Every other 
needs these terms to be met in order to live and to secure the leisure for genuine 
deliberative autonomy.151  These are universal terms and those essential to the 
balance that is Kant’s conscience.  If these are the terms of moral sensibility, 
there is a role for conscience both before and after action.  Is this what Kant 
could have had in mind, after all? 
 To address this question we must, conveniently, get clear on Kant’s 
                                            
151 For democracy and the American way of life! 
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mature view of the conscience.  For the Kant of his later years, conscience has to 
do with doing, with acting, and clearly less with evaluating.  By this account, 
conscience is the “spring” of practical reason in at least two senses.  Conscience 
is one’s self ahead and one’s self here, tied together at both ends by a spring.  In 
one sense, conscience is the best of all possible worlds, under whose lights each 
step along the way is evaluated.  In this sense, the spring is an oasis in a desert 
of despair, those ends in whose realization one feels “peace.”  Conscience 
directs to reach this end, rather than provide directives which limit ends reached.  
Conscience is motivational, and also prohibitional. 
 Conscience is a negative force.  Conscience restrains from other ends 
whose realization is a loss of “worth as a person.”152  Kant details in various 
places throughout the Metaphysics of Ethics the emotive mechanism which 
disqualifies given actions, one’s own or another’s. Kant asserts that the grounds 
for all actions whatsoever depend on feelings about the way of life evidenced in 
the action. These appear, everyday, as reverence or disgust.  For these, there is 
no necessary rationale: this is conscience caught cold. 
For Kant, as the preceding discussion revealed, the moral law is the 
categorical imperative: “Act according to that maxim which thou couldst at the 
same time will a universal law.”153  Willingness to submit to this imperative, Kant 
calls “good will.”  Now, good will, in our everyday contemporary talk, equates to 
something like beneficence or benevolence.  Good will, in Kantian ethics, implies 
more than being nice, however.  Good will implies wanting to endorse the terms 
                                            
152 Kant, Metaphysics of Ethics, page 92. 
153 Ibid, page 43. 
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of those ends which are realized in action.  Thus, the sentiment underwriting “I 
wish you well” is “ I hope you achieve your ends.”  And, for Kant, this way of life – 
only wishing for endorsed ends - holds up to affective scrutiny.  A good will is to 
be revered; selfishness, falsity, dishonor, these are sources of disgust.  Let me 
clarify. 
 Doing the right thing doesn’t feel like a rule, though it is nice to remember 
how to do it in case the opportunity arises again.  Likewise, doing the wrong thing 
doesn’t feel like a contradiction, though upon this determination it makes sense 
to figure where one went bad.  Thus, the reason for doing or not doing any given 
thing may have little to do with reasons, at all. 
Kant’s fully developed moral theory is sensitive to this fact.  For the 
categorical imperative to be realistic, it must test more than reasons.  In fact, the 
imperative itself evaluates at a fundamentally affective level on other formulations 
than the one given above.  The good will in question is a feeling: “THAT, we now 
know, IS A GOOD WILL WHOSE MAXIM, IF MADE LAW UNIVERSAL, WOULD 
NOT BE REPUGNANT TO ITSELF.”154 
Though the test of the categorical imperative is often enough represented 
as a test for logical contradiction, this is not the flavor of the formula richly 
understood.  The contradiction to be avoided is not to be encountered in the 
vacuity of a purely logical space; it is to be encountered in the space of our own 
hearts.  The test is not a rational one, at all, that is unless rationality has to do 
with self-esteem, as Kant makes the connection explicitly. 
For Kant, conscience is the ‘spring’ of practical reason as it directs 
                                            
154 Kant, Metaphysics of Ethics, page 43.  Kant’s emphasis. 
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positively toward a morally ideal situation and against selfishness and 
solipsism155, self-conceit and self-love.156  Conscience pulls one’s self to the 
peaceful reward of a worthy life, without complaint upon doing the right thing, 
which comes with feeling at one with one’s self.157  In deliberating on this end, 
one must discount immediate sufferings and attractions. Conscience allows, 
instead, the free person to act – instead of according to “the solicitations of the 
sensory”158 – out of reverence for what Kant calls the “moral law.” 
The test which constitutes Kant’s moral law, and the spring of practical 
reason, is that of disgust.  Let me restate Kant’s imperative in more direct terms: 
Do not become, through action, a person in whom you are disgusted.  This to 
which I will add: by leading yourself or others to bad ends. 
The basis for this common mode of evaluation is the shared constitution of 
individual persons that is not limited to rationality.  It extends to all persons 
similarly: 
The constitution of my nature forces me to desire and will every 
other person’s benevolence; wherefore, conversely, I am beholden 
to entertain goodwill towards others...159 
 
 Good will has a deep significance in Kant’s ethics.  It is good will for 
another equally with one’s self which grounds good feelings about one’s self.  In 
the passage below, Kant equates benevolence with good will, and does so in 
                                            
155 Ibid, page 81. 
156 Ibid, page 82. 
157 On this picture, voice of conscience is more like the screeching of tires than a scary ghost in 
the machine where the wild things are! 
158 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, page 35. 
159 Ibid, pages 178-179. And the reader will notice that the long sentence begins by noting the 
author’s constitution, which by its nature forces him to desire.  These are not the terms of a 
rationalist, though the tone changes, there is an identity drawn between his constitution and the 
right thing to do, it is simply that the transformation involved is difficult to follow. 
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terms of their common affective ground for duties to one another.  Further it is the 
example at this affective level which he then gives as the sole arbiter of the right 
thing to do:  
Benevolence or goodwill is the pleasure we take in the prosperity 
and happiness of our neighbour: beneficence, again, would be the 
maxim to make that happiness our end; and the duty to do so is 
necessitation by the subject’s own reason, to adopt this maxim as 
his universal law.160 
 
 This is, in my opinion, the most complete exposition of Kant’s moral 
philosophy distilled into one florid passage.  The universal moral law is good will.  
Good will is like a mirror.  In fact after reading this passage and in thinking about 
Kant’s categorical imperative in any form, it is obvious that an foundational 
identity between one’s self and others is, at least in the back of Kant’s mind, 
assumed.161  I mean here phenomenally, “what it is like”: his pain is my pain.  His 
pleasure is my pleasure.162  The terms of a shared nature are those universal 
terms which are the focus of the imperative properly understood, not limited to 
rationality or to reason.  The flower is not leaf and petals alone.  It has roots, and 
turns to the sun: 
The compunction a man feels from the stings of conscience is, 
although of ethical origin, yet physical in its results, just like grief, 
fear, and every other sickly habitude of mind. To take heed, that no 
one fall under his own contempt, cannot indeed be my duty, for that 
exclusively in his concern. However, I ought to do nothing which I 
                                            
160 Ibid, page 180.  Recalling Smith’s introductory quotation to chapter 1 of this text. 
161 The depth of the identity between one’s self and others in Kant’s ethics is evasive.  The 
emotive/constitutive foundation of the categorical imperative had evaded my attention until I 
turned directly to the study of this less popular late text.  In fact, it seems that in all of my 
coursework on this issue, Kant’s ethics was presented as a rationalist counterpoint to other 
systems of ethics whose authors explicitly relied on emotive aspects of selves, like sympathy and 
compassion.   But, as suggested at the beginning of this section, it is impossible to make 
consistent sense of Kant’s view on this reading. 
162 Further, in ACTWith terms, it is this openness of affect which grounds the openness to the 
situations, and relevant determination, of others directly as a product of mirroring, generally. 
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know may, from the constitution of our nature, become a 
temptation, seducing others to deeds which conscience may 
afterwards condemn them for.163 
 
In acting, one evidences a certain way of life that is directed to ends.  One 
turns to the sun, so to speak.  Even though all persons have the same nature, 
and are led to the satisfaction of similar needs, one must do nothing to satisfy his 
own needs which leads to a situation whose embodiment cannot be 
conscientiously endorsed for all others alike.  My own actions signify to others 
alike “this way to the good.”  If I turn only towards what benefits me, then I am 
providing an example to others to do the same.164 
It is, in reverence for the law, the ends of all things in common, deliberated 
on; this is morality conceived as a spring.  Springs seek rest as thirsty persons 
seek wells.  So, with the categorical imperative in mind: do what you must to be 
at rest, but do so as if one’s self were all others, alike.  With this view from these 
ends, one’s esteem is guaranteed: 
Reverence, even when felt for a person, results from the law 
whereof that person gives us the example (Cato, of integrity). If to 
cultivate talents be a duty, then we figure to ourselves a learned 
man, as if he presented to our view the image of law, enjoining us 
to be conformed to his example; and thus our reverence for him 
arises. What is called a moral interest, is based solely on this 
emotion.165 
 
It is an embodied moral exemplar which is the object of reverence, and the 
                                            
163 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, page 141. 
164 It is difficult to imagine a universe in which all flowers turned towards individual suns, but it is 
easier to imagine desperate flowers searching the skies with the sun blotted out. 
165 Metaphysics of Morals, page 60. In a further note, Kant adds: “The dependency of the will on 
sense is called appetite, and it always indicates a want or need; but the dependency of the will on 
principles of reason is called an interest.” 
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form of his life itself exhibits the situation to which one is drawn by moral interest.  
These are the terms to which one holds himself in comparison.  To be alike with 
this person, this is an end to be sought, and likewise embodied.  Further, this 
person is as much one’s self as any other; the logic is the same. 
Taken altogether, these passages and our previous discussion lead to the 
following conclusion: reverence or disgust for self and others and the power to be 
an example for self and others is all there is to morality, at all.  Once we set out 
rules, we have missed the point.166 
Reverence is to want to become someone, when caught in the reflection 
of that which one aspires to in the demonstrated being of another.  It is a special 
sense, more than admiration, more than mere recognition: 
A man may be an object of my love, my fear, or my admiration, up 
to the highest grade of wonder, and still he may be no object of 
reverence. His jocose humor, his strength and courage, his power 
and authority, from the rank he has, may give me such emotions, 
but they all fall short of reverence.167 
 
Reverence is to want to take certain ends as one’s own and to live a certain way 
of life.  Hereby, Kant’s ethical theory provides that bridging notion between 
subjective and objective which its more common interpretations fail to deliver in a 
robust and realistic way.  His later view is grounded in similarity of constitution 
and way of being in the world, grounds which will suffer the plow of every moral 
philosopher since his time, present share included: 
I may add, that to any plain man in whom I may discover probity of 
manners in a grade superior to my own, my mind must bow 
                                            
166 To the objection that there is a place for rules which I am neglecting, I must respond thusly.  
There is no use in a rule past its revision.  Anyone who thinks otherwise has missed the point of 
the rule. 
167Metaphysics of Morals, pages 83-84. 
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whether I will or not. To what is this owing? His example presents 
to me a law which casts down my self-conceit when it is compared 
with my own deportment; the execution of which law—that is, its 
practicability—I see proved to me by real fact and event. Nay, even 
if I were conscious of like honesty to his, my reverence for him 
would continue; the reason whereof is, that all good in man being 
defective, the law, made exhibitive by an example, prostrates my 
conceit, which exemplar is furnished by a person whose 
imperfections—which must still attach to him—I do not know as I do 
my own, and who therefore appears to me in a better light. 
REVERENCE is a tribute which cannot be refused to merit, whether 
we choose or not. We may decline outwardly to express it, but we 
cannot avoid inwardly to feel it.168 
 
 
 Reverence is no ordinary attitude, as it attaches only to a way of life, an 
way of being in the world.  “REVERENCE is bestowed on Persons only, never on 
Things.”169  
 What is explicit in this picture of conscience is an aspect of our topic which 
only arose implicitly in our look at Socrates.  Conscience, the spring of practical 
reason, is at both ends bound to one’s self.  That end in the distance, that is not 
just some end, that is not just some man, that is my end, and me. This aspect of 
the mechanism is clear on Kant’s mature view.  Conscience carries the sense of 
this inward reflection: how would/should/could/do I feel about my self, reverence 
or disgust, upon realizing the end of some action?  One may be practically 
capable of some action, having reasoned out the means of its execution, “But so 
long as man lives, he cannot endure to be in his own eyes unworthy of life.”170   
Conscience opens the space between this end and that, and however I get there, 
I take myself with me.  This is a universal situation. 
                                            
168Ibid, page 84. 
169 Metaphysics of Morals, page 83.  Echoing this distinction is Heidegger’s caring for and caring 
about. 
170 Ibid. 
 118 
 
  
 So far so good.  Sounds familiar, in fact, and we shall make a great deal of 
this aspect of conscience when Diogenes takes a bath.  A spring, after all, is 
more then a metal coil. 
 In this section, we have seen how certain emotions ground moral thinking.  
The feelings of disgust and reverence motivate persons to seek or to avoid 
certain situations.  We have also seen how conscience motivates to ends by 
disclosing ends, as ends, altogether.  Most importantly, we have seen how 
conscience is a universal mechanism in determining what is moral and immoral. 
 In the following section, we shall look more deeply at the universal 
conditions of being in the world.  In it, I will introduce a thought experiment which 
illustrates the universality of our condition as situated beings.  Through this 
illustration, I hope to begin to show the critical role of conscience in opening up 
the space of the future, and what this means for how we live the rest of our lives. 
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9.  Conscience, and the good. 
 
It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation 
would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own. 
  -- Ludwig Wittgenstein171 
 
In this section I will introduce a thought experiment.  The basic idea is to 
exercise conscience by feeling as-if in some other situation, and then come to 
terms with it.  I use the bath because it is a space of relaxation and reflection, as 
well as for other reasons to come clear momentarily. 
In the everyday way, conscience brings one from space of need to 
satisfaction by first presenting the perspective of that space ahead with needs 
met.  It is this view from the place ahead which provides the conscience its 
motivational infallibility.  One never fails to find some end for which to reach, one 
only fails to reach it.172 
Remember, the spring of conscience both ties to ends and motivates to 
their realization.  A spring has a work function, and we can see the conscientious 
agent sort of like an inchworm, at either end himself.  Persons stretch out and 
pull up to ends, reaching those ends and deliberating over new ones, inching 
along in life, situation to situation.  At both ends of the spring is always and 
already one’s own self.  One end of the self is there before the rest arrives, but 
the whole of the worm is at that place, at that time.  He is simply ahead of most of 
himself most of the time he is on his way, and when he rests he may be in two 
places at once.  Even at rest, he reaches out for this or that, whatever it is he 
                                            
171 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, 2.0121 
172 Lost is an especially unpleasant end. 
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needs, at least in mind or as a matter of fact. 
Earlier, we saw that conscience opens the space between a thirsty man 
and a needed drink of water.  Some men have taken this to mean that the good 
life is one lived with his drink in his hand.  I tend to agree.  It pays to have what 
one needs, to have more is to have too much, to have less too little.  This is true 
in every moment.  This is a situation to which all must confess being bound. 
Consider this report on the ancient philosophers called the Cynics: 
Their fundamental Maxim was to live in conformity to virtue, which 
they said was sufficient to make men happy. They sought Liberty 
and Independency as the greatest Good. The Gods, said they, 
stand in need of nothing and those that stand in need of few things 
do most resemble them. To procure this happy independency they 
pretended to look upon honor and Riches with perfect indifferency, 
and to renounce all the inconveniencies of Life. Diogenes would 
have no other habitation than a Tub, and when he found that he 
could drink out of the hollow of his hand, he threw away his wooden 
cup as a superfluity. Alexander the Great, coming to visit Diogenes 
in his Tub, asked him what he desired of him. “Nothing,” said the 
philosopher, “but that you would not stand between me and the 
Sun.”173 
 
Diogenes’ example makes explicit a universal condition.  Everyone will 
thirst, and not simply for fluids. Diogenes exemplifies this condition by living in his 
tub. Understand that in renouncing worldly attachments, Diogenes had few 
needs.  With so few needs, he can live happily in his tub.  He needs nothing, so 
he can refuse Alexander’s offer of help. 
Imagine that Diogenes’ tub is filled with water.  He is laying in the sun, 
bathing.174  His situation is a good one because though he will still thirst, his thirst 
                                            
173 Fordyce, “A Brief Account…” pages 177-178, remarking on the Cynics, for whom morality was 
the only true science, causing them to renounce worldly attachments. 
174 Though Diogenes may have not been an avid bather in reality, I am hoping the reader can 
overlook his suspicions and enjoy the illustration. 
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shall with the least effort be reliably satisfied.  He has thrown away his cup, but 
he doesn’t need it.  It is this aspect of his situation which permits him to refuse 
any offer from Alexander.  He needs nothing done from him. He lives in the 
space of his own necessity. Because he is situated in the space of his own 
needs, when he thirsts again all that Diogenes must do is to dip his hand in his 
bathwater, and drink.175 
To have thirst satiated once is not a guarantee of never being in need of 
water again. Diogenes answered as he did because the space in which his 
needs arise is that very same space through which his needs are filled.  His 
needs like the water come to meet his own determinations.  There is no anxiety 
about how and where his needs might or might not be filled.  Diogenes has no 
uncertainty about his capacities to satisfy his thirst.  He has come to terms with 
his situation.  He doesn’t even have to lift a cup to his mouth, and every little 
thirst is quenched one handful at a time.  Just what he needs. 
He put himself in this situation deliberately.  It is a situation with very little 
tension.  This is a comfortable situation.  Minimizing the tension between where 
one is and where one needs to be was something Diogenes did, but it is more 
than that.  It is something that all people do.  When I know that I will need lots of 
printer ink, I try to have an extra cartridge on hand.  Why?  Because then I do not 
have to get up from my chair, bike to the shop, and return.  I feel good reflecting 
                                            
175 To the objection that Diogenes may not have had water in his tub, as it was a wine cask, I 
must respond as follows.  This is beside the point.  Diogenes motivates the illustration in this 
section. I do not spell Diogenes’ own views out, however, because to do so will be to detract from 
the value of the exercise. 
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on the fact that there is an extra printer cartridge there, right next to me.  I can 
relax in the space with my coming needs met. 
A similar dynamic is at work in the space of every situation.  Persons feel 
good when their needs are met.  They also feel good when their situation is such 
that their coming needs will be met.  That’s why I have an extra cartridge of 
printer ink.  It is as-if I were bathing in it.  There is a similar dynamic at work in 
every situation. This demonstration is the power of Diogenes’ example, the 
timeless power of a philosophic life. The image of this man in this tub on display 
will never fail to express the truth of every situation. 
It is in this spirit that the Cynics understood morality to be the highest 
science, and it is in this spirit that Diogenes refused any other need.  He had 
come to terms with his own situation well enough, he was practically wise 
enough, that he was able to demonstrate our own universal condition, as well. 
Most of us are unwilling to follow Diogenes’ example.  Other people rely 
on us not to spend our days in a tub.  Other people rely on us not to forsake 
every need.  Diogenes, however, lived in his tub alone.  We will get other people 
in the tub in the next section, and make more of the following illustration in the 
final section.  For now, we will imagine what it is like to sit in a bathtub alone in 
order to better understand what Diogenes, the way I have painted him, may have 
been up to.  It is in this light that I offer the following illustration. 
Imagine that you are, like Diogenes, reflecting in the space of your own 
needs.  Imagine that all of the things you think you need are in the tub with you.  
Imagine that all of these needs are met.  The kids are cared for, the clothes are 
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clean, the work is done.  Imagining this situation is the work of conscience.  
Conscience holds out another situation as-if one were so situated.  The 
difference is motivational.  In this case, we are imagining that anything that may 
be a motivation is not.176  Imagine Diogenes’ bathtub, but with everything you 
need in it, not just water. 
This is where I wish to begin our thought experiment.  Imagine you are in 
a bathtub which describes the space of the perfect situation.177  The perfect bath 
is everything outside the bath, too.  It is the rest of the world.  The perfect bath 
involves letting one’s self drift away in peaceful reflection because there is no felt 
weight of need compelling distraction. Your every need is met.  There are no 
external constraints, no kids to pick up, no dinner to cook, no bills to pay, no love 
to miss.  Take this to be true. 
Take advantage of the feeling of what it is to take a bath and imagine this 
space.  It is like being in a situation without tension.  We will modify this feeling in 
a moment.  Once we release tension, we will try to account for every dimension 
                                            
176 Hegel has written that conscience is “…this deepest inward solitude with one’s self where 
everything external and every restriction has disappeared.” Cited in Ricoeur, 1992, page 344, 
fn.51, from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right page 254. What I think Hegel means by this in simple 
terms is that conscience represents what it would be like if the world perfectly aligned with one’s 
own personal wishes. Ricoeur recalls from Hegel that this is a lonely situation until and unless 
made actual through ethical life. This causes Ricoeur to reflect on Hegel as follows.  “It is the 
absence of contents, which ethical life alone can bring, that condemns conscience to this solitude 
and this arbitrariness: “Here at the abstract standpoint of morality, conscience lacks this objective 
content and so its explicit character is that of infinite abstract self-certainty [Gewissheit], which at 
the same time is for this very reason the self-certainty of this subject…””  Ricouer here cites page 
91. I take this aspect of Hegel’s thought – abstract self-certainty – and put it work in the 
illustration to follow.  My efforts at motivating the thought experiment take precedence over 
keeping Hegel clear on this count, though I believe that my use of Hegel is not contrary to his own 
designs. 
177 I like to start with the bath because the feeling of being in the bath is of the loss of external 
restrictions and this is what I want to emphasize.  Also, not simply coincidently, bathtubs look like 
gravity wells, and represent low energy states wherein external demands are relaxed and internal 
demands take over. 
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and boundary condition of this bathtub and all the rest of the world order which 
may have been a source of tension.  The idea here is to remove all sources of 
tension, and then to be aware of the feeling of tension as its concern is 
reintroduced.178 
To begin with, imagine being in a bathtub, with tensions wholly relaxed.  
This is the space of an ideal situation.  It is yours.  Your deepest inward wishes 
and grandest life’s dreams are all met right down to the fabric and the color.  This 
represents the space of ideal determination, where everything significant in your 
life is exactly where it is supposed to be.  This is the space of the world as one 
would have it, the space where one feels his own highest potentials realized.  
This is the space of reflection which answers to “life would be perfect if…” 
What is conscience doing here?  Remember the characterization of 
conscience as con-science.  Con-science holds two sciences in comparison.  
Sciences were characterized as ordered arrays of objects which are significant in 
terms of one’s engagements with them.  When the order of the array is less an 
issue, I call them “scenes.”  In the first scene to be compared, that feeling of 
being in the world before the bath, all of the determinations of one’s situation are 
loaded with everyday tensions.  One has to come to terms with having kids, or 
with living alone, or with finding a drink on a moment to moment basis.  This is 
how one’s situation is determined, by the tensions between one’s self and the 
next scene for comparison.  In this second scene, all of these same everyday 
tensions are met.  The kids are cared for, the girl moves back in, the bartender 
                                            
178 Instead of beginning by rationally disbelieving all beliefs, as Descartes did, I am offering an 
affective method.  We begin by feeling. 
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buys the next round.  In this scene, all the terms of one’s own situation which are 
normally strained are relaxed.  In this scene, you are happy. 
The difference between the two scenes is the tension between this 
situation and that.  This tension is motivational.  People want to be happy.  
Conscience motivates us to reach a situation “where everything external and 
every restriction has disappeared.”179  This is a space of rest, a space in which 
our needs are met. 
This is the space which we created when we imagined the “perfect bath.”  
In the perfect bath, there is no tension because conscience holds one’s own 
terms as-if they are met.  In the perfect bath, one lives as-if his situation leaves 
no need unsatisfied.  In ACTWith terms, this is the c/o mode: as-if one’s self 
coming to terms with another (ideal) situation.  In this case, all prior 
determinations are held up to a situation in which these terms are met by the 
situation.  In the perfect bath, there is no space between them, no distance to 
travel to get there.  There are no terms to be come to in this new situation 
because the terms are already met.  This is a low energy state, one of utter 
relaxation.  Life in such a situation, when all that one wishes is affirmed, is good. 
Let’s modify this illustration.  In this case, there is all the tension of 
everyday life.  In my case, there is a great deal of tension attached to finishing 
this dissertation.  This is a great deal of tension.  Writing a dissertation is what is 
called a “weighty situation.”  My entire life hangs on the balance. 
I can imagine myself in another situation, the situation in which my 
                                            
179 See footnote 6 this section. 
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dissertation is done.  This is ACTWith c/o: as-if my self in coming to terms with 
another situation.  The situation is one in which this dissertation is done, and 
done well.  The difference between them is the tension releasing as I let myself 
come to terms with the new situation.  This difference is that of which I am aware 
as tensions relax.  I am aware of the determinations behind these tensions only 
after the fact, as they already release.180  But, I can imagine, based on prior 
experience, a state in which this need, the need to complete the dissertation and 
to do well, is met.  To do well and get done is the best situation I can imagine.  If I 
were in a bathtub, however perfect, this may be one need I could not forget. 
Let’s return to the basic model, that of a bather with a growing thirst.  
Imagine now that you are in the perfect bath with all needs met and begin getting 
thirsty.  Unlike the illustration with Diogenes, in this case you are not resting in 
the space whereby this need can be filled.  Drinking the bathwater is no longer 
an option.  Recollect the discussion on thirstiness and the orientation to the good. 
Recall what thirst requires.  An end needs to be reached.  In the case you must 
imagine, now, this is not the place in which you are presently situated.  The drink 
is outside of this space.  Hereby, a difference opens up between where you are, 
and where you need to be.  You see a space ahead with a drink in it. 
To be thirsty is to need a drink.  To get a drink, in some places and at 
some time, requires walking to the well.  Think of having to walk to the well.  Pull 
up the water, and lift the cup to your mouth for satisfaction.  The energy 
necessary to complete this operation is the minimum expenditure of energy 
                                            
180 And equally in other contexts insofar as they tighten. 
 127 
 
  
necessary to get that drink of water.  Things could be worse.  If there were 
obstacles, things would be harder.  Luckily, the walk to the well has been cleared 
for us by prior generations.  Others have gotten thirsty, needed a drink, and gone 
to the well for one before we have gotten thirsty and have been in need of a 
drink.  Prior generations have given us wells, though we continue to dig more.  
And, prior generations have done more than give us wells; now, we have sinks, 
and pipes, and sewer lines.  Walking to the well requires a lot of energy 
compared to what most people do now.  Now, we simply walk to the tap.  It is the 
energy expended by others in digging wells and laying pipes which saves us so 
much energy, now. 
Even our situation is more energetically expensive than was Diogenes’ 
when it comes to getting a drink of water, however.  The present process - 
getting up, walking to the sink, pulling a clean glass of water - still requires a 
great deal of energy.  For Diogenes the energy necessary to satiate his thirst is a 
minimum.  It is difficult to imagine an easier situation for the thirsty man than 
comfortably drinking his own bath water.  This is a perfect space of rest.  In such 
conditions, there is no place to go because one is already there.181   Now, that is 
taking it easy. 
Let’s return to a more common scenario.  Imagine standing over the well 
after taking a drink, as-if without a need.  In this situation, the situation 
punctuated with thirst is safely behind.  The future is open; no need ties us to any 
                                            
181 It is practical reason which lowers energetic requirements in cases when paths from 
beginnings to ends must be found.  I say little about this, however, beyond pointing out that it is 
practical wisdom which provides the building blocks for all of practical reason’s bridges. 
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end not of our own determination. Momentary thirst now past, standing over the 
well is no longer necessarily the right place to be.  Drinking water is no longer the 
right thing at the right time.  Water is no longer needed.  This is an opportunity for 
deliberation, for tying one’s self to some end of one’s choosing, even some end 
which answers to no need.  It is a moment of leisure.  This is an opportunity for 
luxury.  It is also an opportunity for philosophy.  It is at a moment like this that a 
man is free.182 
At this point, there is an option.  One may continue on in one’s practices, 
slaking thirst at the same old wells and live out a life of utter routine.  In it, one 
may look around the well for distractions, and busy one’s self with certain 
aspects of the world until he grows thirsty again.  Conscience is at work here in 
these mundane instances, keeping track of changing situations and opening to 
some things and not to others.  But, there is a greater capacity untapped here.  
This mirrors the theme of the last few sections: what is the character of a man to 
be?  This is an especially compelling question when that man up ahead is one’s 
self.  Am I to be a man who hovers around at the old watering hole, or am I to be 
a man who does great things? 
In order to demonstrate what I am getting to, let’s recall Socrates’ 
question: is that me ahead or some scarecrow?  We will imagine each situation 
in turn. 
As I relax in the bath, I feel the tension slip away.  I can attend to some 
aspect or other of the situation, but this introduces external restrictions.  Where 
                                            
182 We found Socrates championing this position in section 6. 
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external restrictions do not meet internal requirements, this difference causes 
strain. This introduces tension.  It is the difference between the two which is the 
motivational force of conscience.  In the perfect bath, there is no difference 
between where you are and where you want to be.  It is the perfect situation, as if 
the world were a bathtub molded to meet your every need.  Primary amongst 
these needs is that of being revered. 
Recall Kant’s stipulation that “what is called a moral interest, is based 
solely on this emotion” reverence.  Let us return to the perfect bath for a moment.  
The perfect bath certainly involves being revered.  What I want you to do is to 
imagine that your perfect bathing situation is an object of reverence.  Imagine 
that all the tensions are released, but pay attention to the feeling of having this 
tension, in particular released.  Begin by imagining how others regard those 
whom they revere, because in this case this is you.  Others want to be in a 
situation exactly like yours and to fit with that situation they want to be exactly like 
you.  This is the significance of reverence.  It is more than admiration.  They wish 
they were you, and are actively engaged in becoming more like you. They are 
adopting your practices because yours seem to fit the situation where others’ fail.  
This is more than fame or passing fancy.  You are setting the standard. 
In prior discussions, we have focused on particular aspects of given 
situations.  Where is the furniture?  Where is the one you love?  Where can I get 
a drink?  Here, we are focusing on one’s entire situation.  Reverence is about 
one’s entire way of life.  It is not some aspect of one’s self which is the object of 
reverence, it is the entire self. 
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Wanting to be revered is universal because selfhood is universal.  
Reverence does not mean “admire for some trait or quality.”  Reverence is for 
persons only, whole persons.  Reverence is for a life.  To my mind, that Diogenes 
could capture something universal in such a simple expression as living in a tub 
is to be revered.  Everyone wishes to be in a situation with needs met and turned 
toward the sun.183 
Of course, every tub is different in detail.  Each person has unique needs.  
These details are relative because selves essentially differ from one another.  
And this points to the object of reverence.  One is revered for his difference, his 
embodied difference which is the right difference at the right time.  It is this 
difference which displays that situation to which one is drawn in reverence.  In 
being different from the object of reverence, one is conscientiously motivated to 
become otherwise than he is. 
I have often said that conscience is about doing the right thing at the right 
time.  I have stressed the value of examples.  Here, these two aspects come 
together.  Conscience is about doing the right thing at the right time and serving 
as a model for others to do the same.184  This aims at others taking one’s own 
situation as the ruler of theirs.  At the very least, wanting to be revered is wanting 
to be responsible for doing the right thing at the right time in one’s own eyes and 
in the eyes of others like one’s self.  If one is revered, unlike the men named by 
                                            
183 Perhaps this explains Alexander’s remark, that if he could not have been Alexander, he would 
have been Diogenes. 
184 I am not prepared to go into details here but I think that this good feeling stems from the fact 
that others in moments of reverence are o/o to one’s self, and one mirrors their state (love) for 
one’s self as one mirrors that other’s expressions normally.  I am presuming nothing controversial 
here.  But, the simple four-square ACTWith matrix is here revealed to be a four square with each 
square embedded with another full matrix mirroring others, at the very least.  
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Callicles in the 6th section, this sentiment continues long after the party is over.  
Reverence is more than a fat belly and a happy face.  Like Diogenes, to be 
revered is to be situated with no place to go because one is already there.  In 
fact, one is the there to which others come in reverence.  Can any of us say that 
this is where he is now? 
Imagine that you revere yourself.  That man, up ahead, is already you.  In 
the perfect bath, it is as if one had come to terms with his world and all needs are 
met.   This includes coming needs.  Imagine that you have lived such a worthy 
life that all needs are met, including being revered.  You already are that man 
ahead.  Imagine, for instance, that you have provided for the security off yourself 
and all others through hard work and dedication.  You are in the situation of 
having this work behind you.  You are successful.  Relaxed.  That feels good.  No 
tension. 
Real life is seldom this way, however.  Is who you are the person you wish 
you were?  How far are you from this ideal situation?  We will look at how far you 
might be in the discussion to follow.  Let’s take the perfect bath and invert it.  
Let’s turn the tub upside down.  You are cast out on the muddy floor covered in 
filth and soot.  Imagine that you are the object of disgust.  Imagine that 
everything has gone horribly wrong. 
This is a terrifying difference.  First, in the space of the perfect bath, all felt 
needs are met.  These include fame, fortune, and other worldly things.  These 
needs also include health, hope, and happiness.  Now, none of these needs are 
met.  In fact, these are lacking.  You are sick, infamous, and miserable.  This 
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situation is not a place anyone wants to be.  It is the opposite of being revered.  
This situation differs in that you are disgusting.  No one wants to be you.  
Especially, you don’t want to be you. 
We can begin by imagining particular things.  In the perfect bath, one is 
clean and healthy.  In this inversion, one is slimy, sick, and likely even 
contagious.  In the perfect bath, one is revered by others.  In this inversion, one 
is despised.  In the perfect bath, the one you love comes to you in your time of 
need, she does not go off to drink beer with a hippy to live in a van for a month 
on the road.  After all, the love expressed by those others to whom you are open 
is what makes the bath perfect.  To open to another in love, only to have her lie, 
and reject you in disgust, is the opposite of a perfect situation.  In this inversion, 
the one you love abandons you in your time of need.  In her eyes, you see the 
disgust behind the rejection.  “Yours is no longer the place I wish to be.  I wish 
instead to be away from you.”185  In self-disgust, this evaluation is internalized.  
One mirrors the rejection, and it is complete.  It is not that some aspect of one’s 
situation is wrong, it is that everything about one’s situation is wrong.  What is 
wrong is one’s entire self.  It is disgusting.  One’s self is the situation one cannot 
be. 
Becoming an object of self-disgust is a very real possibility.  Without good 
examples to follow, and the good-will of others, and with an opportunity to do 
otherwise here and there, one already is this situation.  This is as-if one were 
already the scarecrow, and not Socrates up ahead.  This is most terrifying.  
                                            
185 I am picturing disgust as this internalized holistic self-rejection felt as self-disgust. 
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There is nothing more terrifying by my imagination.  This is why Socrates’ 
question is, as he maintains, the most important question of all.  When we have 
the opportunity to do the right thing, it is a valuable opportunity.  It means a life 
worth living, or not. 
This thought experiment is meant to capture the sense of conscience as 
that capacity to open spaces which respond to need and correspond to 
satisfaction.  Conscience presents us with a gap which must be bridged in order 
to find satisfaction.  Conscience motivates one to bridge this gap by holding out 
that situation as that in which one may be happy. 
This illustration also captures an opportunity for reflection.  In sitting in the 
bath, oscillating from reverence to disgust as we just have, we have caught a 
glimpse of two poles which bind the whole of one’s life.  We aim for doing the 
right thing at the right time.  If we succeed, we are revered for this way of life.  
We avoid doing the wrong thing at the wrong time.  If we fail, we are an object of 
disgust.  Conscience motivates us to the former, and away from the latter.  This 
marks the search for the meaning of life.  When we wonder which ends are 
worthy, and which are not, we wonder about what it is that makes the right thing 
to do the right thing to do at the right time to do it.  This is the work of the 
conscience. 
The sections to follow mark a change of pace.  I will leave the talk for the 
ACTWith model, and of bathtubs and potato games until the final section, when 
we will take what we have learned and apply it to a pressing situation requiring 
conscientious attention.  I do this for two reasons.  Primarily, I leave this 
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language behind in order to meet the thinkers to come on their own terms.  The 
relationships between the material to come and the materials already covered 
are obvious enough.  Secondarily, I leave this language behind so that the reader 
may begin putting these basic concepts to use in interpreting the material to 
come.  In this way, I hope that what follows is productive of an understanding 
which then, as this text closes, we are ready to apply to real problems in real life.  
We are here to draw a circle of words around the world.  It sounds like hard work 
but, this way to the good. 
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10.  Conscience, and the appearance of the good. 
 
In a receptive, attentive observer, intuitive images of the 
characteristic aspects of the things that interest him come to exist; 
afterward he knows no more about how these images arose than a 
child knows about the examples from which he learned the 
meanings of words. That an artist has beheld the truth follows from 
the fact that we too are seized with the conviction of truth when he 
leads us away from currents of accidentally related qualities.  An 
artist is superior to us in that he knows how to find the truth amid all 
the confusion and chance events of daily experience. 
 --H. Helmholtz186 
 
 
We saw Diogenes take a bath last section.  The lesson that we derived 
from his example involves the universality of the human condition as situated in a 
world of need.  In the end, we discovered something about the conscience.  It is 
what motivates us to realize our highest dreams and aspirations.  It also reveals 
our frailty, and the horror of being cast out.  In this section, we will approach the 
theme of alienation in general.  We will find in Martin Heidegger’s thought a basis 
for some things revealed in the prior sections.  One is the significance of others 
in how we come to see ourselves.  Another is the role of conscience in motivating 
one to realize his highest potentials.  Together, these constraints will give insight 
into what is universal about man’s condition, trying to make the most of mortality. 
There is a danger in working with Heidegger’s philosophy directly.  
Everything is connected with everything else.  To begin talking on one point 
inevitably leads to a web of critical associations with supporting notions.  Herein, 
we are asking: what is the relationship between conscience, death, and other 
                                            
186 The Facts of Perception.  Anticipating dynamic systems, and the agent on the edge of chaos, 
frantically ordering the turbulence simply to ensure that the plane of his existence remains 
continuous in all its critical dimensia.  This is the picture of conscience at work, artistry, the 
workhorse of philosophy. 
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people?  Even this simple question unlocks a floodgate.  So, we must tread 
lightly and skip on through to more solid ground. 
For Heidegger, conscience is universal among human beings.  
Conscience is a “”universally established and ascertainable fact.””187   
Conscience shows up as a call.  It “summons” one’s self away from everyday 
entanglements and forward to one’s highest potentials.188  Consistent with its 
characterization as a call, it “gives us something to understand, it discloses.”189 
What it discloses, and what it calls one toward, is one’s self. 
In some traditional phenomenological terms, the movement of disclosure, 
“clearing” in the sense of a verb, is one of exstasis.  “Ex-stasis” comes from root 
words: -sta, meaning “staying in place,” and ex-, “out of,” implying moving from, 
standing up, no longer staying in place.190 
Only living things are ex-static.  As their situations in the world change, 
they experience new things, or old things in different ways; they “disclose” the 
                                            
187 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 1996, page 249(270).  Where possible, notes to 
Heidegger’s Being and Time are from the same edition and will follow this format: B&T, page 
xxx(xxx), with English pagination first, and German pagination in parentheses. 
188 I use the word “highest” to describe what Heidegger is translated to refer to as one’s 
“ownmost” potential.  I clarify what this potential is – discovery toward understanding – as the text 
continues.  Though “ownmost” captures the sense in which one’s understanding is unique, and so 
the possibilities stemming from this potential are always one’s own highest possibilities, I simply 
use the term “highest” as it captures this sense for all persons equally.   
189 B&T, page 249(270) 
190 This movement need not be understood spatially, though this picture is easy to grasp.  
Consider this example.  What’s the difference between a Socrates sitting and a Socrates 
standing?  Ex-stasy! To think of ex-static in this way, as the English word appears, ex-, meaning 
having been, and –static, meaning at rest, is not far off, but must not be confused with especial 
glee.  It may be understood as excitability resulting in embodied difference though experience, 
and this requires no spatial movement per se. 
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world in their ex-static movement from a resting place, as the phenomenological 
tradition has maintained since the Greeks.191 
Heidegger’s focus in Being and Time is not “living with clocks,” as the title 
in English suggests, although he has something to say about that too.  
Heidegger’s focus in Being and Time is “die Lichtung”, or “the clearing” of being.  
And by the clearing of being, we are really talking about the meaning of life: 
“…the essence of a human being is to be “already” … that place where things 
show up as what, that, and how they are.”192 
Let me clarify.  “Clearing” is both a noun, as in “already that place where 
things show up” and like “the cleared space of a dark forest wherein one dwells.”  
It is also a verb, as in “clearing up the darkness for the building of a dwelling.”  
Heidegger means both, as in “being in the clear.” 
 These two together lead to the possibility for another sense of clearing.  A 
clearing is a space in which things arise.  A clearing is an open space in which 
things can be constructed, ordered, arranged.  A clearing is a place where work 
is done.  A clearing is a site of synthesis.193 
The word that Heidegger uses to indicate beings like human beings is 
“Dasein.”  Dasein is German, and literally signifies “being there.”194  “Being there” 
is not quite complete, though; what Heidegger has in mind is more like “the being 
                                            
191 The locus classicus for Western Philosophy’s role this disclosure resides in Plato’s Myth of the 
Cave. 
192 Sheehan, page 276.  The astute reader will realize the parallel with the three aspects of 
temporality in kairos; the what is the past, what is judged, the present is that which is on display, 
and the future is how these become new, again. 
193 “It is not that the self is conceivable by some sort of reduction.  It is not a thing out there, to be 
arrived at “by purely logical means.”  “Rather, the I is the subject of logical behavior, of binding 
together.  The “I think” means I bind together.”  B&T, page 294(319) 
194 For Heidegger’s own clarification, in terms which suit the following discussion, see B&T, page 
125(132-133).  We will return to these passages later on, in the next sub-section, in any event. 
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of the there” than simply “being in a spot at a time,” like other things, like rocks 
and sticks.  Dasein is where any there happens.  Dasein is where things come to 
matter. 
“Da-sein is a being which is concerned in its being about that being.”195  
That explains why we surround ourselves with the things we do.  “Clearing” 
mirrors “caring.” It is only in terms of this clearing that things matter at all. “One 
is, after all, what one takes care of.”196  One’s situation is defined in terms of the 
objects which occupy his attention.  This aspect of one’s self, that it always is 
understood as situated in terms of objects, Heidegger calls “existential spatiality.”  
Whenever one says that “I am here,” one is remarking on the “existential 
spatiality” of one’s self.  Thus, one can feel “spread thin” when the objects which 
demand his attention are far removed and still important.  “Here” is always 
understood in terms of “the things at hand which [one] initially takes care of in the 
surrounding world.”197  Here is thus understood in terms of the things one cares 
about.  If these things are not “here,” this is a source of anxiety.  Dasein cares, 
and in caring things come to matter.  Here matters.  Mattering, Dasein brings its 
here with it.  This view carries important consequences. 
In a later essay, Heidegger explains that: “Being there names that which 
should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place – 
namely, the location of the truth of Being.”198  Being there is being the place 
                                            
195 B&T, 179(192) 
196 Ibid, 296(322) 
197 Ibid, 114(???)  I have substituted “one” for “it” for readability. 
198 Heidegger, The Way Back to the Grounds of Metaphysics, appearing in Kaufmann, page 213. 
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where things are found to matter, to still matter, or not.  Being there is being the 
place where things are found to matter in this way, or that, or otherwise. 
By truth, Heidegger means alethea: disclosure, discovery.  Its actuality lies 
in the experience of the being whose function is disclosure, whose function is 
truth as such, Dasein.  Heidegger points out that, for the Greeks, “the essence of 
truth” is a privative expression, a-letheia, and signifies a “robbery,” or a taking for 
one’s own.  This is not some passive waiting for the world to present itself.  This 
is a sequestering away on one’s own turf.  This is pushing back the darkness to 
see for one’s self. This is what Heidegger calls “making space for things.” In 
disclosing, our worlds, ourselves, are opened up.  This is how one comes to the 
truth. 
For instance, imagine clearing a field for farming.  In this mode, rich clean 
soil is good and rocks are revealed as obstacles.  Now, imagine clearing a field 
for geology, in order to study rocks; in this mode, it is the soil which is the 
obstacle.  In either case, it is the purposeful movement which evaluates rocks as 
good or bad.  The rock itself suffers either determination without complaint.  It will 
find rest where it is let lay. 
The mode of discovery influences what Dasein takes to be true.  The way 
in which things come to matter becomes an aspect of what that thing is 
understood to be.  If farmer Dasein says to Geologist Dasein “There are a bunch 
of obstacles in that field.  Get rid of them, I am going to lunch.”  He may return to 
a field with all the dirt taken out of it.  This was not his object. 
 140 
 
  
After all, the work in clearing [verb] is for the sake of a clearing [noun] for 
the purposes which discovered the space, in the first place.  So, again, clearing 
farmland means taking out rocks, which, in the end, means clearing a space 
suitable for farming.  Geology means taking out dirt and studying the rest.  If the 
farmer pointed to a rock and said “obstacle,” the geologist will say “false.” 
 This returns us to the expansive sense of clearing.  A clearing can be 
pushed outward.  The clearing, the ordered and ordering space in which orders 
are ordered, can be made bigger.  Disorder is pushed back, and Dasein makes 
the unknown known.   But you always have to begin at your own boundaries, and 
the shovel only turns the soil in the shape of its own blade.  “As the 
understanding discovery of what is unintelligible, all explanation is rooted in the 
primary understanding of Dasein.”199  Let me clarify. 
One way in which the clearing of being is always expanding is in time.  
Dasein is temporal.  In discovering the objects of the world he clears the way for 
himself.   He doesn’t clear the way just anyway, he clears the way ahead.200  This 
is the meaning of being as clearing in the sense of both noun and verb taken all 
at once.  The future is what the clearing is all about. “Its primary meaning is the 
future.”201  
In one’s ecstatic discovery of the world one comes to understand it.  It is 
on this basis that one looks ahead for possibilities. What one sees ahead is 
dependent on one’s present understanding. 
                                            
199 B&T, 309(336) 
200 As we shall see in more detail as we proceed, conscience does special work in this enterprise.  
Conscience calls back from ahead of us, disclosing whether that situation is clear or not. 
201 B&T, 301(328). 
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Understanding constitutes the being of the there in such a way that, 
on the basis of such understanding, a Da-sein in existing can 
develop the various possibilities of sight, of looking around, and of 
just looking.202 
 
After all, the farmer does not clear rocks in order to have a good last 
season, but for the next.  Whatever came of this year’s harvest, the possibilities 
for the next can at least come with fewer obstacles.  “Dasein has always already 
compared itself, in its being, with a possibility of itself.”203  “Dasein comes toward 
itself in terms of what is taken care of.”204  Heidegger calls this a “project.”205 
Understanding is unique to individual Dasein.  Everyone has their own 
“projection.”  This unique understanding which is projected is based in the 
understanding one has of one’s own situation.  One’s self is always situated, 
whether explicitly or not.  Thus, Dasein in discovery comes to understand its 
situation.  And, as one’s self is the situation, this is where one finds one’s self.  
“Saying I means the being that I always am as “I-am-in-a-world.”206 
Utterance is not necessary.  With the “I” this being means itself. 
The content of this expression is taken to be absolutely simple.  It 
always means only me, and nothing further.”207 
 
For the most part, people live in a world already cleared. Let’s face it; we 
always find ourselves in terms of which we are not the authors. One’s own 
clearing of being is essentially a shared one.  More strongly than that, being with 
others is an essential aspect of our constitutions.  Heidegger finds proof for this 
                                            
202 B&T, 309(336) 
203 Ibid 179(192) 
204 Ibid 310(337) 
205 Again in two senses, but I will let this go. 
206 B&T, 295(321) 
207 There is a note to this phrase: “Clarifying more precisely: saying-I and being a self.” B&T, 
293(318) 
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in that persons get lonely.  “The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with.  
Being-alone is a deficient mode of being-with, its possibility is a proof for the 
latter.”208 
This is proof that Mitdasein – being with others -  is a structural aspect of 
Dasein.  Heidegger does not start with an isolated “I” from which must be 
construed bridges post hoc.  He starts with a being for whom being essentially is 
being-with-others: 
In order to avoid this misunderstanding, we must observe in what 
sense we are talking about the “others.”  “The others” does not 
mean everybody else but me – those from whom the I distinguishes 
itself.  They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not 
distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too.209 
 
We are with other people, fundamentally, before there is ever the 
possibility of being alone. Heidegger is explicit in the passage below that Dasein 
is simply that sort of animal:210 
Thus, in being-with and toward others, there is a relation of being 
from Dasein to Dasein.  But, one would like to say, this relation is 
after all, already constitutive for one’s own Dasein, which has an 
understanding of its own being and is thus related to Dasein.  The 
relation of being to others then becomes a projection of one’s own 
being toward oneself “into an other.”  The other is a double of the 
self.211 
 
This mirroring carries consequences. Already being with others, persons 
come to understand themselves insofar as they deviate from the norm, from the 
average everydayness that is the public understanding.  A mirror of others from 
                                            
208  B&T, 113(120). Not limited to people. 
209 Ibid 111(118).  See appendices for insight into how this position differs from that of the modern 
tradition. 
210 Mohanty is correct to criticize other approaches which seek to bridge isolated selves though 
some force or other, like empathy, and he notes that Heidegger’s great gift is this insight. 
211 B&T, 117(124)  This picture gels nicely with that of contemporary neurology.  See the 
bibliography. 
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the beginning, one sees one’s self and others in terms of differences.  
“Existentially expressed, being-with-one-another has the character of 
distantiality.”212 This deviance is constantly discouraged as the average 
understanding “prescribes the nearest interpretation of the world and being-in-
the-world.”213  Thus, persons understand themselves in terms of how they differ 
from others, and there is pressure to conform: 
In taking care of the things in which one has taken hold of, for, and 
against others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from 
them, whether, this difference is to be equalized, whether one’s 
own Dasein has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in 
relation to them, whether Dasein in its priority over others is intent 
on suppressing them.214 
 
The anonymous others from whom one is distanced and “with whom this 
difference is to be equalized” Heidegger calls the “they.”  “They” have already 
done it, it has met “their” standards, and so must we to be one of them.215  Yet it 
can be said that “no one” did it, for no one is this standard, and the standard for 
one’s self becomes doing nothing at all.216  To deviate is to risk deviance, to no 
longer belong to the average and to do as expected.  Anonymously, the they 
exerts a positive pressure on us all to remain safely within the body of the group. 
Thus the they maintains itself factically in the averageness of what 
is proper, what is allowed, and what is not.  Of what is granted 
success and what is not.  This averageness, which prescribe what 
can and cannot be ventured, watches over every exception which 
thrusts itself to the fore.  Every priority is noiselessly squashed.217 
 
                                            
212 B&T, 118(126) 
213 Ibid 121(129) 
214 Ibid 118(126) 
215 Every “them” is an “us.” 
216 Who do we hold to account if the standard goes wrong?  We shall see in a “moment.” 
217 B&T, 119(127) 
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On Heidegger’s assay, because of a natural inclination to “taking things 
easily”, there is an attraction to giving one’s self over to the they, “to 
averageness...”218  Being in the norm is comforting.  Being in with the group 
carries with it a sense that one is where he should be.  Being one of them feels 
like home.  This sleepy existence where things are anonymously taken care of 
may feel like a boon, but it comes with a steep cost.  
In holding one’s self to the examples of others nearby, the they 
“disburdens” the self of responsibility.219  Taking the public understanding as the 
standard for truth, “the they presents every judgment and decision as its own.”  
We begin with this public understanding as the benchmark for our own, and we 
are held to account when we become other than.  So, it is not surprising that 
many remain in this understanding, and in fact seek to close their own gap with 
its average ideal.  There is a lot of anxiety involved in taking responsibility for 
one’s self. 
When understood primarily as that indifferent system of anonymous others 
which surrounds and judges every action and activity, the they is deconstructed 
as countless numbers from countless generations who all cannot at once be 
                                            
218 B&T, 121(130) 
219 This criticism is not new to Heidegger. Aristotle asserts that wicked people seek the company 
of others in order to run from themselves.  There is nothing to love within them.  They have 
instilled no virtue in themselves and have perhaps done worse, have become vicious.  As a 
consequence, according to this account, wicked people don’t like to be alone.  For Aristotle, is it 
vicious people who themselves, by having to be in a group which reinforces their vices, in fact 
serve as an example against vice.(1166b27-8)  Socrates, in fact, holds a similar position; the 
virtuous philosopher maintains the truth, even when this truth is unpopular.  The philosopher must 
be able to resist the temptation to hide from his responsibility to represent the truth.  It is the 
motivation of the sophist to “bake pastries” as if for “children,” to act and to speak in flattering, 
comfortable terms.  Socrates, with Aristotle, both hold that one may be “led into better ways of 
living and talking”(13a23-4) while at once one who is in the most wretched condition of life seeks 
the company of others in order to distract themselves from taking the steps to actively end their 
condition.(1166b11-13) 
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wrong.  It is simply the way things are done.  It is this faceless collective which, 
taken for granted, “can most easily be responsible for everything because no one 
has to vouch for anything.”220  This is critical to understanding the role of others 
in Heidegger’s philosophy. Most critical to understanding the role of the “they” in 
Heidegger’s account of conscience is the way in which they take “the 
responsibility of Dasein away from it.”221 
Most persons stay within the fenced range of everyday expectations, living 
as they always have, letting “them” do it and doing their own part to meet the 
average expectation.  This way of being is essentially closed off from the 
world.222 Closedness is that condition to which Heraclitus points in the following 
fragment. “The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each 
into a world of his own.”223 Just imagine the sense of relaxation in the phrase 
“they will take care of it.”  This is taking it easy, like taking a life-long nap. 
Awake, there is another option.  Through moods, one may keep himself 
open to the world.   “The moodedness of attunement constitutes existentially the 
openness to the world of Dasein.”224 To be open is to let things come to matter, 
as in making room for them in the clearing of one’s life.  There is anxiety in letting 
things come to matter, because this means that one cares about them because 
one cares about one’s self.  It is this anxiety which lifts when one lets the average 
understanding of what matters stand in for his own.  If it doesn’t matter to them, 
                                            
220 B&T, 119(127) 
221 Ibid 119(127) 
222 Thanks to Professor Alexander VonSchoenborn for articulating this insight as a mere passing 
moment in a past seminar.  World, here, means the “how of the world” and its order, or “kosmos” 
which is the term of the original. 
223 Fragment 95. http://classicpersuasion.org/pw/burnet/egp.htm?chapter=3#65 
224 B&T,129(137) 
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then it doesn’t matter.  This is a great release of tension, as if some burden were 
removed by “them.”  This is the attraction of residing in the clearing of the “they.” 
In this attraction lies the implicit opportunity for escape; but, it won’t come 
easily.  It is not as if there is some magic key.  If there is escape, it is more like 
climbing out of a well than dashing through a hole in the wall.  After all, one’s self 
is the wall.  In order to overcome the barrier of anxiety that comes with letting 
things come to matter, like crawling out of a depression, “Dasein can, should, 
and must master its mood with knowledge and will.” 225  It may be easier to go 
with what “they” said, but it may not be right.226  Only by keeping open to the 
world is Dasein free to become himself.227 
Heidegger calls all the things in the world which matter to Dasein the 
“referential context of significance.”  One’s self is not to be found in this context.  
Instead, one’s self makes all the things of the world relevant.  It does so in terms 
of its highest aspirations, in terms of the man one wishes himself to be: 
The referential context of significance is anchored in the being of 
Dasein toward its ownmost being – a being which cannot be in a 
relation of relevance, but which is rather the being for the sake of 
which Dasein is as it is.228 
 
Here is where Angst becomes so important.  Angst is the fundamental 
mood of being in the world for Heidegger.  When someone says they are 
                                            
225 B&T, 128(136) 
226 Although inter-subjectively confirmed, they may prescribe actions indifferent to the objective 
world, for example.  “They” sell SUV’s.  “They” say that SUV’s are the best vehicle to buy.  “They” 
may not be right.  
227 Long, page 381. Long puts it thusly: “In the early Heidegger, at least, Verstehen 
[understanding] remains tied to Nietzschean self-assertion: having gotten myself back from 
“everybody’s” standard, everyday (mis)-interpretations of things and owned my very own 
authentic self, I now open up, erschlieBe [would open], significance for myself.” 
228 B&T, 115(???) 
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“struggling under the weight of the world,” this is angst.  Angst is about life itself; 
if it is about something in particular, it is not angst.  “Being-in-the-world is both 
what Angst is anxious in the face of and what it is anxious about.”229 
Angst is characterized by a feeling of uncanniness; “uncanniness means 
… not being at home” in the world.230  Uncanniness is the feeling that something 
doesn’t fit, like something isn’t right about the situation.   It is uncanny that one’s 
girlfriend should utter some particular phrase at some particular instance, for 
example, or that one’s own garden gnome shows up in a flea market in Florence.  
What is uncanny is one’s situation relative some particular thing.  In the case of 
angst, however, what doesn’t fit the situation is not some thing in particular, but 
everything altogether: 
In particular, that in the face of which one has angst is not 
encountered as something definite to be taken care of; the threat 
does not come from something at hand or objectively present, but 
rather from the fact that everything at hand and objectively present 
absolutely has nothing more to “say” to us.  Beings in the 
surrounding world are no longer relevant.231 
 
The uncanniness with which Angst confronts Dasein is the possibility that 
what does not fit in the world is one’s self.  As one’s self anchors the total context 
in which things appear, when all things are no longer relevant, one’s self is 
equally no longer relevant. If nothing is relevant, and what is relevant is relevant 
only in terms of my own life, then how is my life relevant?  Angst confronts us 
with the fact that given what we’ve got, there is nothing ahead.  With nothing 
ahead, and nothing relevant, it is a feeling that one’s own life does not matter.  
                                            
229 B&T, 315(343) 
230 Ibid 176(189) 
231 Ibid 315(344) 
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The feeling of having nothing ahead is the feeling of being confronted with death.  
Through angst, “Dasein is thus essentially individualized down to its ownmost 
potentiality of death as the nonrelational possibility.”232 
It clears away every covering over of the fact that Dasein is left to 
itself.  The nothingness before which angst brings us reveals the 
nullity that determines Dasein in its ground, which itself is 
thrownness into death.233 
 
Death is that situation in which there is no situation.  One cannot imagine 
being dead, this is why persons speak so often about “life after death.”  When 
one tries to imagine what death is like, the situation has the indefinite sense of 
the “nothing and nowhere.”234  It feels as-if being in a non-place, a 
netherworld.235  Because one’s self as the clearing of being is that place, death 
confronts Dasein with non-being, and with the fact that non-being is its certain 
end.  Everyone dies.  Who and when are the only real questions, but there is no 
getting around it.  Angst confronts us with death, with not-being, and with the fact 
that there is no escaping it.  This is scary, but also an opportunity: 
The insignificance of the world disclosed in Angst reveals the nullity 
of what can be taken care of, that is, the impossibility of projecting 
oneself upon a potentiality-of-being primarily based upon what is 
taken care of.  But the revelation of this impossibility means to let 
the possibility of an authentic potentiality of being shine forth.236 
 
“Angst reveals in Dasein its being toward its ownmost potentiality of being, 
that is being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself.”237 Angst strips 
                                            
232 B&T, 283-284(307) 
233 Ibid 285(308) 
234 Ibid 176(189) 
235 We will break with Heidegger on this point, as will come clear as this text draws to a close. 
236 B&T, 315(343) 
237 Ibid 176(189) 
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away all worldly objects and so calls into question the very meaning of existence.  
All that is left is to answer.  Yet, without anything relevant, what constitutes the 
“possibility of an authentic potentiality of being” which Heidegger paints as the 
upshot of Angst? 
It is freedom.  Without significance predetermined, Dasein is free to 
determine what is significant for itself.  This potentiality is disclosed to Dasein by 
the conscience, even though in Angst the world and life itself has lost all 
relevance.  The beacon of freedom is the call of conscience.  “The call of 
conscience passes over all “worldly” status and abilities of Dasein in its 
summons.”238  In getting one’s self back from “everybody’s” standard one opens 
oneself to the possibility of self-determination239 in the face of angst.  Dasein 
understands uniquely, and he can choose to test his understanding or rest in that 
of others who have understood for and before him.  “In choosing to make this 
choice, Da-sein makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-of-
being.*”240 
The conscience offers an opportunity to keep one’s highest potentials 
open and not to close off into a given way of life.  “This potentiality is that for the 
sake of which any Dasein is as it is.”241  This makes a person different from “the 
others.”  Keeping one’s self open to possibilities, which are not those of the 
                                            
238 B&T, 283-284(307) he continues: “Disregarding those, it individualizes Dasein down to is 
potentiality for being guilty which it expects to be authentically.” 
239 Discovery. 
240 To which there is a note: “*a taking place of being – philosophy, freedom.” B&T, 248(269)  
Man’s highest potential, discovery. 
241 B&T, 179(192) 
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average understanding, is the mode in which a person is most himself.  But, it 
isn’t easy: 
Dasein is authentically itself in the mode of primordial individuation 
of reticent resoluteness that expects Angst* of itself.242 
 
Keeping one’s self open to possibilities invites angst.  Reticent resoluteness 
means confronting death by taking responsibility for one’s life, past present and 
future.  When confronted with a situation in which something doesn’t fit, it is one’s 
responsibility to figure out what it is and only then to fix it.  Think of Martin Luther 
King Jr.  Inequality does not fit in a free society, and he worked to understand 
that.  It was part of the situation shared by himself and others alike, so he took 
the responsibility to work at fixing it.  “When we do that, we may be said to “want 
to have a conscience” in the sense of being prepared to supply, out of one’s own 
resources, what is not in any case forthcoming from any other source.”243 
Conscience discloses something for us to understand.  It discloses 
something about ourselves.  Though we begin with others and live according to a 
public standard, conscience shows us that our lives are our own.  Conscience 
discloses by calling “Dasein forth to its own unique possibilities.”244   This has two 
dimensions.  His life is his object and his project, his limit and his aim.  Death is 
his limit, and understanding is his limit, but his object is to make the most of his 
understanding in the space of life before he dies.  In doing so, he keeps the 
clearing open for others to come.  This is not easy, for to spend one’s life-time in 
study; answering the call of conscience, is not going to the library.  It takes 
                                            
242 *”That is, the clearing of being as being.” B&T, 297(323) 
243 Olafson, page 47. 
244 B&T, 252(273) 
 151 
 
  
courage. 
The mood through which one masters angst and the anxieties of 
loneliness and deviance is “resoluteness.”  “Resoluteness means letting one’s 
self be summoned out of one’s lostness in the they.”245  In resolve, one holds 
one’s self open, “authentically “there” for the disclosed situation in the 
“Moment.””246  Instead of doing as has always been done, or as expected, or 
according to convention, Dasein has the potential to discover otherwise.  Dasein 
has the potential to live otherwise. 
In being called to his “own-most”247 possibilities, Dasein is not called away 
from the world and from others.  For instance, renouncing the material world of 
man and going off into a cave may seem enlightened, but it is a way of closing off 
from the world.  After all, being with others is part of one’s own constitution.  We 
mirror one another.  Resoluteness “pushes” one’s self “toward concerned being-
with with others.”248 
Recall the talk of Dasein as the “clearing” of being.  A clearing is an open 
space.  A clearing is shared.249  In resolve Dasein is openly “clearing” in 
anticipating discovery for himself and others.   In resolve Dasein is open to the 
future as an aspect of the clearing in the first place, one’s own and others.  
Instead of bowing to fears and to angst in the face of individuation and death, 
Dasein is open to the opportunities which living together and dying together 
                                            
245 B&T, 275(300) 
246 Ibid 301-2(328) 
247 Highest and unique. 
248 Ibid 274(299) 
249 Always shared.  When apparently not shared, one is lonely, which indicates a deficient mode 
of sharing. 
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present.  His discovery is tomorrow’s understanding.  He doesn’t have to go 
search somewhere “out there” for this or that opportunity to be a hero.  Real 
opportunities happen here at home: 
Resolution does not escape from “reality,” but first discovers what is 
factically possible in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible as 
one’s ownmost potentiality for being in the they.250 
 
Once one has recovered himself from others and become his own unique 
project of discovery, he still must go home.  What one in resoluteness discovers 
and takes home with him is the truth.  Though one treks out and robs the world of 
some discovery alone, its value is for everyone.  It is in resoluteness that 
conscience is related to being with others. 
Resoluteness is the openness to discovery which is embodied in the mode 
of “wanting to have a conscience.”  Resolute, Dasein is “brought to the existence 
of his situation.”251 Resolute, Dasein is open to discovery of the situation as it 
presents itself. 
But this means that it simply cannot become rigid about the 
situation, but must understand that the resolution must be kept free 
and open for the actual factical possibility in accordance with its 
own meaning as disclosure.252 
 
This is what Heidegger means by “Dasein must… master its moods” in 
order to reach its highest potential.  Resolute, Da-sein is “all the more 
authentically “there” for the disclosed situation in the “Moment.”253  Dasein’s 
                                            
250 B&T, 275(300)  Here, Heidegger is sounding like “reverence” is one’s highest potential, and I 
think that this is right.  He does flesh out what this amounts to, the life worthy of reverence, in 
giving cash value for a man’s highest potential in understanding. 
251 Ibid 276(301) 
252 Ibid 284(308) 
253 Ibid 301-2(328) 
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highest potential is discovery, being the being whereby things come to matter. 
“The Moment brings existence to the situation and discloses the authentic 
“There.”254255 
As mitdasein is a foundational aspect of being, the situation is being with 
and for other persons.  Many of these others will outlive one’s self; yet they share 
the situation.  It is authentic as it is one’s own, and not simply the product of an 
anonymous other’s understanding.  It is “there” because one is already and 
always with others. 
Moreover, this is not a one-time thing. 
The holding-for-true that belongs to resoluteness tends, in 
accordance with its meaning, toward constantly keeping itself free, 
that is, to keep itself free for the whole potentiality of being 
Dasein.256 
 
Wanting to have a conscience is a way of life.  The character of being 
open to potential is called “resolve” and involves being open to angst and so to 
the voice of conscience.  The mood which qualifies this openness is “anticipatory 
resoluteness.”  This is preparedness for the opportunities of the moment 
understood in terms of self and others.  This means actively discovering every 
moment of every day for everyone. 
Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the actual situation of the there 
in such a way that existence circumspectly takes care of the factical 
things at hand in the surrounding world in action.  Resolute being 
together with what is at hand in the situation, that is, letting what 
presences in the surrounding world be encountered in action, is 
                                            
254 Ibid 319(347) 
255 For insight into what Heidegger means by “moment” see the discussion on kairos this text.  
Though I do not make this tie any more explicit, Heidegger’s notion of moment is kairological.  In 
fact, this earlier discussion on kairos is in this text in order to prepare for an understanding of 
Heidegger’s thought. 
256 My interpretation of the discussion at B&T, 284(308) 
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possible only in a making that being present.  Only as the present, 
in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is, 
namely, the undistorted letting what it grasps in action be 
encountered.257 
 
In resoluteness, one is open to come to terms with his situation however 
that situation comes to be determined.  This is how one comes to understand 
one’s situation.  In fact, it is only through resoluteness that the situation is 
understood at all. “Situation is the there disclosed in resoluteness… situation is 
only through and in resoluteness.”258  If not coming to terms with the world, 
Dasein is “closed off” from it.259  Where the latter maintains some prior truth to 
hold, the former is open to other determinations and further discovery. 
“For the they, however, situation is essentially closed off.”260  Instead of 
coming to terms with the situation, staying open for the opportunities which each 
moment presents, they know only the “general situation.”  In this way, they take 
themselves as given, and fail to take responsibility for themselves.  The they 
finds meaning in life by “calculating the accidents which it fails to recognize, 
deems its own achievement and passes off as such.”261 
Let’s review.  We can understand being in the world as a clearing.  It is a 
clearing in a number of ways.  In one very important way, being in the world is 
                                            
257 B&T, 299-300(326) 
258 B&T, 276(301) 
259 Living the life of the “they” is not a way of coming to terms with the world as it is taken on 
terms whose significance is already given, and not discovered in light of the authentic situation. 
260 Ibid 276(301) 
261 Ibid 276(301) For example, consider the assistant who gets all the posh side jobs. He 
discovers the opportunities and succeeds in winning them only because of the office in which he 
serves.  If the man is resolute, he will understand that his success is not of his own doing but is 
an extension of the position he occupies.  He may open his opportunities to others.  If the man is 
irresolute, he will see nothing unfair in his winning these opportunities.  By Heidegger’s analyses, 
he will make sense of things by asserting both that his success was a happy accident and that he 
is the best man for the job because he has them both, after all. 
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clearing the way of obstacles which lie between one’s self and one’s object.   The 
most important obstacles arise from the future, because the most important 
object is one’s self up ahead.  If we stick with what everyone else is doing, and 
remain in the common clearing of the they, then we don’t need to worry about 
these things.  But, that doesn’t mean that these things do not matter.  Leisure 
isn’t everything, after all; you have to do something with it. 
The call of conscience is the voice of angst.  Angst individuates one’s self 
and provides the opportunity to act, and to become one’s self, according to one’s 
own unique understanding.  This is one’s highest potential.  Angst also confronts 
one with the worst possibility, a possibility which cannot be avoided.262  the 
certainty that is death.  Being open to angst and to the possibilities that 
understanding brings is called resolve.  Through the openness that is resolve, 
new things arise with previously unthought significance.  They are significant in 
terms of the life lived in the authentic situation.  For Heidegger, this is man’s 
highest calling.  In answering the call of conscience a man answers not only to 
his highest potential, but to that of humankind altogether. 
With that in mind, one might ask: to what end, exactly?  What is a self-
discovering project of self-discovery, in love with others, in terms of others, alive 
with others and dying with others, what is Dasein to do with this life? 
Thus, Dasein must explicitly and essentially appropriate what has 
also already been discovered, defend it against illusion and 
distortion, and ensure itself of its discoveredness again and again.  
All new discovery takes place not on the basis of complete 
concealment, but takes its point of departure from discoveredness 
in the mode of illusion.  Beings look like … that is, they were 
                                            
262 Heidegger calls death the possibility not to be bypassed; there is simply no getting around it.  
It is certain but for its time and mode. 
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already discovered, and yet they are still distorted.263 
 
Heidegger tells us that our highest potential is to understand, to discover, and to 
make sure that others always have the opportunity to seek the same.  What more 
can we do, what other freedom do we have, than to hold out for the truth?  As 
this text draws to a close, we will see that this is always the right thing to do and 
that it is always the right time to do it.  What we must provide for, along the way, 
is a better understanding of our own limited freedom to do so.  This is where we 
will turn in the next sections. 
 The material which led up to this section presumed Heidegger’s 
philosophy.  Much of what we saw in this section, thus, is familiar.  It is simply 
given herein in Heideggerian language.   What has been reinforced is the sense 
that staying open to meet the terms of the situation is not easy business.  There 
is angst.  Conscience motivates a person to make the most out of life in the face 
of angst by confronting him with a “call” to his highest potential.  One stays 
available to the call of conscience only in the mode of resolve.   Anticipating 
death, one who is open to the situation works to ensure that the terms of the 
situation are disclosed, and not that some prior understanding stands in for the 
way things are.  This means not doing what everyone else is doing simply 
because it is expected.  This leads to ostracism, loneliness, and alienation. 
 Against this strain, the conscientious man discovers for others who are, 
and who shall be, born into the situation even as it comes to be determined 
through his life-time of discovery.  He is responsible for keeping the clearing of 
being clear and free of obstacles of convention which stymie open discovery.   
                                            
263 B&T, 204(222) 
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 Heidegger, hereby, shows us that the conscientious man is a powerful 
force in culture. Open to the turmoil surrounding the seeming quiet of 
conventional life, the conscientious man serves a crucial role in maintaining the 
conventional order’s viability.  He reaches the fringes of chaos and orders it, 
coming to terms with it, and expresses that order to others so that they are aware 
of the changing world around them. Ironically, however, this defender of the 
clearing of being suffers by way of the very persons for whom he cares.   
 Bittersweet as it may be, we are starting to see more clearly the shape of 
a life worth living.  It turns out that doing the right thing at the right time has little 
to do with what is the right thing at the right time for one’s self, alone.  Living to 
do the right thing is a life lived for the sake of the only thing worth dying for, the 
best possible situation.  And, as one may not live to see it, doing the right thing 
means doing so for others.  Tragically, as others may not recognize the value in 
such sacrifice, the conscientious man is often targeted, and his life made more 
difficult for caring in the first place. 
 In the next section, we will continue our push to understand conscience’s 
role in doing the right thing at the right time.  I will focus on doing the right thing in 
terms of one’s situation. A distinction will emerge between inter-subjective and 
objective contextual constraints.  This will return us to our discussions of kairos, 
King, and practical wisdom as the limiting factor in doing the right thing at the 
right time. 
 We will begin by investigating contemporary phenomenological methods 
for finding common ground between seemingly incommensurate inter-subjective 
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perspectives on the objective world.  These perspectives are natural to diverse 
cultures.  The common ground will be found in the objects of the world.  We will 
find that the objects of the world mediate differences between competing 
perspectives.  We will also discover a silent player in this process, one’s own 
body. 
 In every case, there is the body as the subject and object of change.  The 
human body is both subject to difference and object of change when that 
difference is annulled.  This result opens the potential to see one’s self in 
objective terms, and not merely in terms of others like or different from one’s self. 
In the end, we will see that it is the body which provides the grounds for radical 
change in persons, and that the objects of the world gain their significance in 
terms of these changes.  
 On the view that I am presenting, human freedom is grounded in the 
capacity to open one’s self to the world and to others.  In opening to the world, 
one experiences what otherwise he would not.  These experiences have an 
effect.  A person becomes different because of them.  His unique experiences 
alter the structure of his unique body.  It is on the basis of this body that he then 
moves into his next situation.  And the cycle repeats itself.264 
 This is self-determination though of a limited sort.  Habitually applied, one 
quickly builds a burgeoning store of practical experience which, when applied to 
moments as they arise, is wisdom in action.  One may not have perfect control 
                                            
264 This asymmetry is reflected in the ACTWith model: as-if represents embodied experience, 
coming to terms with represents being open to new determinations thereby generating new 
understanding which is in process embodied, and taken into the next situation represented by the 
as-if.  And repeat. 
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over that to which he opens, but he can open and try to come to terms with 
whatever presents itself.  Though it is equally self-determining to remain closed 
to the world, closing off invites no such diversity of experience.  This mode of 
being eventuates in a dearth of understanding, a condition known as ignorance.  
In either case, one becomes the person he becomes by way of his way of being 
in the world.  In both cases, one’s self is the embodied result of experience.   
 There is only so much time for discovery, however.  One can only open to 
the world so long as he is alive.  Heidegger reminds us of our mortality.  
Heidegger reminds us of the urgency with which life is felt, and points to the 
relevance of things to which one’s livelihood is attached.  Life is not primarily an 
exercise of rationality.  Life is an exercise of bone and blood, birth and rebirth.  
One’s mortal body is the locus of all of his experience, and the source of his 
greatest concern.  Life is not simply an exercise of some higher over some lower 
aspect thereof, or vice versa.  Life is an ongoing discourse between one’s self 
and his world.  No matter how the world changes, how the body changes from 
birth to death, life is the ongoing exercise of one’s own mortal coil. 
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11.  Conscience, and the fact of matter. 
 
Life is a local countercurrent to entropy. 
  -- Rolston265 
 
 
 
There is an essential difference between persons and non-living things 
like rocks and stools.  The difference has to do with the types of changes they 
undergo.  Consider the distinction as laid out by Edward Ballard: 
The contrast between the kind of change which objects undergo 
and the more radical change to which a self is subject is often 
expressed by noting that human self-change consists in acts which 
are self-determined, whereas the changes undergone by objects 
are determined by something external to them.266 
 
Ballard is claiming that the subject can change himself, while things like 
rocks cannot.  A person is something more than a rock in this way.  Ballard is 
pointing out that persons are objects of change, as well as subjects of change.  
Persons are able to experience change, as well as to change themselves 
through “acts which are self-determined.”  In the sections to follow, I will try to 
clarify how freedom of change through self-determination is possible.  Next 
section, I will focus on which sorts of acts within our power to determine are most 
effective in self-determined self-change. 
As we begin life, and aim for the person we want to be, the body is there 
at every step along the way.267  One’s body is there before and after one opens 
himself to the opportunity of a basketball game, for example.  In pursuing this 
opportunity, one subjects himself to change. 
                                            
265 Rolston, page 97. 
266 Ballard, 1976, page 111. 
267 Properly speaking, the -science of con-science is a total system state of situated being.  
Conscience holds system states against one another.   
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There appear to be two different types of change.  In one case it is that of 
a subject opening to change through a basketball game.  In the other, it is that of 
an object getting crushed by a bus.  Even as the body is there before and after 
the bus crushes it, the body is there before and after the basketball game.  The 
difference between the two is that the subject opened himself to the latter, and 
was merely overcome by the former.  
We have seen how conscience works at opening the spaces between 
one’s self and his ends.  We can see how conscience works at presenting the 
situation post basketball game, and how it motivates a man to seek this end for 
fitness and health.  In the case of getting hit by a bus, the victim’s conscience did 
not do that work.  This was not the situation he thought he was going to find 
himself in.  He may have been motivated to move toward a hot dog cart.  He 
stepped from a curb and found himself in no situation at all.  Not a happy ending. 
In both cases, however, we see the conscience in action. 
Conscience has to do with self-change in two ways.  In one, wanting to 
have a conscience means being open to a situation.  In being open, things arise 
which had otherwise not appeared to be significant, for example when someone 
says “that book changed my world.”  In such cases, conscience calls one to 
come to terms with the world, and not to close off from it into one’s own 
understanding. In the second case, conscience discloses definite possibilities in 
light of one’s highest potentials.  In disclosure, conscience presents the space of 
future situations in the world.  We have seen that discovery, coming to terms with 
the world in understanding, is man’s highest potential.  Conscience calls on one 
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to become himself through the exercise of his own unique understanding.  
Conscience calls one’s self to his own unique future situation.  Thus, being open 
to the world is being open to one’s own future self. 
As we proceed, we shall examine how one may exercise conscience to 
fulfill this promise. In order to “explicitly and essentially appropriate what has also 
already been discovered, defend it against illusion and distortion, and ensure 
itself of its discoveredness again and again” one must understand the differences 
between himself and others and this depends on one understanding his situation. 
In a recent article, William McKenna offers an analysis of inter-cultural 
objectivity to this end.  His discussion begins with the notion that members of 
diverse cultures have an accordingly diverse understanding of the world.  He 
notes that when an understanding is naively appropriated by individuals the 
differences lead to “bias.”  In order to overcome such biases, McKenna offers a 
notion, “situated objectivity,” which “requires the participation in different cultures 
in order to be achieved.”268  Let’s see what this adds up to. 
“People in different cultures have different ways of understanding and 
experiencing the world that are due to cultural differences.”269  According to 
McKenna’s analyses, this is because the experience of members of different 
cultures is “partial.”  “Partial” is a loaded term; it means both a part of a whole 
and biased.  “Partial,” in other words, can be employed both as adjective and as 
adverb.  Thus, persons raised in the 20th century United States are “partial” to 
                                            
268 McKenna, page 117. 
269 McKenna, page 115. 
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baseball and apple pie.  It is natural to adopt these attitudes.  “You do not 
question your perspective…”270  This implies both that they have experience of 
baseball and apple pie rather than other things, like cricket and baklava, and that 
they favor these aspects of the world coincident with their experience over other 
things.  One’s culture prescribes what is the right thing to do and the right times 
to do it.  This is the starting point from which all members of all cultures begin 
their waking lives.  This is the world seen subjectively. 
The subject begins in the clearing of his culture.  One begins hopeful 
about a future understood in terms his relations with those nearby, those he 
loves and who care for him.  One naturally wants to become successful in the 
terms set by his parochial way of life, to find esteem in the eyes of others most 
like himself.  Raised in a given culture and measuring personal success in terms 
of its practices, a person naturally comes to value his partial understanding of the 
world.  Partiality is not necessarily bigotry.  Partiality is what one needs to know 
to get ahead.271  One does what his partial understanding dictates to be the right 
thing to do at the right time to do it.  McKenna calls this attitude “naïve.” 
Just because one is partial to apple pie doesn’t mean that either partiality 
or apple pie are good things.  Partiality may not be good at all, and some apple 
pie is bad.  He must begin with what is given, and may live his entire life without 
                                            
270 McKenna, page 112. This uncritical attitude over one’s inherited way of life which in 
translations of Husserl is called the “natural attitude.” 
271 Likewise, one often looks to his leaders in order to see success in the flesh.  I shirk from 
speculating further on this point. 
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discovering more.  However naively taken up, McKenna calls originally given 
ways of being in the world “cultural natural attitudes.”272 
Partiality, so constituted, contributes to bias, the second, stronger sense of 
partiality pointed to above.  McKenna reminds us that, naively, members of 
cultures take theirs not as one way of doing things, but as the way of doing 
things: 
When a member of one culture comes into contact with another 
culture the strength of his cultural natural attitude leads him to 
experience the other culture not simply as different or strange, but 
as wrong …273 
 
It is toward reconciling the bias between perspectives which see each 
other not merely as “different” but as “wrong” that McKenna develops his notion 
of “situated objectivity.”  However, McKenna’s object, bridging biased positions 
through philosophy, is not new.  Writing in 1919 for the veteran French of the 
First World War on the conflicts between men, Emile Boutroux notes that 
resolution is “insoluble so long as each of the two parties nourishes a secret 
scorn for the other,” and that the “problem … becomes simplified if every man is 
able to find the substratum of truth in the beliefs he does not share.”274  This 
substratum of beliefs is that clearing which must be discovered and defended.  It 
is also the grounds through which contrary positions can be reconciled.  How, 
though, is this substratum to be discovered? 
                                            
272 Raised in a given culture, one comes down with a case of his culture before one’s culture 
comes down with a case of him. 
273 McKenna’s line continues – “… (you can think here of the value dimension of the life world and 
the kind of experience that some people have of it when in a foreign land that motivates them to 
reject what they experience).” McKenna, page 117. 
274 Boutroux, page 67. 
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In McKenna’s terms, bias, taking another’s way of life to be “wrong,” is 
tantamount to “scorn.”   On this basis, let me restate the problem.  If the naïve 
natural attitude is the attitude through which everyone approaches difference, 
then there is no hope for the peaceful reconciliation between ostensibly contrary 
ways of life.  Scorn does not breed peaceful coexistence.  Scorn, as Boutroux 
understands, leads to war.  To demonstrate that there are objective – read non-
biased - means by way of which such natural differences can be overcome is 
McKenna’s ultimate purpose.275 
McKenna’s effort stands as a clear advance on Boutroux’s in the following 
regard.  Where Boutroux asserts that “… all real and lasting peace is impossible, 
unless, amid all differences in principle and point of view, human beings have 
mutual understanding and esteem,”276 McKenna offers a method for overcoming 
the partiality and bias that make this impossible.277  This is a phenomenological 
method. 
Reconciling seemingly incommensurate perspectives is a basic problem in 
phenomenology.  To reconcile differences seems to require that a single person 
take on two perspectives at once.  But, where does this other perspective come 
from? What is there besides the naïve, natural attitude?  How can anyone take 
                                            
275 Boutroux, page 67.  I will make a good deal of this sentiment as this section concludes, 
holding forth that the tradition is mistaken to presume subjectivity prior to objectivity, as if atoms 
to be bridged, instead of reading conscience as objective, with subjectivity a deviance from right, 
and so secondary to objectivity.  I will lead us through some recent neurological research in order 
to cement this conviction, and so to provide a stable platform from which to launch the final 
sections of this text. 
276 Boutroux, page 65. 
277 A similar point is pressed in Mann, 1999.  For Mann, tolerance of competing or even contrary 
ways of life is affected through “structural expansion” [read introduction of new and significant 
determinations] of narrative identity.  We will attend to this view in great detail in the next section. 
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another perspective than the one he has?  What avenue of access is there to 
reach such a state?  No matter the phenomenon under my purview, the view is 
from where if not from here?  J.N. Mohanty writes: “Accordingly, a 
phenomenological philosopher has to face a paradox, a paradox that is involved 
in his very method.”278  The phenomenologist has to take up one attitude, the 
natural attitude, only to transcend it, “to suspend belief” in order to “describe.”  
The goal is to see things from an objective stance in order to deliver a science of 
phenomenon, a science of subjectivity, a science of shadows so to speak.  The 
goal is to take an objective perspective on a situation which is fundamentally 
subjectively understood. 
For Mohanty, the answer seems simple: 
This paradox cannot be resolved, and has to be accepted: this 
simultaneous participation and transcendence – which in fact 
provides the key to phenomenological philosophy.  The philosopher 
therefore need not accept the beliefs of unreflective attitude just as 
he need not also reject them.  Achieving the needed 
transcendence, his job is to tell the tale.279 
 
 Mohanty sets out the role for the phenomenologist.  His job is to report on 
the situation for an outside perspective as-if from the inside.  He need not 
endorse any given situation in order to put himself in it, but he must communicate 
what it is to be in a situation to those who are not so situated.  He need only put 
himself in any given situation, and report objectively on it.  His job is to objectively 
tell the tale that is being subject to that situation.  This is the phenomenological 
science of subjectivity. 
                                            
278 Mohanty, 1970, page 102. 
279 Mohanty, 1970, page 102. 
 167 
 
  
 The idea here is that one phenomenological tale hooks up with all the 
others.  In fact, we can state this even more strongly: the idea is that it is 
phenomenology which binds the stories together in the first place.  All situations 
have objects in common.  All objects have the fact of their appearances in 
common.  The trick is in showing that there is no contradiction in seemingly 
contrary appearances.280  So, it is ‘back to the presents themselves’ in order to 
discover the basis for reconciling conflicts between non-reflective attitudes.  The 
job is to make this journey, again and again, and in every situation to “tell the 
tale.”  McKenna develops this fundamental task of phenomenological philosophy 
into a method in which anyone can engage. 
 This is important because, though everyone is partial, most persons are 
not phenomenological philosophers.  Mohanty’s suspension of the naïve attitude 
is impossible with the presumption that one’s partial understanding constitutes 
the only way of doing things.  From this naïve starting point, it may seem that 
there is nothing more to know about the world at all: 
The problem can be that the bias motivates you to take what is in 
fact a partial knowledge as the whole knowledge (we can think here 
of the fable of several blind people having experience with different 
parts of an elephant and each claiming that the elephant is entirely 
what their experience gives them of it.  One, who holds the tail, 
says that an elephant [is] like a snake, and others say similar things 
on the basis of other parts of the elephant that they experience.)281 
 
Here, McKenna makes obvious the limit experience imposes on what one 
takes to be the objective world.  Note that the focus here is not culture.  It is 
                                            
280 And that means being open to the present and to the opportunities of the moment, as we saw 
in Heidegger. 
281 McKenna, page 112. 
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experience which hardens partiality into bias, whether this is reinforced in cultural 
terms or in terms of some other experience.  The power of experience in shaping 
bias is most evident when one’s experiences are extreme. 
Extreme experiences have a polarizing effect on a person.  It need not be 
an entire culture of prejudice which leads persons to bias on the basis of partial 
experience.  Experience alone can bring one’s self to a similar rigidity.  Though 
cultural attitudes are reinforced because others in the culture subscribe to them 
as well, one’s own experience reinforces certain attitudes when this experience is 
especially significant.  Consider the following illustration from another author, 
Lewis Feuer, in 1959: 
For instance, let us suppose that a man has lived through some 
years of concentration camp experience, or relentless political 
strife, or the embitterment of racial discrimination.  He may then, 
like Freud, tend to regard the world’s history as the resultant of a 
dualistic conflict between love and hatred… His experience and its 
standpoint were not the outcome of childhood anxieties or fixations.  
They came to him in the fullness of his powers and observations.  
His world is one which he cannot negate as fantasy.  It is obstinate 
and unyielding to analyses.282 
 
It resists analyses because this world is the product of his experience.  
What else does he know?  Partiality is simply that part of the world one has come 
to understand.  This understanding may be of a world drastically different than 
that in which one grows up.  It is not a fantasy world, it is the world in which one 
has come to terms, the world in which one has come to live. 
                                            
282 Feuer, page 389. 
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Everyone has a partial understanding, but Feuer is pointing to the force of 
experience in forming the attitude that one’s own partiality is all there is to know.  
There is little hope in coming to terms with another in this frame of mind.  This 
attitude excludes the possibility of any “substratum of truth.”  This attitude is one 
which resists change and scorns its opposite.  Where there is no such opposite, 
this attitude will find one.  For instance, in every situation, whether there is good 
or evil present, the concentrationary understanding will look for it, and find it.  It is 
the bipolarity of his experience which “puts” evil into a situation, at all.  Here is 
partiality’s claim to universality, and a perfect example of the active bias of partial 
understanding.  What we see here is bias taken to be determinative of the 
objective world.283 
The concentrationary man did not have to be raised in a polarized 
situation.  He simply had to come to terms with one, and this attunement can 
have a lasting effect.  Although being raised in a concentrationary situation leads 
to a naïve cultural attitude, Feuer points to the fact that bigotry can arise through 
polarizing experiences alone.  It is anything but naïve.  It is learned.  The fruit of 
this education is that there is no space for the reconciliation of the poles of 
experience.  Good and evil, love and hate, these opposites are taken to be basic 
constituents of the objective world.  This attitude presents a special challenge for 
the phenomenologist interested in overcoming bias.  If it can be learned, 
however, perhaps it can be unlearned.  Let’s find out how we may go about doing 
this.  
                                            
283 We will look at life stories in the next section, wherein this polarizing attitude is extra 
dangerous. 
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Let’s begin by imagining what it is like to come to terms with a 
“concentrationary” culture.  A concentrationary culture is one in which all things 
are polarized.  In a concentrationary universe, there is “us” and “them,” “good” 
and “evil,” “free” and “enslaved,” “on” and “off.”  The leaders of a 
concentrationary world say things like “You’re either with us or against us,” and 
“Death to America.”284  Each party of the world is the obstacle to each other 
party’s aims.  Each party thinks his is right, and the other’s wrong.  Naively taking 
one’s given way of life as the right way of life is to take one’s given way as 
objectively basic.  “Our life world is the “objective world”; theirs is some 
subjective interpretation of it.”285 
The naïve attitude takes the world from its partial perspective to be the 
objective standard.  In the concentrationary universe, this leads directly to bias 
and scorn.  Because one’s way is the right way, others must be just that: others, 
and mistaken others at that.  This is the attitude of an enforcer of old laws in 
whose paternal wisdom others are better “subjectively” dead than “objectively” 
wrong.286   
                                            
284 And two from Ariel Sharon, first in 1956: “I don’t know something called International 
Principles. I vow that I’ll burn every Palestinian child (that) will be born in this area. The 
Palestinian woman and child is more dangerous than the man, because the Palestinian child’s 
existence infers that generations will go on, but the man causes limited danger. I vow that if I was 
just an Israeli civilian and I met a Palestinian I would burn him and I would make him suffer before 
killing him. With one strike I’ve killed 750 Palestinians... I wanted to encourage my soldiers by 
raping Arabic girls as the Palestinian woman is a slave for Jews, and we do whatever we want to 
her - and nobody tells us what we shall do - but we tell others what they shall do.”  And then this, 
in 2003: “As soon as Iraq is dealt with, I will push for Iran to be at the top of the ‘to do’ list.” Posted 
April 26, 2006, at http://planetmove.blogspot.com/ 
285 McKenna, page 117. 
286 Granted, this is an extreme attitude, but it begins as a natural byproduct of the partiality of 
one’s own unique experiences.  One’s experiences begin in the clearing of his culture.  He 
naturally wants to be successful in terms of this way of life.  It is what one needs to know to get 
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McKenna’s method in overcoming bias is “situated objectivity.”  Situated 
objectivity is a method of overcoming subjective bias by requiring the 
“participation” in “different perspectives in order to be achieved.”287  It discloses 
to an individual the partiality of his own perspective by revealing otherwise 
hidden aspects of the world around him. One’s partiality is revealed as he 
discovers another way to engage the world. This disclosure takes place on the 
basis of a common participation with objects. 
Consider the following brief example.  Imagine that you are in a passenger 
plane and it crashes.  You find yourself on an island with natives whose practices 
are a mystery in every way.  The flora and fauna are seemingly alien.  You are 
getting hungry, and thirsty, and tired.  In order to begin to understand how to live 
in such a strange world, you follow the natives around and reproduce their 
actions.  In this way, you reproduce the engagements with the objects of the 
strange land, and come to understand their significance. In a short while, you will 
have begun to understand the native situation by participating with the objects in 
common. 
By participation, McKenna does not mean the participant observation of 
the “tourist.”  In the case of the tourist, the foreign point of view is merely held to 
be “interesting” in terms of one’s pre-existing standard.  In this case, one may 
see how the other does what he does, but he will not understand the significance 
of these acts in terms of the other’s life.  It is merely observation from the outside, 
                                                                                                                                  
ahead.  Likewise, one often looks to the appointed leaders of his culture in order to see success 
in the flesh.  I shirk from speculating further on this point. 
287 McKenna, page 117. 
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without an understanding of what it is to be engaged with the objective world in 
that way.  The significance of the engagement is merely curious. 
Instead, what McKenna has in mind by “situated” is just that.  One must 
take up the situation of the other for himself, and not merely look on in curiosity.  
This means that one must engage with the objects of the other’s world in the 
ways in which the significance which the other attaches to these objects is 
revealed.  This requires that an object is not seen to be either this or not, but that 
it may be many things.  By way of this openness, one’s own experience is 
compared with that of others. In this way, one can check with the other to see 
that one is seeing things from the other’s point of view.  Thereby, otherwise 
hidden aspects of the world are revealed.   
Whatever you are experiencing in common is experienced 
differently by both, and is different in the ways experienced…  
These objects have two “sides,” and, up to the point of the 
encounter with the other, you were unaware of the other side.  To 
learn about it through dialogue with the other can never give you 
the first person experience of it that is primary evidence, but it can 
help and clarify your own experience of that alien something that 
resided within the negativity and disturbance.288  
 
What “situated objectivity” amounts to is putting one’s self in the other’s 
position, and then engaging the world as-if one were that other.  The experience 
of this engagement leads to an understanding of the other’s situation.  In opening 
to the other’s perspective, one is then able to come to terms with his situation as 
if it were one’s own.  In this way, what is revealed is what the other sees in the 
objects of the world that oneself otherwise does not.  This is more than just a 
field trip of the mind.  This is not the mode of the tourist.  This practice reveals 
                                            
288 McKenna, page 118. 
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the other’s situation directly.  It is no longer a question of “what would it be like to 
live in China?”  It is now a matter of “so, this is what it’s like to live in China.” 
The aspect of this method I wish to stress is the role of the object in 
providing the grounds for the understanding.  It is as if there are two sides to the 
object as the object reveals two sides to one’s situation.  One comes to see the 
world as-if the other through the medium of the object.  This is possible because 
either party is situated in terms of the objective world.  Thus, McKenna calls it 
“situated objectivity.” 
The object allows one to move from a perspective “outside” into a 
perspective “inside” the other’s situation.  One goes “inside” and discovers the 
significance of the object which corresponds with the other’s way of life.  In this 
way, one comes to terms with the other’s situation.  He also comes to terms with 
the difference between his own situation and that of the other.  It is this insight 
which is most valuable.  In opening one’s self to the world, one learns something 
about one’s self.  The object mediates an “objective” view of one’s self, a view of 
one’s self from the “outside,” from the “inside” position of the other.  The 
understanding that such an exercise generates clearly works toward overcoming 
bias by discovering the substratum of truth underlying differences.  This 
substratum is found in common engagements with the objective world.  With this 
in mind, McKenna’s “situated objectivity” can be equally labeled “situated 
subjectivity.” 
What is explicitly shared in McKenna’s method is the situation relative to 
some object. Something is left out of this account, however. Because human 
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beings are essentially the same, sharing a situation is being as-if another person. 
Implicitly, McKenna’s view requires that each individual have a similar capacity to 
engage with objects before they ever come to see this or that engagement as the 
right thing to do and the right time to do it.  This requires that a subject 
experience his engagement with the objects in the situation as the right one, not 
simply as a different one, or as a strange one.  The value in the experience is 
that a subject comes to understand that his old way of doing things is not 
necessarily the right way.  From this point of view, it is equally subjective. 
What McKenna has shown us is a method for reconciling differences 
between persons of different, often conflicted naïve perspectives. Different 
persons come to terms with rocks differently from one another, and this reveals 
their differences.  One person may say that a rock is an obstacle, and another 
that the same rock is an aim.  These are contradictions. McKenna’s method 
allows for the reconciliation of these contradictory positions through the 
mediation of the very object whose qualification is in dispute.  What had 
appeared to be a contradiction is revealed to be merely a biased result of one’s 
own partiality and inexperience.289  Rocks simply stay the same.  Through the 
sameness of the rock, what had appeared contradictory is now two sides of the 
same stone.  One side up, one side down, one side mine, one side yours, one 
side discovered, one side covered over. 
This brings us to a further question. We have seen how situated objectivity 
is a method for understanding differences between two ways of being in the 
                                            
289 Conscience holds one system state of engagement against the other, and the difference is 
what it feels like to be in another culture. 
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world when these are exhibited by different persons relative the same objects.  
Will this method work in reconciling conflicted naïve perspectives within the same 
person?  Can this method do the same work when the differences are within the 
span of a self-same individual’s life? 
Persons come to terms with another situation through the mediation of 
objects.  What changes in this process is not the object, however, it is the 
subject. The capacity to invite change through openness to others is one way in 
which persons appear to differ from rocks.  Stones do not fall in love or take new 
jobs in Korea, for example.  The living body is both the subject and object of 
change.  It is subject to the experiences of which it is the object of change. 
People appear to be different than rocks.  With enough pressure, some 
people will crack, and some will rise to the occasion, and some will do both.  With 
enough pressure, all carbon becomes diamond.  In the right situation, some men 
change purposefully.  In order to be a good fullback, with leisure and opportunity 
a man will train himself to be a good fullback.  Rocks do not change purposefully.  
A rock never does sit-ups to be a better engagement ring.  Let’s rejoin Ed Ballard 
on this subject: 
The same kind of regularity [exhibited by objects] does not 
determine the changes of the self, for the self who intends and 
experiences, can engage in radical change so that, upon occasion, 
the continuity of personal identity becomes problematic.  (How 
complete was the change from Saul to Paul?)290 
 
How complete was the change from Saul and Paul?  Let us review the 
story of Saul’s conversion.  Saul was a tentmaker and a thug employed by the 
Jewish authorities to round up or murder Jews who were converting to the 
                                            
290 Ballard, page 111. 
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nascent Christian movement.  He was on his way to Damascus “So that if he 
found any there who belonged to the Way, whether men or women, he might 
take them as prisoners to Jerusalem.”291 
Here, Saul was affected.  The Bible reports that he was blinded by a flash 
and was confronted by the voice of Christ.  The voice asked “Saul, Saul, why do 
you persecute me?"  His companions reported experiencing a “sound,” but none 
were struck blind.  It is through this incident, confronted by his victims through a 
religious experience, that Saul converted.  Thereafter in Damascus, instead of 
arresting converts, he “preached fearlessly in the name of Jesus.”292 Just prior to 
his departure, he had been a major proponent in the death of a Christian 
sympathizer named Stephen.  This is a radical change.  Was it self-determined 
self-change? 
Recent information suggests that Saul may have been different than 
others.  By this view, Saul didn’t change so much as demonstrate a difference 
which others did not.  Saul may have been born sensitive to the effects of 
magnetic fields which are known to induce the same symptoms Saul reported. 
Saul was likely affected by a magnetic wave which propagated along the fault-
line of an earthquake. In this case, his change is not an example of freedom 
through self-determination.  He had this sensitivity long before he was caught by 
                                            
291 Acts, 9.1 (New International). 
292 Acts, 9.3 (New International). 
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one on his road to Damascus.293  In fact, the best evidence for this is that his 
companions were also affected, just not so much.  Let me explain. 
Religious experience is something that we human beings share.  
Commenting on the ubiquity of the experience, William James writes that 
“Religion … shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual 
men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to 
whatever they may consider the divine.”294  Neuroscientists have before and 
since worked towards understanding the universal physiological grounds for the 
human experience of God.295  Recently, researchers have made breakthroughs 
in discovering physiological processes common to religious experience.  The 
physiology underlying the religious experience has a lot in common with one's 
sense of place in the world, wherein the personal identification with the totality of 
world, or a sensed  presence of God, is just one extreme.296 
One team of Canadian researchers championed by the now deceased 
Eugene D'Aguili has provided a universal interpretation of research data on this 
affect.  On their account, what they call "Absolute Unitary Being," a "sudden, vivid 
consciousness of everything as an undifferentiated whole" is predictively and 
reliably reached through prepared mental exercise, such as meditation and 
                                            
293 This issue has received a great deal of popular attention.  The transcript including the cited 
conversation with neurologist V.S. Ramachandran can be found at:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/features/stpaul/st_paul_script.html 
294 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, page 42.  
295 Descartes speculated that the pineal gland was structurally significant to the experience of 
God; and, although everyone has a pineal gland, he was wrong.  In fact, there is now a branch of 
work dedicated to this task called "Neurotheology."  Much of what follows is this field’s fruit. 
296 It is a feeling of sharing one’s situation with everything else.  I am here intending to develop it 
as a standard objective perspective opposed to subjectivity. 
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prayer.297  The data includes brain imaging corroborated with self-reports from 
seasoned religious devotees including both Buddhist monks and Christian nuns.  
These self-reports cite the undifferentiated blissful one-ness with God and world, 
experiences which the subjects share, that they have in common.298  The 
research reveals that the experience is not all that they share; the brain images 
of the subjects have a lot in common, too.  The activation patterns of the subjects 
who reach this state are similar, and these patterns can be reproduced in 
laboratory. 
Most importantly, the activation patterns of religious experience can be 
reliably induced through the controlled application of powerful magnetic fields.299 
The results when applied to different persons vary, however.  Persons who are 
physiologically predisposed to religious experience have religious experiences 
induced via magnetic fields in the laboratory.  This means that persons who have 
religious experiences in the everyday life have religious experiences in the 
laboratory.  Others, less so.  
Saul appears to have been physiologically prone to religious experience.  
Though there is no brain imaging data on Saul’s experiences, there is other 
information which confirms this picture.  V.S. Ramachandran explains that there 
is a certain personality which is consistent with a sensitivity to magnetic stimulus 
of religious experience: 
                                            
297 Newberg, 2001, page 147 
298 The self-reports, understandably, come in the forms of linguistic expression native to either 
sort of religious commitment - i.e. the Buddhists explain their experiences in Buddhist terms, 
citing feelings of selflessness and universality, while Christians report sensing the presence of 
God. 
299 An interesting starting place with much research: http://www.innerworlds.50megs.com/ 
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...generally there is a pattern a tendency towards being a little bit 
egocentric, feeling of self-importance, a feeling of righteousness, 
righteous indignation, they're often argumentative, often completely 
convinced that they're absolutely right, there's this tremendous 
strength of conviction,... and I wouldn't at all be surprised if this was 
true of St. Paul.300 
 
After his experience, his closed mindedness to those he had persecuted 
ended. He stopped excluding people through the biases of old laws, and 
discovered an absolute openness to others.  “There is neither Jew nor Greek, 
slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”301  Though 
apparently open to others, Saul remained strong-willed.  He simply leveled his 
“tremendous strength of conviction” in new ways.  He became a righteous 
champion for tolerance instead of an equally rigid champion of intolerance.  His 
change is evidenced in his relationship with the objects of his world before and 
after his experience. 
Saul suffered what appears to be an inversion.  Instead of being closed off 
from a world of others different from himself, he took an opposite stance.  This 
change in perspective is most obvious in regard to the old Jewish laws.  These 
laws represented the objective world for Saul before his experience.  He lived by 
the terms of the law as-if it were the way the world were supposed to be, and 
imposed those terms on others, forcing them to do the same or to suffer.  These 
others were not simply different, they were wrong by these standards.  Where 
before Saul enforced the law, after his experience he denied it.  “Now that faith 
                                            
300 http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/history/paul_1.shtml (last accessed 
September, 2006.) 
301 Galatians, 3.28 (New International Version). 
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has come, we are no longer under the supervision of the law.”302  In the space of 
Saul’s life, he embodied two positions which are mutually exclusive, each 
corresponding with opposing determinations of the objective world. Where once 
he lived as-if in one objective world, he then lived as-if in another. This is a 
radical change. 
Saul did not change, completely.  He still understood himself as-if he had 
a lock on what the objective world “really is.”  What had changed is that this 
objective world is opposite the one he began with. One is a world of rigid law and 
retribution, one is a world of tolerance and love.  Saul’s objective world is not the 
real world for Paul.  Saul’s world is closed to the new situation, the new Way that 
is Christianity, while Paul’s is open.  Saul and Paul both, however, take their 
characteristic modes to be those which suit the objective world by one of the 
determinations.  Saul did not change, completely.  Saul was intolerant of 
tolerance.  Paul was intolerant of intolerance.  Some things about Saul remained 
the same.303 
Consider Saul’s relationship with himself.  After his experience, Paul takes 
his old intolerant way of life as an object from which to close off and to reject.  
That way was not the right way to live.  He himself is the object in terms of which 
his opposing situations are mediated.  He no longer does as his old way of life 
prescribed.  In the following passage, Paul identifies with a religious persecutor 
                                            
302 Galatians, 3.25 (New International Version). 
303 I am thinking of Saul’s conversion as a concentrationary experience which blinds Saul with a 
o/o state which itself relaxes back to an habitual c/o and then c/c state through the course of 
Saul’s life, though with a much affected understanding.  I suppose a home computer corollary 
may be the flash-memory of a bios.  Saul had his bios flashed. 
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and warns him that he will suffer a similar conversion if he continues in his 
closed-heartedness: 
Then Saul, who was also called Paul, filled with the Holy Spirit, 
looked straight at Elymas and said, "You are a child of the devil and 
an enemy of everything that is right! You are full of all kinds of 
deceit and trickery. Will you never stop perverting the right ways of 
the Lord?  Now the hand of the Lord is against you. You are going 
to be blind, and for a time you will be unable to see the light of the 
sun.304 
 
It appears that McKenna’s situated objectivity does hold as a method for 
understanding changes in one’s self.  Saul took the other to be in his own 
situation.305  He had been as this person appeared to be, but by his 
understanding of the situation God had affected his conversion.  Meanwhile, 
Saul’s traveling companions and fellow animals were not so affected at all.  The 
companions reported a “sound.”  The animals may not have been affected.  
Neither were the persons far away from the event.  Saul’s change was unique, 
and uniquely mediated by his own unique body.  His body is the object which 
mediated the difference between the two positions. 
Saul’s relationship with himself changed, but everyone else stayed pretty 
much the same.  For instance, the Jewish authorities in Damascus went from 
waiting for his help to wanting to have him killed.  They did not change.  What did 
change was that Saul all of a sudden exemplified the power of conversion to the 
new Way of Christianity.  This is the objective significance of his subjective 
experience.  He who was once a violent authoritarian was all of a sudden 
                                            
304 Acts, 13.9 (New International Version). 
305 o/c. 
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preaching tolerance and forgiveness with equal authority.  This is the same 
subject with radically different objects.  Herein the same subject are two very 
different gods, two very different objective worlds, two contrary positions, two 
contradictory laws, two sides to the same rock.  Like any other rock, however, we 
see only one side at a time.  With this information, we can ask Ballard’s question 
again. How complete was the change from Saul to Paul? 
If the science is right, then Saul did not really change, at all.  He was 
affected, a dormant potential was activated by a natural occurrence, but he 
remained Saul.  Saul, if the science is right, was born with a certain sensitivity.  
What changed was Saul’s relation with objects which triggered that sensitivity.306  
Others were not forced to come to terms with this difference.  This makes Saul’s 
situation in the space of history a critical one.  He was a special chunk of carbon 
who, with the right pressures, became a diamond.  His example is still that 
valuable. 
For others, the value of his experience came through in his expressions 
regarding objects they all held in common.  His situation was different and this 
difference was revealed in an inversion on basic evaluations of worldly things. He 
suddenly took different ends to be the right ends at which to aim than he had 
before his experience. The most telling of these inversions is Saul’s difference in 
regards to himself, and to others as intolerant as he had been.  What he had 
understood to be objectively the right way of life before his experience, he took to 
                                            
306 If magnetic pulses propagate from earthquakes and some populations have member sensitive 
to magnetic pulses then these more sensitive members may serve as important sources of 
community revision throughout deep evolutionary time.  This interface between emergent life and 
radiative backgrounds holds promise in explaining many folkloric anomalies. 
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be objectively the wrong way of life after his experience.  This is an expression of 
radical change. 
Was it self-change?  That a rigid man should come to terms with a 
radically different objective world in the course of a few days appears to be 
evidence for the reality of the objective world as Paul came to see it.  Did Saul 
change himself on the basis of this evidence?  It may appear as-if he discovered 
the kingdom of heaven, and through his dramatic change in perspective he 
merely pointed to it.  Yet, this is already what he was doing, he merely began 
pointing to a radically different kingdom of heaven.  We can only see one side of 
a rock at once, but did this one turn itself over?  No.  It was flipped by a magnetic 
field.  For our own purposes, in turning Saul over, we have discovered for 
ourselves this object’s underbelly, but we haven’t seen a rock present its under-
belly on purpose.  It’s just a rock with a dark side. 
In this section we have seen that it is possible to reconcile contrary 
positions through common engagements with the objective world.  We have seen 
that this is possible both inter-subjectively, between one’s self and others, and 
intra-subjectively, within one’s own self.   We have begun to see how the body 
plays the central role in mediating such difference by providing the grounds for 
the changes which one’s self undergoes.  It is apparent that one’s self is capable 
of a great deal more variance of perspective than one typically utilizes.  What is 
not yet apparent however is whether one can take advantage of this capacity 
purposefully, freely, and so change himself and his world through self-change 
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and self-determination.  What is the role, if any, of the body in grounding freedom 
through self-determination?  Let me briefly lay the issue out. 
 One’s body is the only constant in the whole course of one’s life story. It is 
always changing.  It is always one’s own.  It is always situated. Stories change, 
situations change, others come and go.  If a situation changes radically, the body 
changes radically, and there is room for a person to change radically. In 
situations different enough, one’s very identity comes into question.  Oedipus 
went from King to madman in an afternoon.  The physical position of his body did 
not change, but his situation did, and his life was turned upside down.  Even with 
his eyes torn out, his body was the same.  It was the relevance of objects in his 
world which changed, and these which determined the end of his life’s story, his 
objective realization of himself.  Oedipus, subject to the blind mechanisms of the 
objective world, object of self-change, appears to be two men at once.  It is the 
difference between these two perspectives which drives him mad.  His irony is 
that he lives, from the subjective versus the objective perspectives, two 
incommensurate life stories.307 
In tragedy, however, there is hope.  On the basis of the body, it is possible 
to live a completely different story to a completely different end, all while 
maintaining the continuity of a single life.  This is where we will find room for a 
man’s freedom through self-determination.  But, it isn’t easy; there is no pill for 
freedom.  Freedom for self-determination is limited by understanding, and we 
have seen that gaining understanding is hard work, stressful, and even risky.  
                                            
307 I will remind the reader of the first section, wherein conscience is defined as that capacity 
which opens the space between situations, and point to the relevance in this context as capturing 
the sense of one’s entire life. 
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Self-determination is nothing other than discovering for one’s self the meaning of 
life, and only then doing something about it. 
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12.  Conscience, and freedom. 
 
The human individual lives usually far within his limits; he 
possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. 
He energizes below his maximum, and he behaves below his 
optimum. In elementary faculty, in coordination, in power of 
inhibition and control, in every conceivable way, his life is 
contracted like the field of vision of an hysteric subject—but with 
less excuse, for the poor hysteric is diseased, while in the rest of us 
it is only an inveterate habit—the habit of inferiority to our full self—
that is bad. 
    -- William James308 
 
If one is not content to wait on a geologic event for an objective 
determination of the right thing to do and the right person to become, he must 
figure it out for himself.  Every person begins life subject to the world, and makes 
his own life his own object.  Every person begins life in subjective uncertainty, 
and moves through life in discovery of himself through an understanding of his 
objective situation.  Every person seeks the right situation at the right time, and 
lives life in preparation thereof.  This is our universal condition.  Some modes of 
being in the world prepare one’s self better to do the right thing at the right time 
than do other modes of being in the world. As this text winds up, we will come to 
understand the limits of our powers to affect what we take to be the right thing to 
do and the right time to do it. 
In life, one wishes to see better and to plot his course toward that man 
ahead he wishes to become.  I held this possibility out as a special capacity of 
conscience many pages ago.  We have come across pieces of advice on how to 
reach this goal through our discussions since.  Socrates taught us about 
                                            
308 Energies of Men, page 331. 
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discourse and the good.  Kant reminded us how important it is that our lives are 
esteemed by others alike. Diogenes starred in an illustration of conscience 
opening a space of rest in a situation determined by need.  Heidegger showed us 
that even in taking on everyday anxiety, we are coming to terms with our own 
deaths.  McKenna helped us to see how we live together, even beginning as if in 
different worlds filled with the same things.  And we have seen Saul, who through 
an inverted perspective came to live in terms of another world, altogether. He is 
still esteemed as a singular example of the Christian object, a rock converted to a 
mode of tolerance.  Through his change, Saul demonstrates a way of life whose 
object is that conversion even though he is not responsible for this change 
himself.  In this section, the aim is to discover a mode of being which makes such 
conversion through self-determination possible. 
Saul does not demonstrate that sort of self-change to which Ballard 
alluded in the last section.  We see Saul both as an object of change, and subject 
of change, but this change is not self-initiated.  His example does show that our 
bodies make it possible to be situated in two seemingly contrary objective worlds.  
His example thus shows that conversion is possible.  The trick now is in figuring 
out how it is that we have some freedom to choose our own.  We will find it in 
another object of the meaningful life, the life story.  Our freedom lies in our 
determination of what makes for a happy ending. 
All the discourse and drama as one seeks one’s highest calling is called 
“writing a life’s story.”   To talk about writing a life’s story presumes that one has 
some power over the determinations which constitute such a thing.  Considering 
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the terms which Saul had imposed on others prior to his conversion experience, 
if he had been asked to write his story from that perspective, he would not have 
chosen to write the story he actually lived out.  On his way to Damascus, a happy 
ending may have included a number of dead Christians.  Afterwards, a happy 
ending included countless Christian converts.  These are radically different ends.  
Saul, however, does not demonstrate self-change through self-determination.  
He does not choose his ends.  Saul does demonstrate a bodily capacity for 
radical change, radical change possible for others.  His example just doesn’t 
show that this man determined these changes for himself. 
What we shall come to in this section is a possibility for writing the story of 
one’s own radical conversion.  I will present a view which locates the freedom of 
self-determination in the choice of ends towards which one strives in his life time.  
For example, one is able to live for ends which he will never in his life time 
realize.  The silent heroes in every story are those who lived and died for the 
ends of the story, not to be the hero at the story’s end.  This does not mean that 
happy endings do not come by way of his efforts.  It only means that a man is 
free to live for ends so that others may be happily situated within them, if not 
himself.  It means that a man is free to live, in love, for another’s happy ending if 
not for his own.  But this freedom is difficult to see clearly, and requires some 
convincing for most to take as ends worthy of serious consideration. 
In this section and the next, we will come to terms with the role of 
conscience in providing for a special human freedom, the power of self-
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determination.309  In the end, the capacity to determine for one’s self those ends 
in terms of which he lives his life is a freedom to live as-if in another world.  This 
power to become a member of a just world as opposed to an unjust one I will call 
a power of redemption.  In opening one’s self to the world to meet the terms of 
the moment, one can be redeemed.  One can live as-if a citizen bound by the 
terms of a just world, as if justice were his cultural attitude and his way of life a 
demonstration in how to engage with common objects justly.310 
Granted that this world is not a just world, to live as if it is imposes radical 
changes in the course of a man’s life.  In aspiring to meet the terms of the just 
situation, one invites self-change which suits that end.  Slowly, as these changes 
take effect, one’s course in life changes.  In order to change courses, however, 
one must first have an end in sight.  Let’s begin with how this first point comes to 
be established. 
Plotting one’s course is a component of writing a life’s story.  Writing a life 
story is emplotting one’s self in terms of the objects of the world.311  ““Emplotting” 
is a process of making the intelligible out of the accidental, the universal from the 
singular, the necessary from the episodic.”312  Having a life’s story is the 
difference between meaningful life and a series of random disjunctions. “The 
                                            
309 The trouble, for most people, will be that this power is only effective through the lived life.  
There is no pill on can take to be a just man, a good man, or whatever man he wants to be.  
Freedom doesn’t come in a bottle. 
310 Yes, there is a difference as we shall see.  Acts which get rewarded in a just world get you 
crucified in this one, for example, but there are other costs as well. 
311 See Christoff 2005 for research to the effect that persons are bound by experience in what 
directs spontaneous thought.  That is, even “free” movements proceed on the basis of prior 
determinations.  Even at rest, it is hard to see a happy ending if you’ve never seen a happy 
ending before.  
312 Mann, xvi. 
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function of narrative is to artificially order discordant experience by emplotting 
it.”313 
It is through narrative that individual experiences hang together. Unless 
they are arranged by way of some global structure like a strand of narrative, 
there is merely a series of causes and effects, either without any necessarily 
significant relationship with one another.314  The story of one’s life is the thread 
through which otherwise paradoxical experiences come to be continuously spun 
out in one ongoing tale.  
One’s story begins by coming to terms with the objects of one’s own 
situation.  It is in terms of that place into which one is born and raised that objects 
come to have special significance.315  We saw last section how such natural 
attitudes inform one’s sense of self, other, and right and wrong.  Persons identify 
themselves in terms of their way of life, and emplot themselves accordingly.316  
One’s cultural attitudes prescribe what is the right thing to do and the right time to 
                                            
313 Mann, 12.  If the reader expects that this makes emplotment sound like living a life of fiction, I 
wish to refer him Ochsner et. al. 2003 for a sterling review of emotional regulation mechanisms 
which permit a selective engagement with the organism’s situation thereby contributing to a self-
constructed world-view.  Life stories are not fiction, but they are constructed, and there is 
deception of self and others. 
314 I am thinking of the Sound and the Fury. 
315 Consider the classic experiment wherein kittens are raised in rooms wallpapered solely in a 
parallel bar pattern.  Once the visual system prunes for optimal performance in that limited 
environment, the kittens fail to recognize parallel bar patterns perpendicular to the original.  They 
literally bump their heads on objects arranged in such patterns, literally unable to see them there 
to avoid them at all. 
316 At no time in life is the pressure greater to discover one’s own story for one’s self than in 
youth. Especially in adolescence.  See A. White, forthcoming.  Herein, one takes his situation for 
his own, for the first time.  It is not merely the objects of the world which are his or not, it is the 
world itself.  It is one’s own life.  It is no longer “ours.”  And it is never too late to change. I 
remember.  Imagine a boy in a room 20 years ago, and then recount how he got here.  That is the 
story of my life.  But it is not yet my life’s story.  Not yet.  I have not seen many happy endings.  
Still, let’s see if we can’t whip one up, anyways. 
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do it.  Emplotted accordingly, a life story is, if nothing else, a telling series of the 
right things getting done at the right times, or not. 
It is natural for persons to think of their lives in terms of stories.  Here, I do 
not mean a reductionist story iterating some series of events.  I mean myth, 
drama, comedy and tragedy.  These are all products of culture.  To be in a 
culture is to be enculturated.  To be enculturated is to be emplotted in terms of 
one’s native myths and stories.  One is not born merely to a group of persons in 
a cleared area of land with a given geographical character.  One is born into an 
ongoing narrative, the collective story of others all writing their stories and writing 
their stories together in terms of their shared situation.  To be enculturated is to 
have one’s own story interwoven with others’, and all of these together form one 
broad-cloth spun out over generations.317 
One is spun into this world story at its open end, and moves ahead from 
there.  The ongoing narrative into which one is born is a fundamental factor in 
one’s life story, as “who one is and what one will do will be determined by the 
story one sees oneself a part of.”318  Thus, it is natural for a man to find meaning 
in his life through the medium of the broader narrative through which his own life 
threads:   
The fact that people have been willing to give their lives in the 
service of a larger story of possible human liberation, peace, 
growth, or flourishing attests to the human drive for narrative 
meaning.319 
                                            
317 The strength of a nation, thus, is the strength of this flag.  The material thing has no 
significance of its own if it does not represent this fact of lives lived in and for one another, lives 
lived in common. 
318 Mann, 84 
319 Mann, Introduction, vii. 
 192 
 
  
 
In her text, Internarrative Identity, Ajit K. Mann argues that traditional 
views on what makes for a good life story carry implicit, and arbitrary, constraints 
on what one takes to be the right life to live.  The presumptions of what makes for 
a good life story inhibit the freedoms one might otherwise have to do otherwise.  
One can hardly be free if he is bound by the very form of the very story he wishes 
to live even before he begins to live it. 
Mann’s problem with traditional narratives is structural.  If one assumes a 
certain life story type, one assumes a way of life which makes that story type 
work.  This goes for any narrative structure so long as a certain structure is 
presumed to be sufficient for the emplotment of all pro-social ways of life.  
Mann’s primary concern is that much of life is undervalued by the presumptions 
of traditional narrative structures.  This structure pressures against certain ways 
of life by failing to value certain types of experience: 
The basic principle of narrative identity theory is that personal 
identity is correlative to plot, that the only sense in which a self can 
be identified is in relation to the stories one sees oneself as a part 
of.  The problem with this conception is that identity is not simply 
emplotted, it is emplotted in a very particular type of narrative 
structure – one that admits only a particular type of assimilated 
experiential material.320 
 
According to Mann’s analyses, the traditional narrative schema is selective 
for a certain type of life-story.  It does so by discounting certain experiences, 
while trumpeting others.  This encourages certain modes of engagement with the 
world and discourages others.  What this means is that how one thinks about 
stories imposes terms on how one thinks about his own life story.  What this 
                                            
320 Mann, 55. 
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means is that how one thinks about stories influences how one lives his life.  This 
implies that how one thinks about life stories imposes terms on what one takes to 
be the right thing to do and the right times to do it.  This leads to the biggest 
problem, that how one thinks about stories imposes terms on what one takes to 
be the right life to live, and the right ends to live for. 
Mann’s concern is of the latter scope.  The problem is that certain happy 
endings are selected against by way of the traditional narrative standard.  This 
means that, not just any ways of life, but ways of life which are good are denied 
value by this old standard.  For example, the story of a selfless mother is 
certainly one which aims for a happy ending, but it is certainly not the narrative 
which is recommended by traditional standards.  “The hero of a traditional 
narrative is defined by an exclusionary means, by separation, by uniqueness.”321 
Traditionally, a life story is a good one when one player, one’s self, 
pursues and satisfies a set of intentions which are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the completion of his life’s projects.  My favorite example is The 
Count of Monte Cristo.322  This story emphasizes one identity and one aim.  
Other persons are integral to that, but the aim is the hero’s own end.  The story is 
not about the girlfriend.  It is not about the gold.  It is about one man’s 
redemption.  It is about himself. 
This narrative structure forces the evaluation of all intermediary events 
and actions in terms of the ultimate end of one’s own life story.  In the Count of 
Monte Cristo, Edmund Dantes’ ultimate end is the restoration of the situation in 
                                            
321 Mann, 59. 
322 Thanks to Eddie Adelstein for the suggestion. 
 194 
 
  
life which was unjustly stolen from him.  He begins a newly appointed ship’s 
captain and on the basis of that promotion becomes engaged to the woman he 
loves.  His life is destroyed by false accusations.  He is imprisoned.  He suffers, 
and struggles, and frees himself through resolve fueled by desperation.  Dantes 
himself is transformed through his experience. Where in the beginning he is a fair 
and patient, in the end he is calculating and hard.  He takes on roles at both 
sides of the law, gains a fortune by luck and becomes, instead of Edmund 
Dantes, criminal, The Count of Monte Cristo.  It is still his story, and its tale is the 
transition from loss to redemption. 
The tale is told in terms of Dante’s distance from his ultimate aim.  His 
love, his home, his life.  It is told in terms of the distance of this good man from 
himself.  To return home, he must change.  To reclaim his unique situation, he 
must become a different man.  Edmund Dantes could not regain his station.  
Edmund Dantes could not regain his love.  To do this, Edmund Dantes must 
become Monte Cristo.  This man, excluded, separated from the world he cares 
for, is uniquely attached to a certain end.  Gratefully, so the story goes, he 
succeeds in living it happily. 
In terms of a traditional narrative like this one, everyone wants a fairy tale 
ending uniquely his own.  The problem is that, in order to live this life story, there 
have to be evil men and monsters to kill and gold to find and damsels to save.323  
                                            
323 Though I use fairy tale examples, this presumption of the traditional narrative structure exerts 
forces in an everyday way.  The sentiment encouraging this life story is captured in phrases like 
“get a purpose in life” and “the key to success is choosing a narrow specialty and doing that one 
thing very well.”  This sentiment also encourages slogans like “shoot them all and let God sort 
them out.”  What is presumed is that there are others who need to be shot, just as one’s self 
never does.  Whether or not this is deserved is beside the point.  That there is evil in the world is 
a given on this perspective, and that is a dangerous presumption. 
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The structure of the story prescribes what is the right thing to do and the right 
time to do it.  To live this life story requires that one find evil, that one seek gold, 
and that one rescue a woman who, it is presumed, is cruelly mistreated in a 
hostile world already full of evil men and monsters.  This is the traditional story of 
a hero with a happy ending.  It tells us to find evil, destroy it, and to take what we 
want for ourselves. 
The problem is that the story of the exclusionary and unique hero of 
traditional narrative may not be the right story to live.  The problem is that the 
ends which this selfish character seeks may not be those which the situation 
demands.  The problem is: how can one be free for self-determination when 
these determinations are evaluated as already good or bad by a narrative 
structure which is not freely self-determined? 
This is where others become so integral in exerting the formal narrative 
pressure which Mann warns about.  If one fails to find and kill the evil man, he 
does not fit into the story.  He appears to be doing the wrong thing at the wrong 
time.  Others may find his behavior unintelligible, or simply unintelligent.  If one 
consistently finds the socially significant object, and does what is expected with 
it, then his behavior is intelligible, and even intelligent.  He does the right thing at 
the right time as defined by what makes sense to others.  If one does not follow 
the rules, his capacity to live a coherent life story is brought into question. 
Subjects are intelligible according to narrative structures in which they and 
others reside.  That is to say that “intelligible” persons live consistently in terms 
already routinely socially significant.  “”Intelligible” subjects are the effects of rule 
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based signifying practices and these rules operate through repetition.”324 Think of 
the traditional narrative structure.  Within the given narrative, ogres are significant 
because they must, as a rule, be destroyed.  One is intelligible when he says 
“ogre” and draws his sword.  He is equally intelligible when he says “ogre” and 
runs.  He is unintelligible when he says “ogre” and then tries to reason with the 
“ogre.”325  This engagement is not only unconventional.  It is essentially 
impossible.  Ogres, after all, do not reason.  Trying to talk with an ogre is simply 
the wrong thing to do, and while he is alive it is the wrong time to do it. 
This illustrates the force of the narrative structure pressuring one to live a 
life story commensurate with that of others.  This pressure shows up in every 
engagement with every significant object throughout the course of one’s life.  The 
pressures to live consistently in terms of the conventional significance of 
common objects in the world depends on the presumption of a certain way of life 
as a standard.  The ubiquity of this pressure captures how critical this concept is 
in understanding the inter-subjective force of narrative structure on the shape of 
a man’s life.326 
One is intelligible to others in terms of the presumptions of a shared 
narrative structure.  Insofar as one understands himself in the same terms, he is 
intelligible to himself by the same standard.  It is in terms of such a structure that 
one makes sense of his experiences at all.  For example, if there were no such 
                                            
324 Mann, 27. 
325 As a rule, ogres are incapable of reason. 
326 Fairy tales have become the greatest lies of all.  Yet, for some reason, we insist on orienting 
our children within them even as we teach them language.  Imagine how deep and lasting the 
impact! 
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standard, there would be no such thing as failure or success.  In terms of the 
narrative structure in which one lives, the failure to reach the prescribed end is 
not simply a matter of reaching a different end, but is a matter of reaching the 
wrong end.  It is not a matter of succeeding in doing something else.  It is a 
matter of failing to meet the terms for a happy ending implicit in the very structure 
of one’s life story. I will leave it as a given that noone wishes to identify himself as 
a “failure.”  
The pressure which presumptions about the way a life story is supposed 
to go imposes constraints on what one takes to be the right thing to do and the 
right time to do it.  One is successful in terms of his narrative structure so long as 
he does the right thing as prescribed by his position within that narrative context.  
For example, one is successful if he saves the damsel, a failure if he lives the 
lonely life of a selfless philosopher.  This is all well and good if the narrative 
structure in place prescribes the right things to do and the right times to do them.  
It may be the case that philosophy is not the right thing to do when the damsel 
needs saving.  It is not clear, however, that traditional narratives sufficiently 
provide for all contexts in which the question of the right thing to do arises. 
Mann’s criticism is that this narrative structure is not only insufficient, but 
that it is “psychologically oppressive.”  By her analyses, it actively discourages 
the possibility of plotting a life’s story which does not fit that of the traditional 
hero.  Not every life story needs to be one of one man becoming a hero against 
all odds and against all others who finally through strength of will and at all costs 
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forces his terms on a final situation.327  There need to be other lives lived for 
other things, too.  Many times life is peaceful and filled with family and 
community.  What then? 
What of stories which do not presume such extreme experiences, one 
man against the world?  What of stories which are lived in terms of love, home, 
and life which is not unjustly lost?  What narrative structure provides for doing the 
right thing when that doesn’t mean finding an evil man with gold and damsels to 
kill, steal, and rescue?  Mann faults the traditional structure for failing to account 
for those narratives.  Without the isolation and the separation which motivates 
the traditional hero, an alternative life story may be lived toward the successes of 
others’ projects, of others’ lives, and not necessarily toward the successes of 
one’s own, alone.  In fact, this story is not uncommon; it is much more common 
than that of the uniquely individuated hero.  This is the story of all those 
countless persons who through history have been “willing to give their lives in the 
service of a larger story of possible human liberation, peace, growth, or 
flourishing.” 
Such a “narrative” does not necessarily aspire to traditional determinations 
of what makes for a good life story, one in which a strong character suffers and 
succeeds in a final redemption.328  In fact, such a narrative may not come in 
                                            
327 Her criticism is that it is insufficient to accommodate typically feminine stories.  She argues 
that traditional structures are “psychologically repressive.”  I agree.  I have dropped the qualifier 
“feminist” as I see no reason why the point doesn’t hold, generally.  Although, if one must be 
essentialist, there is good evidence for physiological grounds for generalized differences in 
storyboard preference, though I shall not review this research here. 
328 A term of opportunity with which this text shall close. 
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terms of a single thread at all, but may consist in multiple narratives, and 
altogether by some narrative standards not consist as a “story.” 
Consider again the story of the selfless mother.  Her life story may consist 
of many threads, each consisting of the narratives of her children and spouse, 
her home and her house.  Her own life is spent meeting the needs of these 
others.  Her own life story is not a single strand of narrative, but a rope of many 
strands woven around her own selfless core.  Without these others, there is no 
story of a selfless mother. 
The scope of this analyses is not limited to the nuclear family.  A similar 
structure can be found in the life of the selfless philosopher.  Picture Socrates 
astride in the markets conversing on justice and virtue.  He never charged for his 
philosophy.  He always began dialogue with the terms of the other, and moved 
from their starting place toward only what all present could consign the good.  
Without these others, there is no story of the selfless philosopher. 
Instead of being a long strand of narrative soliloquy, this life story is 
already interwoven with those of others through the great tapestry of human 
history.  On this view, there is no single aim and no single main player.329  One’s 
life story is written with others’ inseparably.  This is a narrative which isn’t driven 
to satisfy some heroic standard.  This is a narrative the focus of which is doing 
the right thing at the right time by a selfless standard.  These are the stories 
which weave the very fabric of society, and create that substratum underlying all 
differences between men no matter how heroically individuated.  These are not 
                                            
329 For instance, at a local level, to read the story of a selfless mother is to read the story of her 
children and home. 
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the stories of men off on their own.  These are the stories of communities, told by 
way of its members. 
By Mann’s thesis, one’s life narrative is not necessarily bound within the 
horizons of one’s own personal projects.  One’s life narrative is bound within the 
horizons of one’s society.  “[The] emphasis is less on individuality and more on 
community; that is to say, there is identification through relationship rather than 
through individuation.”330  On Mann’s view, I do not live my life story, we live 
ours. 
Inside of the traditional narrative form, there appears to be no object to 
this sort of narrative.  Once one finds himself inside of the traditional narrative 
structure, all that is left for him to do is to discover objects in its terms.  This life 
story is written about overpowering bad guys and saving damsels, overcoming 
obstacles and securing objects for one’s own.  From this point of view, if there is 
no evil it is not that things are good, it is that something is missing!331 
There is pressure to be the hero, the princess, and to aim for that one holy 
object of desire.  This is not to say that there is pressure to kill ogres, to sleep on 
peas, and seek the grail.  Not literally. 
That does not mean that these narrative expectations are inactive.  The 
critical issue here is that there is pressure to think of one’s life in a way which 
finds ogres, and peas, and grails in the world.  It is as if those who do live in 
terms of such a narrative live in a world which really contains evil, and ogres, and 
fairy tale endings where the good live happily and the bad suffer righteously.  
                                            
330 Mann, 59. 
331 I cannot stress this point enough.  Recall the discussion on the concentrationary universe last 
section. 
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There is pressure, in other words, to live in a “concentrationary universe,” not 
because one’s prior experience demands it, but because that is the experience 
that the narrative structure itself demands. 
The structure itself exerts pressure through the expectations of others that 
one will do the same.  The others exert pressure through the presumption that 
the common tale of life will be in every man repeated.  Some may meet the terms 
of the happy ending, others will fail, but this is beside the point.  Each man is held 
to this standard.  Each life story, thus, is a repeat of the last at least in terms of its 
structure.  To deviate is to risk unintelligibility.  To deviate is to risk membership 
in the community.  This is to risk isolation, alienation, loneliness, and the anxiety 
of self-responsibility.  Deviation is still an option, however uncomfortable.  At 
best, the pressures to conform are inter-subjective.  These intersubjective 
pressures are not objective forces.  There is still room in the world to do 
otherwise.  These may be felt as if they were objective forces shaping the course 
of one’s life.  But they are not; they are social pressures.   
If we are to escape from the concentrationary confines of the narrative into 
which we are born, we must have somewhere to which to escape.  We must 
begin by coming to terms with a different sort of ending.  We must begin by 
setting up a different sort of aim.  This aim is an ending which suits any and 
every pro-social narrative.  This is an ending which is for every person at all 
times a happy one.  This is an objective aim.  It is a universal aim.  This ending 
will be that in which every action of everyday along the way is evaluated.  This is 
an ending in terms of which a man lives justly.  This is not to say that one does 
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what one wants and then sees where that takes him.  This is choosing a situation 
in terms of which one would want to live, and then living as if one were there.  It 
is this end, and this freedom, which is the meaning of a man’s life. 
For Socrates, as discussed in depth earlier, his end, his aim, is a just 
world.  He lives as-if on its terms, and stands out from others who do not.  
Walking innocently as if in a just world, Socrates marches to the beat of the 
proverbially different drummer.  Talking innocently as if in a just world, Socrates 
is targeted by power hungry sophists, professors of wisdom and would be 
leaders of Athens.  Living openly as if in a just world, Socrates is ridiculed by the 
ignorant masses.  One man alone in an unjust world, Socrates exemplifies the 
conscientious way of life.  He was unable to convince many that his was the best 
way of life while he lived it.  He may yet be able, however, to fulfill this aim in his 
death.  It is toward coming to terms with the limits implicit in his life story that we 
now aim next.  This limit is the freedom to do the right thing at the right time 
regardless of the situation. 
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13.  Conscience, and the just life. 
 
Socrates: The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used 
to describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general 
it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at 
Delphi. 
Protagoras: You mean, Socrates, "Know thyself." 
Socrates: I do; and the opposite would be, "Know not thyself."332 
 
Persons note changes in themselves in relation to objects, but the only 
changes of which persons are aware are those of their own bodies.  In fact, it is 
impossible to imagine change without some affect of the body indicative of the 
dimension of said change.  The change is itself only a matter of a difference 
between a before and after embodied situation.333 
We have seen in McKenna’s work a method for coming to terms with 
others’ situations.  His method is to identify with the other by taking up his 
situation in terms of the objects therein.  On McKenna’s program, the locus for 
the identification lies in the common objects.  Through common engagements, 
one begins to come to terms with the other’s situation.  This presumes that the 
other is a similar critter, a human being with a body which needs the same things 
in the same ways at similar times.  On top of this, one and another can try to talk 
out their differences. 
                                            
332 Philebus, 48d. 
333 This goes for space as well as for time: “who moved my shoes?” marks a similar phenomenon 
to “where did the time go?”  In these instances, it is objects external to one’s self which determine 
the difference in the situations.  This analyses applies equally well to changes in the self, with a 
slightly different result.  When forgetting an appointment, one is heard to say things like “where 
did I put my head?” or “I lost myself.”  In these instances, it is one’s self as an object which 
determines the difference in the situations.  In either case, it is the changing situation of the body 
relative to some object which is expressed. 
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For Mann, the locus of the identification relation with others is the body, 
itself.  Her focus is on how one person can live a good life story in terms of more 
than one’s own selfish narrative.  Her interest is in discovering how this can be 
the case, when the traditional theory assumes that the good life story proceeds 
on the model of the individualized hero.  What she finds is that, traditional hero or 
not, in every situation the body is common: 
The only constant through spatial and temporal discontinuity is the 
body.  One may not have an over-riding narrative which unifies her 
experiences.  There may be multiple narratives which differ from 
place to place, but they are all housed in one body.334 
 
 Our bodies show up every place we go.  No matter who we care for, 
whose terms we try to meet, whose lives we place above our own, how radically 
we change or what object we fumble over, it is our bodies which appear at either 
end of change.335   One’s narrative, no matter how diverse, threads through the 
single body.  The body’s movements constitute the moments of one’s life story.  
Each step in the plot is a situation in a series of situations from birth until death. 
 The body is situated in terms of objects, aims and obstacles.  The body is 
situated in terms of an unfolding life story, however conceived.  Mann argues that 
one’s life should not be constrained arbitrarily by some traditional narrative 
structure: “assuming that narrative structure affects action and identity, narrative 
choice should include not only alternative plots in terms of content but also 
alternative formal structures.”336  It is in this choice that one comes to see himself 
the way that he does.  It is in this choice that one comes to see actions as right or 
                                            
334 Mann, 59. 
335 Again, as hers is a feminist critique, this speaks of the cultural dominance of the male 
embodiment even in terms of what one expects of their own life stories. 
336 Mann, 16. 
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wrong.  It is in this choice wherein one is free to become otherwise than he is. 
Earlier, we saw how one’s self arises in terms of differences from 
others.337  We have also seen how objects serve to mediate these differences.  
We have seen how one’s life story is such an object.  What we are beginning to 
see here is the direct influence of language on this process.  When ogres signify 
something to be killed, linguistic signifiers express this relevance.  Others take up 
this attitude, act on the basis of this vocabulary, and repeat it.  Repetitive 
signification is what makes language more than a bunch of random sounds.  
Accordingly, repetition also grounds narrative.  Repetition thus grounds any talk 
of writing a life’s story. 
Though there is no life story in a random series of words, one need not 
merely repeat whatever terms to which one has come through enculturation.  
One may open himself to previously unthought determinations by opening 
himself to a world outside of repetition.  One may open himself to new 
evaluations of the significance of objects in his world.  This includes opening 
one’s self to the significance of his own body as a vehicle for change.  One can 
do otherwise.  One can become otherwise.  One need not merely repeat in talk 
and in life the evaluations of the objects of the world which had been handed 
down to him, or given over by others, or to which he had come in prior 
experience.  This result opens a view on a special human freedom: “‘agency,’ 
then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition…  it is 
                                            
337 Most recently in the section on Heidegger. 
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only within the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity 
becomes possible.”338 
One can determine for himself the situation by way of which his everyday 
actions are evaluated. If one opens to the world, he will change.  He will have 
done so of his own initiative.  Instead of going with what is given, with what they 
say or with what they say that God says, one can open himself to alternatives.  
Instead of closing off into one’s own prior understanding, repetitively acting on its 
terms, these habits can be broken.  If one opens to the world, and discovers what 
is hidden in it, he can live according to his own unique determinations.  If one 
opens to the world, he can rediscover his place in it rather than going through life 
on the basis of a map to a magic end drawn by generations past. 
What then does stand for a good life story?  Once we have freed 
ourselves from pressures implicit in prior determinations, it is up to us.  Our story 
is ours to write.  Its ends our terms to meet, ourselves at every end to meet again 
and again, in every new moment, so determined as we move into the future.  
“The reconceptualization of identity as an effect, as produced and generated, [as 
opposed to something you are born with] opens up new possibilities for agency 
that are closed by positions that consider identity fixed and foundational.”339  
As we have seen, our bodies allow for radical change in the course of a 
single life.  We have seen that this radical change is within our power to initiate.  
All that is left now is to explore the limits of this power.  Freed from the artificial 
constraints imposed by one’s narrative tradition, the limits to change are simply 
                                            
338 Mann, quoting Judith Butler, 27. 
339 Mann, page 28. 
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those of the body.  Freed from the inter-subjective constraints of conventional 
determinations of the good life, one is free to live life by other terms.  One is free 
to seek other ends, but here again is a limit.  This limit is one’s understanding of 
the objective situation.  This limit is one’s understanding of what is universally 
good.  This is a short limit.  If one goes out on a limb, with a partial understanding 
of the way the world works, he risks his life. At least in the old narratives there is 
some record of success. If not in terms of the tradition, where does one look for 
orientation toward the right ends? 
That we are able to see ourselves as either subject or object in the world 
is a given: 
It is because we are embodied consciousnesses that we can view 
ourselves from two different standpoints: as objects of theoretical 
understanding (from a third-person perspective) or as the 
originators of our actions (from a first-person perspective).340 
 
What differs between persons is the understanding which is brought to 
bear from either perspective. 
I have maintained throughout this text that one’s understanding is a 
product of one’s experience coming to terms with his ever-changing situation.  
One begins a subject in the world, and increasingly comes to self-understanding 
through a cycle of action and the realization of the situation resulting from action.  
It is in coming to terms with one’s situations that one comes to understand his 
place in the world.  If one comes to terms solely with the determinations of other 
persons, then one’s situation is determined inter-subjectively. This situation is 
                                            
340 Atkins, 2004, page 345 
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defined by partiality, and even bias. The understanding which such sensitivity 
produces is a conventional understanding, or at least an arbitrary one based in 
the partial understandings of others more or less alike to one’s self.  This leaves 
room to do otherwise.  The problem is: how does one come to understand that 
this is the case? 
Very early on in this text, I introduced a concept, kairos, which the Greeks 
took to signify objective constraints on right action regardless of context.  No 
matter the narrative in which a moment is couched, each moment is essentially 
the same.  No matter the moment which calls for action, every moment shares a 
fundamental structure.  Each moment has a beginning, middle and end.  The 
opportunity for right action approaches from the future.  The capacity to see an 
opportunity, however, is a product of what has past.  The right thing to do is 
always up ahead, but the wisdom of what to look for is something one must 
discover first. 
Along with kairos, I introduced the concept of logos.  Logos was defined 
as “the form of the practice which fits the situation requiring action.”  The capacity 
to arrive at this form of action was defined as practical wisdom.  Hereby, it is 
clear that the second step to doing the right thing at the right time is recognizing 
the opportunity to do so when it arises.  The first step is to maximize one’s 
capacity to recognize opportunities before they arise by becoming practically 
wise.  To this end, there is the conscience.   
There is one mode of conscience in particular which is productive of 
practical wisdom.  I have described it variously as the open mode of conscience, 
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being open to the world, to the terms of the situation, to the terms of the moment, 
and also as the mode of conscientiousness.  In being open to coming to terms 
with the situations of others and with other situations, one comes to understand 
what is common to these situations.  As one accumulates this experience over 
the course of a life, one comes to see what is universal in all human situations.  
The wealth of this wisdom is only possible if one is open, not only to others, but 
to the things of the objective world which determine every situation equally.  This 
includes other animals and plants, and also rocks and clouds and stellar bodies.  
It is in terms of these things which all human situations are universally 
understood.341  
In being open to the terms of the moment, one lets things be seen rather 
than to see what prior understanding reveals.342  One lets what he engages in 
action stand for itself, rather than stand as some extension of some prior 
understanding.343  For example, imagine walking over a steaming grate on a big 
city sidewalk in the winter.  Homeless men huddle over garbage cans.  The heat 
from the grate is comforting, even for a lonely philosopher on a short walk 
between strange pubs.  Subjectively, this brief bath is mere color of the world 
reminding him of the cozy stool inside.  Objectively, heat is life or death for an 
even lonelier man.  Objectively, this heat is what it takes to see another dawn 
                                            
341For all appearances otherwise, the human situation is always nestled inside an envelope of 
natural order.  We shall make much of this in the next section.  For now, it is important to 
understand that the mode of being open which is productive of practical wisdom is being open to 
the objective terms of the situation whether another’s or one’s own, in ACTWith terms, */o. 
342 This returns us to Heidegger’s “anticipatory resoluteness.”  In this mode of being “one is open 
to come to terms with his situation however that situation comes to be determined.  This is how 
one comes to understand one’s situation.  In fact, it is only through resoluteness that the situation 
is understood at all.”  This text, pages 154-5. 
343 “Only as the present, in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is, namely, 
the undistorted letting what it grasps in action be encountered.” B&T, 299-300. 
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whether the night is spent inside or out.  Subjectively, this heat is a clue for both 
men to the difference between one’s own and the other’s situation.  Experiencing 
this difference, as the philosopher comes to terms with the life of a man on a 
street grate, one understands something objectively new about his own situation.  
He may also understand something subjectively new about the other’s situation.  
Experiencing this difference, a man’s world comes to hold others within it.  
Experiencing this difference, a man comes to be concerned.  His situation comes 
to include others, and things could be made better. 
In this way, being open to the terms of one’s own and others’ situations is 
productive of an understanding of what is universal to all human beings.   This 
understanding is practical for all persons in all situations.  It is this understanding 
which recognizes unique opportunities within those situations.  This, again, is 
practical wisdom.  It is with this understanding that one is able to live in universal 
terms, as if in a just world evaluating every action along the way by its standard.  
Whether there is a heaven or a hell is secondary.  What is important is that this 
situation is that toward which one aims in life.  Meeting these terms is the 
motivation for actions as a man moves from moment to moment.  With an 
understanding of what it is to be all men in all places and at all times, the 
practically wise man is able to hold himself to life as if in another world and to 
aspire to meet its terms.  This is the work of the conscience. 
Even as conscience works at disclosing the situation, conscience 
motivates according to one’s capacities to meet the terms of the situations held 
up for comparison.  In the practical experience of having come to terms with 
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many situations, one is able to recognize opportunities in situations as they arise.  
But there is still more to it than that.  With an understanding of what is universal 
to all human beings comes an understanding of what is necessary in every 
situation so that any man may live a life with opportunity in it.344  With an 
understanding of what is universal in every situation comes the picture of a world 
wherein all persons are held to universal standards of evaluation of action.  
Conscience motivates toward the realization of this common end.  In terms of this 
end, a man may live a just life.  Otherwise, his life is lived for the sake of less. 
Being open to the world is not a passive mode of being.  It actively seeks 
indications of disorder in the world.  Very early on in this text, we found Martin 
Luther King Jr. in a jail cell saddled with the task of reconciling seemingly 
contradictory ascriptions of himself, his own and those of others.  He was a 
practiced peaceful man, though by the community of clergy he was 
simultaneously understood as an “inciter of violence.”  He was a man struggling 
for the freedom of others, yet simultaneously caged for his personal sacrifice.  He 
was a man who rose to meet the terms of the moment, while his actions were 
widely reported to be “untimely.” 
King put himself in the crux of conflict and contradiction.  One side 
proclaimed its equality, the other denied it.  One side maintained the old order, 
the other sought to have that order remade.  King put himself in positions in 
which he had to come to terms with both sides of the issue.345  In opening to both 
                                            
344 The good life. 
345 Here is my understanding. It may appear that he rejects one side or the other but this is not 
the case.  In order to do his work, he must understand both sides to issues.  He may speak 
against one side or another, but his intentions are not to reject the other side, but to expose it as 
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sides at once, he came to new determinations of the shared situation.  These 
new determinations he expressed in new uses for old words.  He recast the 
conventional vocabulary to describe the world he came to understand through 
this open reconciliation of apparent contradictions. In coming to this 
understanding, King was able to discover an opportunity for equality where 
otherwise there was none from the space of a jail cell.  Through his 
understanding, he opened this end as an end, a “promised land,” even though he 
would never come to stand in it. 
In the next section, we shall put the tools of conscience which we have 
collected to the test in creating for ourselves the vision of a better world towards 
which to aim in life.  We will put the potato game, and Diogenes’ bathtub, and the 
ACTWith model all to use in the conscientious construction of a promised land of 
our own.  For the moment, I wish to remark briefly on the Socratic example of 
conscience, and the role of irony in the development of practical wisdom. 
In the final movement of Socrates’ life as detailed in Plato’s dialogue the 
Crito, we also find Socrates in a cell.  He too is forced to reconcile a certain 
tension.  He is the most just man in Athens, but he is to be executed for 
corruption. 
As he waits for his death, Socrates puts forward a certain challenge.  He 
awaits execution, and his friend Crito is trying to convince him that escape is the 
right thing to do and that now is the right time to do it.  Socrates politely 
entertains his friend’s plea.  Finally, however, he asks whether Crito would think it 
                                                                                                                                  
untenable and to at once provide an alternative interpretation without such conflict.  This is basic 
reconciliation, by my view. 
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right for a man to break the laws of Athens when he could have left Athens for 
another city at any time prior, or, barring that, when he might have convinced the 
people of Athens that the laws were in need of correction.  Crito cannot tell. 
According to Socrates’ analyses, in escaping he would offend Athens in 
three ways.  For one, Athens is the place of his parents, and in fact is like his 
own parents.  It is the place of his birth, and the womb of his development into 
the philosopher.  Socrates began his life as an Athenian, had taken up the 
philosopher’s mission, and had made no moves since to change his residence.  
To disobey the laws of Athens at the end of his life would be to disrespect his 
parents, and their way of life.  In fact, Socrates’ life speaks against such an 
option.  He was “the most constant resident in the city,” leaving Athens only once 
in his life besides those times he had been sent away on military service. 
For another thing, Socrates owes Athens the debt of his own education.  
This is the culture into which his own life story is threaded, and he has made no 
moves to unthread himself from its history.  In fact, his life speaks against this 
option.  He has lived his life in discourse with the people of Athens, purposefully 
integrating his own story into the unfolding story of the city.  It is in fact this work 
which lands him in jail.  To escape would be to begin a thread of life anew, apart 
from his prior integration, and at his age this narrative promises to be very short.  
There will be no rethreading of his narrative into those of another city.  For 
Socrates to escape is for Socrates to die alone, and for nothing but a momentary 
freedom from the very social responsibility for which he had always already lived. 
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Finally, in all of this, he failed to convince the people of Athens that the 
laws should be changed before his sentence.  He had a lifetime to do so, and 
had stood up for the laws at other times in his life.  Socrates was a champion of 
and not an enemy to a justly ordered city, and laws play a critical role in these 
constructions.  Socrates does not take the lawful order of the city lightly, and 
failed to alter this order before his hour of need.  So, he lived as he always had, 
by the law.346 
It is in terms of this order which he finally judges himself as he speaks to 
Crito.  Taking up the perspective of the laws he would be breaking, Socrates 
finds no motivation for escape.  Taking up the third-person perspective, he sees 
himself as any other citizen, and judges his escape accordingly.  He takes the 
laws of Athens for his own, even as these mean his death.  Though he 
understands that his situation is an unjust one, these are the laws.  Though he 
would like to be convinced that escape is the right thing to do, he reconciles 
these competing points of view.  Holding this objective perspective on par with 
Crito’s own subjective perspective, Socrates cannot escape.  Working to ensure 
that Athens was a just city was the purpose of Socrates’ life.  To spurn that effort 
at his life’s end would be to deny that his every action along the way was in fact 
the right thing to do.  That the laws themselves have led to a singular injustice is 
beside the point.  His mission remains the same.  If the people of Athens are to 
see that her laws are unjust, they must see that these laws lead to injustice.  
                                            
346 Though, he did not always do as authorities directed. 
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Socrates is the vehicle for this realization.  He is the object by way of which 
Athens’ perspective will change.347  
 In the Socratic example, we find the conscience at work.  He sees the 
man ahead he must become and becomes that man, even in the face of death.  
He complains that, should he run, he would make himself “ridiculous by escaping 
out of the city” and “wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and 
metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is.”348  He is a just man; he is no 
scarecrow.  There should be no need to disguise this fact.  His final defense of 
the laws proclaims that he should “think of justice first,” so that he may be 
“justified before the princes of the world below.”349  By Socrates’ treatment, even 
the laws of Athens recognize their own failure to serve justice on Earth, and 
recommend a higher court.  Even at the end, Socrates sees himself in terms of a 
just world, and lives to its standards, not those of the world of corrupt Athens. 
For Socrates, it is his sense of integrity which denies his escape.  He is a 
just man, living in terms of a just situation; anything else is not to be revered.  It is 
this sense which also denies a confession of wrongdoing which would have 
spared his life.  It is also his integrity which denies the use of his children as a 
tool to gain sympathy from the jurors.  It is this same sense of integrity which he 
then finds deficient in the city, and especially in its judges.  He does not beg for 
his life.  He does not offer to quit philosophy.  He will not be pressured into 
becoming a man he cannot stand to be.  For Socrates, “a man who is good for 
anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to 
                                            
347 And, it does. 
348 Crito, 53d. 
349 Ibid, 54. 
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consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong - acting the part of 
a good man or of a bad.”350 
 Finally, the Socratic example can be seen clearly as a mode of 
conscience.  Let the painter of your mind loose on the following scene.  The 
situation is Athens, and it is 400 years B.C.E.  Socrates is on trial for corrupting 
the youth and worshipping false gods, charges brought against him by Anytus 
and Meletus and others. In the Platonic dialogue, the Apology, his trial is 
detailed. 
Socrates understands the charges against him in the following terms: 
Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into 
things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse 
appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to 
others.351 
 
Socrates is the kind of man who turns over rocks, discovers new things, and 
shows others how to do the same.  He finds a man who professes to wisdom, 
and he “interrogate[s] and examine[s] and cross-examine[s] him.”352  If the man 
appears to have no understanding of what he professes to understand, Socrates 
aims to show him that he has seen only part of the picture.  To those professors 
of wisdom who are in fact not wise, Socrates confesses to reproaching “him with 
undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less.”353  Socrates is the kind of 
man who shows others that their understanding of the world is partial, prejudicial, 
or biased.  He pursues this work actively.  Socrates takes this to be the 
                                            
350 Apology, 28d. 
351 Ibid, 19c. 
352 Ibid, 29d.   
353 Ibid, 29d-30a. 
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“philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men.”354  He does this 
not in order to corrupt men, but to lead them to become the best men they can 
be. 
This means searching out practical wisdom, and the testing of the 
professed wisdom of others.  This is the philosopher’s mission, on Socrates’ 
understanding.  This is how he understands his own experience, from his own 
point of view: 
…young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come 
about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders 
examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others 
themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they soon enough 
discover, who think that they know something, but really know little 
or nothing: and then those who are examined by them instead of 
being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded 
Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth!355 
 
Against this characterization, Socrates does not so much offer a defense 
as he does an explanation for why he has lived the way he has, and how others 
in Athens have come to misunderstand him.  He does not try to persuade the jury 
with dramatic expressions.  He addresses them honestly, anticipating that, if 
these men are just, each shall consider his words on the basis of common 
experience and he shall be acquitted.356 
Socrates confesses that he has remained open to the direction of an inner 
voice.  He believes this to be a sign from god to do the right thing in any given 
situation.  To this end, he preaches practical wisdom, and disdains politics 
                                            
354 Apology, 28d-29a.  
355 Ibid, 23c-d. 
356 The great tragedy is that Socrates, who met every citizen of Athens eye to eye and one on 
one, treating each with the respect of his equal esteem, is treated with an opposite regard by the 
city, itself.  Should he have discussed with each jury member one on one he would have been 
found not guilty and freed, as he himself attests in the Apology.  How can a man be just and good 
to every other man, and still be found unjust and evil in the eyes of the city? 
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because politicians do for themselves at the expense of others, while he does for 
others at the expense of himself. 
This sign I have had ever since I was a child. The sign is a voice 
which comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I 
am going to do, but never commands me to do anything, and this is 
what stands in the way of my being a politician.357 
 
Instead of seeking influence through persuasive rhetoric and politics, 
Socrates confronts “pretenders to wisdom” and compels others to speak 
constantly of virtue and justice.  He does not charge for his philosophic work, and 
greets everyone equally.  He takes this to be his role as dictated by the guiding 
inner voice which motivates him to seek his highest potential, wisdom.  His 
philosophy is not, as was that of the sophists, intended to corrupt persons to 
seek their own wealth and luxury over that of others.  In fact, he rejects these 
things as any kind of real wealth at all.  For Socrates, the health of the city is 
measured by the justice of its members.  Tragically, for all his efforts, it is a city in 
denial of its injustice which puts him to death.  It is the men of the jury who fear a 
Socratic interview by Socrates’ estimation.  It is this fear of being brought before 
themselves which leads them to Socrates’ death penalty, not the charges against 
Socrates, themselves. 
Me you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, 
and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you 
suppose: far otherwise. For I say that there will be more accusers 
of you than there are now; accusers whom hitherto I have 
restrained: and as they are younger they will be more severe with 
you, and you will be more offended at them. For if you think that by 
killing men you can avoid the accuser censuring your lives, you are 
mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or 
honorable; the easiest and noblest way is not to be crushing others, 
                                            
357 Apology, 31d. 
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but to be improving yourselves.358 
 
Tragically, being open to their potential, understanding and living justly, is 
the last thing these judges wished. Socrates has his life stolen for being a 
conscientious man.  He was murdered for the vices of these men, that they 
should keep them hidden.  These men would rather sleep in their own worlds 
alone than bear the burden of caring for a shared world awake.  Let us not 
become these men, but become like Socrates instead: 
Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create the tension in 
the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths 
and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analyses and 
objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies 
to create a kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the 
dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of 
understanding and brotherhood.359 
 
In the next section, we will pick up on Socrates’ promise.  We shall take up 
the philosopher’s mission.  But, rather than interrogating others, we shall 
interrogate ourselves.  We shall take the stance of both accuser and defendant, 
and see whether a conscientious reconciliation of the two cannot result in our 
own self-improvement. 
There is still one more aspect of the Socratic example which deserves 
mention, however.  Socrates is famous for many things, one of which is “Socratic 
irony.”  Often, Socratic irony is taken to be merely that the wisest man in Athens 
confesses to knowing nothing.  However, there is much more than this to irony by 
the Socratic example.  
                                            
358 Apology, 39d. 
359 King, Letter…, page 3. 
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Irony occurs at the intersection of the subjective and the objective.   
Consider the man who lives justly and for the right things.  Subjectively, he does 
all he can to be recognized as a good man.  He sacrifices and he suffers in order 
that others do not.  Objectively, the world is ordered such that, from this 
perspective, for all of the subject’s efforts, he will be led only to fail.  From the 
objective perspective, with enough distance, the turn of events is comical.  From 
the subject’s perspective, it is tragic.  Irony is these two together, bound in the 
same person. 
Socratic irony is of the greatest possible scope.  For example, it is ironic 
that a man’s girlfriend ends up sleeping in a van with a listless hippy just when 
when that man needs her support most.  It approaches Socratic irony when that 
man provides for her vacation, outfitting her with necessary equipment so that 
her life may be a success, only to have his own fail because of a taste or listless 
hippies, something which had lain hidden to this point.  With enough distance, it 
is funny that these things happen.  For at least one of the persons involved, the 
picture is less pleasant.  Something is very wrong, here. 
Socratic irony, on the other hand, captures the sense that everything 
about one’s situation is out of place.  It is not simply that one’s lover isn’t where 
she is supposed to be.  It is that nothing about the subjective and the objective 
perspectives match up.  Socrates is not on trial for some aspect of his life.  He is 
not confronted by the loss of his left arm.  He is confronted with the loss of his 
life.  He is not confronted with lost time.  He is confronted with lost significance.  
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He is confronted with a meaningless, fruitless life.  He confronted with the 
possibility that his life may be null.  Nothing is what will come of him. 
Where does Socrates find room to understand the contradictions between 
the third-person and the first-person perspective on himself?  He finds room in 
the just world, where he looks forward to meeting just judges of character, and 
not corrupt judges as those of Athens’ juries.  He does not fall to 
meaninglessness but dies with meaning.  He is able to take a perspective which 
makes sense of his own subjective understanding of his life’s work and that of 
the others in Athens.  It is this perspective which makes sense of the irony he 
suffers: the most just man executed for corruption.  It is from this perspective that 
we will approach the final section of this text. 
Socrates and Plato provide clues that irony plays a very special role in the 
development of wisdom.  Famously, as the Platonic dialogue the Symposium 
closes, Socrates is telling his half-sleeping friends that the artist who appreciates 
comedy must also tragedy and vice versa.  He does not tell us why, but in irony it 
is obvious.  It is in the reconciliation of the subjective and objective perspectives 
that either arise to consciousness at all.  It is in the reconciliation of these two 
aspects of one’s self that he comes to understand the situation, his own and 
others.  It is in the reconciliation of the greatest scope of these two aspects of 
one’s self that he comes to the greatest understanding of the differences 
between the way persons think of the world, and the way that the world 
objectively has proven.  Irony, thus, is productive of wisdom. 
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Socrates was known often to wonder whether virtue – meaning wisdom - 
could be taught.   If irony can be taught then wisdom can be taught.  But, irony is 
essentially unteachable.  It is something which happens when a subject does his 
best and what he does not know forces his failure.  It is the difference between 
where one intends to go and where one ends up.  I suppose that such instances 
could be arranged by others, but at what expense?360  It seems as senseless as 
a man asking the heavens why he must suffer so, while at once expecting a man 
to answer him.  It would be fine to have an answer, but it is man’s condition that 
he must find out for himself.  It is man’s condition to discover.  A man’s condition 
to die.  He does it for others. 
One last note.  I have spoken off and again about turbulence, chaos, 
disorder.  Irony is of this family, its disorder existing in the fact that two 
irreconcilable poles are brought together in a single human being.  It is 
superimposition of two contradictory states in a single human heart, one the 
subjective and one the objective points of view of one’s self.  It is a contradiction 
within one’s sense of his place in the world.  How is it possible to be in two 
situations at once?  This is exactly the strain which irony imposes on one’s self.   
It is for the man who suffers irony to find the order in this torn embodiment.  
It is for the man who suffers irony to see a way past his own torn world.  This 
man must find a way to render contradictory determinations of his entire 
character continuous.  He must find a way of life where otherwise there was 
none.  He must do it for the sake of himself, or he risks doing nothing at all. 
                                            
360 I am thinking of the farmer’s plot in Emil. 
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Remember Oedipus.  Irony calls into question his entire being.  Irony is 
angst.  Angst confronts Oedipus with the meaninglessness of his life.  His life is 
nothing.  Unable to reconcile reverence as risen King with the disgust at his own 
fell origins, there is no room for Oedipus in the space of his own world.  He is 
cast out from himself.  Oedipus cracks.  He is crushed between his subjective 
and his objective self-realization.  He finds no way to understand his situation, so 
he blinds himself to it, even as he did not understand his situation because he 
was blind to it before.  His tragedy is this realization.  He suffers for what he 
comes to know, the objective determinations of the situation for which he has 
struggled, suffered and sacrificed.  For all his efforts, his life is null. 
Not every irony is as crushing as is Oedipus’.  This man must come to 
terms with his situation en toto, as if caught in the eyes of god, or he is lost 
completely.  Not every irony reduces a man to nothing.  There are lesser 
tragedies.  However, every instance of irony brings one’s place in the world into 
question.  The question is, do I come to terms with my situation, or do I blind 
myself to it? 
Blind, there is only the past.  Closed off, there is only one’s self.  If we 
open to the world we can discover what is hidden in it.  And we can be hurt.  We 
can take the world for our own.  And we can be hurt.  We can suffer change.  We 
can live according to our own unique determinations in full view of the 
universality of the human situation.  We will change.  It will hurt.  And we will 
have done so of our own initiative. This is our freedom, to deliberate over an end 
and to live by its determinations.  This is our freedom, to change, and to suffer.  A 
 224 
 
  
man is more than a rock.  A man may become otherwise than his environment.  
A man may become himself. 
This is our freedom.  It is a freedom that is shared with every embodied 
human being.  This is our universal condition. Realizing the promise of human 
freedom begins with a chosen end.  Choosing well is hard work.  It is the work of 
conscience, work which will open our next and final section.  The freedom to live 
as if in a just world, to live as if amongst just persons, to live as if in a healthy 
world, even though we do not: this is a good life, or at least the best life a free 
man can live. 
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14.  Conscience, and the end of the world. 
 
That, if one truly wants to succeed in leading a person to a certain 
place, one should first and foremost take care to find him where he 
is, and start there. 
   -- Kierkegaard361 
 
He who possesses virtue in abundance may be compared to an 
infant. 
   -- Lao Tzu362 
 
Did any obstacle oppose you in your effort towards an object?  If 
indeed you were making this effort without any reservation, this 
obstacle is at once injurious to you as a reasonable being.  But if 
you take into consideration the common lot, you are not yet hurt nor 
hundered. 
   --  Marcus Aurelius363 
 
We live in an increasingly unified world.  The human globe is increasingly 
unified by a single human language, the binary language, machine language.  
Machine language is a bunch of 1’s and 0’s, on’s and off’s, true’s and false’s.  
Machine language is the code directly processed in the circuitry of computers; 
gates open and close, lights brighten and dim, and electricity goes in and out. 
Persons do not type 1’s and 0’s into computers to get them to do these 
things, however.  Persons do not speak machine language.  The fact is that each 
individual 1 or 0 isn’t very significant to a human being, even if he is a logician or 
a computer programmer.364  Every individual 1 or 0 captures only one minimal 
aspect of the logic at work in the machine.  A computer uses so many of them 
that it would take way too long to enter the information in this way. 
                                            
361 Quoted in Lovlie, page 339. 
362 Lao Tzu, The Book of the Way, passage 55, sentence 1. 
363 As translated in Samburskey, page 115.  
364 That is, until things quit working. 
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The 1’s and 0’s are electrical pulses, or the lack thereof.  Where the 
natural languages of humans consist of waves of sound and gestures and 
postures of body in complex contexts, computers speak in terms of switches 
opening and closing, thereby permitting or denying the movement of electricity 
through a circuit.  A computer is a set of switches arranged in ways which turn 
input electrical pulses into output electrical pulses.  The input is given in human 
terms, converted to electrical pulses which are represented as 1’s and 0’s 
(computer terms), operated on, then output again in human terms.  The circuit 
begins and ends with a person.  What happens inside the box is only a means to 
these ends. 
A person does not see the logic at work in the system any more than he 
feels the switches open to the flow of electrons or shut them out.  It all moves 
way too fast!  Besides that, one little gate opening and closing just like one little 
pulse of electrons speeding along does very little work on its own.  It takes 
billions and billions of openings and closings, billions and billions of little 
electrons, for any human sense that anything has happened, at all.  It takes this 
much opening and closing to make a set of switches into information significant 
to the human being.  This makes communication between persons and 
computers difficult.  This is where computer programming becomes so important.  
This is where logic becomes so important.  Logicians and programmers order 
pulses of electrons in ways that do work for people.  They make the computer 
meet the terms of the person.  They make 1’s and 0’s get things done. 
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The computer processes a series of 1’s and 0’s as a series of open’s and 
closed’s.  A switch is either open or closed; there is electricity in the circuit or 
there is not.  With enough circuits arranged in the right ways, opening and 
closing rapidly enough, computers output virtual environments.  Virtual 
environments are full of representations of everyday objects which are 
maintained in patterns of electrical pulses.  These patterns of pulses, when either 
on or off, indicate that there is some thing in the virtual environment, or there is 
not.  The patterns of pulses are insignificant to humans, directly, but the 
computer turns these into the objects of the virtual environment. 
Persons increasingly live their lives in terms of virtual worlds which are 
designed by computer programmers.  For the most part, programmers recreate 
natural environments.  For example, when the virtual basketball floats to the 
virtual basket in the virtual world, the trajectory which the virtual basketball 
follows is designed to mirror that trajectory which a real basketball follows.  The 
evidence for this is the realism imparted to the image as it flashes across the 
screen. 
This realism is evident to everyone within the virtual environment, whether 
that person is Chinese or Spanish.  Real basketballs behave the same in every 
culture because everyone is bound by the same laws of nature.  Virtual 
environments reflect this fact.  In the natural environment, human metabolism 
projects the ball and gravity and friction pull it down.  In the virtual environment, 
there are series of switches opening and closing in ways which lead to pixels 
firing and falling dim.  Millions upon millions light up and irradiate the optic nerve 
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of the person in the game.  This turns patterns of electrical pulses into sight.  
Virtual environments are realistic when what the player sees in that world 
matches what the player comes to expect of the other. 
Moreover, because of the realism, persons from across the globe can 
share in these environments.  A Chinese man in Hong Kong can play basketball 
with a Spanish man in New York.  There is no potential for this to happen in the 
natural world.  Because of the realism, coupled with the freedom persons have in 
determining the environments in which they engage, they spend an increasing 
amount of their lives engaged in virtual activities.  These environments become 
the spaces in terms of which they live their lives.  Where success often means 
killing the other guy, some professional computer game players make their living 
living in a virtual environment.  Computer programmers are the intelligent 
designers of this virtual world. 
This is how they do it.  Computer programs are like translators.  They 
order electrons in terms significant to human beings, and vice versa.  No matter 
the human term, whether Chinese or Spanish, it can be translated from and into 
machine language.  All human languages find common ground in the language of 
machines.  Computer programmers are responsible for ordering the mechanisms 
which do this work. 
A computer works by shuttling patterned sets of pulses around to its 
various parts, like the graphics processors, and the audio processors, and other 
specialized sets of switches which are constructed in order to recognize and to 
operate on some patterns of electrical pulses as opposed to others.  The pulses 
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from person to processor and in between are themselves products of switches 
opening and closing, letting current in or letting current out.  The human brain 
works in much the same way, with the essential difference being that the pulses 
in question are produced electrochemically, and not electronically. 365 
A computer is a network of processors which work to translate certain 
input into desired output.  The human brain is also a network of switches 
arranged in ways to process input into effective output.  The computer has 
special cards and chipsets which are switches arranged to operate on different 
aspects of the sensed world.  The human brain is also modular in this way.  
There are audio and video processing areas.  The sub-processors of either 
computer or human being coordinate with one another to produce a particular 
output given input, or not.  If these are not coordinated, sense cannot be made of 
the output.  This result is thought to be the product of a dysfunction.  Consider 
what it is like to have the sound mismatched with the video on a movie or a video 
game.  There is something wrong with this picture.  Persons expect these 
operations to come together in the output in ways which preserve their everyday 
experience.  Persons take the coordination between the sub-units, both in their 
heads and in computers, for granted.  When it is not in place, the system is 
broken. 
                                            
365 Another essential difference had been that the human brain can learn.  It is plastic, at least in 
the beginning.  Baby brains quickly embody operations in terms of the objects of their particular 
situations.  This is something that computers are only beginning to do.  I believe that this 
realization in computers awaits that same realization in the human programmer.  This text is an 
effort to close this gap, between the programmer and his understanding of himself. 
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Network coordination is taken for granted in much of the rest of life, too.  
Persons coordinate with other persons, through computers as mediators, as in 
the virtual basketball game, and the old fashioned way, face to face.  Computers 
coordinate with other computers, and computers with persons and vice versa.  
With the pulses coordinated between human being and computational machine, 
and the input/output processed rapidly enough in just the right ways, these sets 
of switches produce virtual environments like computer games and the internet.  
Thus, persons and computers work together to network between human brains 
and computer processors, and back again.  It is this networking which is 
responsible for the increasing unification of the human globe under one 
language, machine language. 
It is the coordination of persons which is the great promise of the virtual 
world.  Persons are positional.  Sometimes, persons are distant from each other.  
Networked together, virtual environments seem to help to close these distances.  
Computers, are also positional.  Just as every computer in a network of 
computers has a uniquely identifying position within that system of relations, so 
does a person have a similar place in his family, society, and civilization.  Some 
positions are critical for the integrity of the system.  Consider the preacher in the 
church, the leader of a cult, the professor in the classroom, or the tyrant in a 
tyranny.  If one of these are missing from their places, the systems of relations as 
wholes may fail, so critical are these positions for the networks in which their 
positions arise. 
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In many ways, as the world is unified in the language of machines, the 
person’s position relative to some computer’s position also constitutes that 
person’s position relative another person’s position.  The essential difference is 
that, so far, computers have no stake in their positions.  One IP address is as 
good as is any other for the computer.  What makes any given place unique is 
that there is a person at either end of a computer.  Thus, so critical are the 
positions of each computer that, if a computer is missing from its place, or 
breaks, the network of personal relations which depends on it may fail. 
These environments increasingly provide a crucial avenue to meaningful 
socialization.  This is what it feels like to be globalized.  The increasingly unified 
world appears more than ever dis-unified.  Computer mediated personal 
networks become especially important as globalization motivates increasing 
isolation from friends and family.  For instance, MySpace is a global 
phenomenon which facilitates networking through common interests without 
regard for geographical constraints.366  These are networks of unique persons 
fulfilling unique roles in unique human lives.  This virtual world is a network of 
persons built on the bedrock of networked silicon processors.  Insofar as these 
networks of persons depend on the technologies which keep computers going, 
however, their integrity is difficult to ensure. 
                                            
366 In general, I am skeptical of the MySpace phenomenon.  Insofar as computer mediated 
socialization stands in for direct care for another human being, I even see a problem.  I feel that it 
is always best to remain responsive to local needs first, as this is generally where one’s 
capacities to care are most effective.  Insofar as persons moderate their lives in terms of 
MySpace mediated relationships, much of that most effective capacity to care for persons near at 
hand is underutilized, undervalued, and unpracticed.  Meanwhile, much of MySpace is devoted to 
the collection of friends, not necessarily toward any particular purpose, which draws into question 
the value of these networks. 
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Computer networks are fragile, complicated, and expensive to maintain.  
These networks themselves depend on other, hidden, networks.  These networks 
also depend on networks of people.  They require systems of industry which 
make silicon – the stuff of beaches – into chips.  These industries are networked 
with others which provide heavy equipment, high temperature furnaces, lasers 
and, perhaps most importantly, highly specialized labor.  Computer networks also 
require other networks which reliably provide for electrical power, fiberoptic 
cables, replacement hardware, not to mention technical support, which itself 
requires telephone systems, educational systems, training systems, monetary 
systems, and these, of course, require networks of human beings. 
There are networks of persons at either end of a network of computers.  
These persons work to turn the objects of the natural into objects of the virtual 
world.  The production of the virtual world depletes the resources of the natural 
world.  The fact that the planet is on the cusp of a global environmental crisis is 
well known, and shall receive some attention later on in this section.   The point 
here is merely that, should the resources fail, their delivery fail, or any other link 
in the networks which support the production of the virtual world fail, then the 
virtual world, and all of the personal networks which depend on it, will fail.  Thus, 
that world in terms of which persons increasingly order their lives truly is a castle 
made of sand. 
For the moment, instead of looking directly at the impact of computer 
mediated networks on the felt lives of persons around the natural world, let’s look 
for a moment at the logic in terms of which these networks work.  Let’s look at 
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the mechanism of information processing which underwrites this global virtual 
sand castle.  Let’s see what it is we call the truth. 
Consider the Law of the Excluded Middle (L.E.M).  This is a fundamental 
notion in binary logic, that sort taught exclusively at most schools and 
universities.367  Taking the L.E.M. to be a law is the hallmark of classical logic.  
The Law states that a thing either is, or is not, in the way ascribed at any given 
moment.  So, whatever we take to be p, a thing at any time is either p or not p.  It 
cannot be both; this is the middle that gets excluded in the L.E.M.. 
Everything is a dilemma according to the L.E.M.  Everything is either some 
way or not some way, and it is up to us to figure it out.  In everyday terms, this 
seems to make sense.  A car is either blue, or it is not.  A computer switch is 
either open, or it is not.  A carrot is either good, or it is not.  A person is either 
evil, or she is not.  This seems to be more than a law of logic; it seems to be a 
law of nature. 
What is a law?  What does a law do?  Laws, themselves, are supposed to 
hold things together.  Consider the practical instance of a law, a law of nature.  A 
law of nature is a law because it seems that all natural processes taken together 
are bound to its terms.  If the natural world is an ordered whole, and people who 
try to figure out how the world works, like scientists, already presume that it is, 
everything natural operates according to laws of nature.  A natural law represents 
                                            
367 There are other sorts of logic, like fuzzy and multi-valent logics, the discussion of which I will 
also neglect here. 
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the order of the natural world, and puts in human terms how the apparent objects 
of the natural world are related. 
Consider the Law of Gravity.  It is not as if some cannonball follows the 
letter of some law.  It does not tell objects how to relate with one another. This 
law tells people how objects of the natural world are related.  Moreover, it applies 
not merely to some objects as opposed to others, but to all objects in the field of 
gravity.  That is what makes it a law. 
Laws are supposed to explain things.  That is, a law is supposed to put all 
things under its scope in terms of their common relations, like gravity.  This goes 
for a law of nature as well as for any other law.  Whatever does not fall within its 
scope, and so outside of nature, is not a relationship which is supposed to arise 
in the natural world according to the law.  If it does, either the law is wrong, and 
so not a law, or there are unnatural things which perhaps behave according to 
some law or other, but not according to any law of nature. 
A law tells us what is necessary, and what is necessarily not.  In terms of 
a natural law, unnatural things are impossibilities. They are not given as 
possibilities in terms of a law of nature.  They are necessarily not natural.  This 
goes for any other sort of law as well.  Logical laws indicate that illogical things 
are logical impossibilities, for instance.  They are necessarily not logical.  Thus, 
no matter the context, a law tells us not only what is possible, but what is 
impossible.  What a law gives as an impossibility is necessarily not possible, 
otherwise it is not a law covering the field at hand. 
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What makes logicians think the L.E.M. is a law is that, classically, 
logicians presume what the Law gives as impossibilities are necessarily not 
possible.  L.E.M. is taken to be universally binding.  That is to say that what the 
Law says will, in every case, at every place, explain what is at hand: 1 or 0, a 
thing is p or is not p, and anything else is not a possibility. 
Let’s test this presumption.  Does the Law hold in every context?  This is a 
complex question.  That the L.E.M. is taken to be a law in the world of classical 
logic is one thing.  For it to hold everywhere and at all times in the natural world 
is another thing.  For the Law to qualify as a universal law of nature, it must 
satisfy the latter, stronger, requirement.  Let’s see if this is the case. 
Let’s think of p or not p as either good or not good.  In these terms, the 
L.E.M. says that a thing is either good or not good at any given time, and not 
both.  Are all things either good or not good?  Aren’t many things some of both?  
Don’t many things seem good, and turn out bad, or vice versa?   Are some good 
things good because they are bad, and vice versa?  Much of life is lived in these 
apparently contradictory terms, at least in the natural world.  Meanwhile, the Law 
presumes this to be impossible.  Could it be that we spend much of our lives 
doing the impossible?  Doing the unnatural?  Or, is the Law still the law, and we 
are merely thought criminals, breaking the Law? 
I will assume that a law of nature cannot be broken.  This is an analytic 
impossibility.  If a law of nature is broken, it is not a law of nature.  All naturally 
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occurring things are part of the natural order.368  I am assuming that there is no 
such thing as a naturally occurring thought criminal who breaks the laws of 
nature, at least not one who fails to get caught when he acts on his thoughts.  
Therefore, a law of nature cannot be broken, at least not by any naturally 
occurring thing.  This does not mean that thought is unnatural.  It only means that 
people can be wrong about what they think.  This also does not mean that there 
are no unnatural things.  I suspect there are not, but an unnatural thing is just the 
sort of thing one would expect to be breaking a law of nature.  Neither does this 
mean that there are no such things as thought criminals.  That there are thought 
criminals seems a safe assumption, and still narrows the above unconfirmed 
options to two.  We can presume the Law is still a law, and that we do either the 
unnatural or the impossible if we break it. 
I will assume that, if the impossible is done, we don’t spend much of our 
lives doing it.  This is not to say that the impossible cannot be done.  In fact, I 
think that the only things worth doing are the impossible things, but we will get to 
that in a moment.  It is just to say that if the impossible is done on a routine basis, 
then we aren’t really doing what impossible is usually taken to mean.  We may be 
doing something unusual, but that is beside the point.  Laws cover unusual 
cases; they do not cover impossible cases.  They exclude them.  If the Law is a 
law, then it should exclude all things which are not possible.  In the case of an 
exception, the law has excluded a clear possibility.  Thus, doing the impossible is 
                                            
368 This makes me a naturalist, but I say go with what’s given. 
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an exception to the law, requiring that the statement of law be revised at the very 
least.  Needless to say, this has been known to happen. 
To do the impossible is to break the law, thereby denying the status of the 
law as law.  This goes for the L.E.M. as well as for any other law.  Yet, we are left 
with one further question.  Is it unnatural to break the L.E.M.? 
Let’s think of a practical case.  Consider the conflict in the Middle East 
over the territories known as Palestine and Israel.  If one were to ask a stalwart 
defender of either side, he may say that deaths on the other side are good, and 
that deaths on his own side are bad.  This attitude, naturally, excludes any 
middle ground.  Examples of this attitude are easy to come by.  An especially 
militant man recently told me, regarding this very conflict: “Even pacifists can 
believe in pest control.”369  What could he have meant by this?  Is this attitude 
really natural, or could he merely be misinformed?  What about children who 
have no prejudice one way or the other?  What would they say? 
Let’s use the Law of the Excluded Middle to test his assertion.  On its face, 
the expression is committed to two things, pacifists and the pests in need of 
control.  Let’s take a look at the pacifist’s position.  This is the position which the 
man claimed as his own.  Pacifists may hold to two ways of thinking about pests.  
Consistent with the L.E.M., a pacifist is either a pest, p, or not a pest, not-p. 
If a pacifist is a pest, p, then controlling the pest is a special case.  We will 
look at this in a moment, after we clear away the more everyday way of looking 
                                            
369 To which he added that the other side birthed children, at all, for the sole purpose to have 
them shot in the streets.  On his account, the children are sent, by adults, to attack tanks with 
rocks, so that the adults will have opportunity to justify their own eventual suicide bombing. 
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at things.  If a pacifist is essentially different than a pest, then he may attempt to 
control them as if they were any other objects in the world like tables and chairs.  
For example, a person controls a chair by pulling it up to a table and resting on it.  
When a chair meets one’s needs, one uses the chair for his own resting state.  
The chair, hereby, is no pest.  When the chair fails to meet the terms of one’s 
needs, one declares it broken.  This chair is now a pest.  It gets in the way of 
one’s search for a resting place; it does not provide for it.  The broken chair is an 
obstacle. 
Pests are special sorts of obstacles.  In the case of the militant man at 
hand, the obstacles to his rest are other human beings.  Here, the logic which 
excludes pests overcomes him.  There is no such thing as a good pest.  There is 
really only one way to control a pest.  Controlling pests means ridding the 
environment of them.  Pests are merely a special kind of obstacle.  From this 
perspective, “not p is good” means that “an absence of pests is good.”   This 
means that those other human beings must disappear. 
This attitude is prefigured in his use of language.  Pests of every sort are 
typically treated according to the option most conducive to the rest of the one in 
control.  There is no fixing a pest.  They are removed, or are overcome.  
Typically, pests are destroyed.  Thus, the expression “even pacifists can believe 
in pest control” is nonsense.  What happened to the pacifism? 
Considering the context of his expression, the violent conflict raging 
across the Middle East, the absence of pests involves killing them, torturing 
them, killing their families, and bulldozing their homes.  Hereby, the militant isn’t 
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merely making a mistake.  He hasn’t mistaken himself for a pacifist.  He 
advocates violence and maintains that he is a pacifist.  What he says, and what 
he does, are two different things.  Some parts of his network of mental 
processors are not coordinated.  He points one way, and moves another.  Sadly, 
his own discontinuity is actively coordinated with others like himself and of them 
there appear to be many.  The advocates of violence are many, and are very well 
organized. 
Such dissemblance, however, is contrary to what people come to expect 
of things of the natural world.  The Law of Gravity and falling are perfectly 
consistent, expression and action.  The militant’s expression and his actions are 
not.  What the militant man’s expression hides is something unnatural.  He claims 
pacifism and advocates violence.  Pacifism and violence, however, are practically 
exclusive of one another.  They do not appear together in nature.  Logic only 
reflects this fact of matter. 
Let’s follow this line of reasoning where it leads.  There is another option 
for the militant pacifist besides the dishonest one.  He may remain consistent 
with his claim to pacifism.  He may maintain “even pacifists can believe in pest 
control.”  Consistent with his pacifism, and seemingly contrary to the L.E.M., he 
may hold that he is a pest as well as a pacifist.  He may maintain that he is both 
p and not p.  In this case, the expression “even pacifists can believe in pest 
control” makes sense.  If the pacifist is the pest, then this expression may be 
rewritten: “even pacifists can believe in self control.”   To this, I will add a further 
revision: “especially pacifists can believe in self control.” 
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That is, especially pacifists do not believe in the L.E.M..  In terms of the 
militant’s expression, L.E.M. presumes an essential difference between persons: 
one is a pest, the other not.  Considering the treatment which eventuates from 
this presumption, at least in practice, this essentially means: one is a person, the 
other not.  Needless to say, the L.E.M. is of limited utility when the object is to 
keep persons open to one another in sharing an increasingly overburdened 
natural world.  It works if the idea is to close off from one another.  If the persons 
on either side are taken to be essentially the same, these implications of the Law 
no longer hold.  There is no other side from which to close off.  There is no 
middle to exclude.  P is either good or bad, both, neither, or a non-issue.  P is not 
p; not p is merely the absence of p.  Not p is the logic which merely reflects the 
fact that somebody missing. 
Practically speaking, the L.E.M. should be renamed the Law of the 
Included Extremes (L.I.E.).  On this logic, there are two positions around any 
polarized field of positions which presume a world wherein their opposites are 
necessarily not.  This is a logic of exclusion.  On this logic of exclusion, there is 
simply not enough world to go around.  There is the world for one, and that 
means not for the other.  Practically speaking, there is no shared global situation 
on this way of thinking.  It is always mine and not yours.  Meanwhile, L.I.E. 
presumes the fact of a unified “it” in the first place, otherwise there is no 
distinction to be made.  For the L.I.E. to be a law of nature, a world with both of 
us in it is necessarily not possible.  Meanwhile, here we are. 
 241 
 
  
By the L.I.E., some men hold themselves essentially different from others.  
These men see the value in guns and tanks, prejudices and arbitrary distinctions.  
These things are necessary in order to keep other men away, and to get them 
out of the world.  This is what the militant man meant by pest control.  His 
expression is one weapon in an arsenal of exclusion.  His expression is a violent 
one.  It says there is one world, and it is not theirs.  So long as they don’t 
object370, he has no reason not to be a pacifist.  Once they do, he finds his 
reason: so that he can again be a pacifist.  This way of thinking hides a deep 
contradiction, not to mention a lack of integrity.  This way of thinking fails to cover 
all the possibilities open to the natural world.  It excludes some which are clear 
possibilities.  Thus, the L.I.E. cannot be a law of nature.  The question remains, 
then, how does such a logic increasingly unify a world? 
It cannot, unless that unification is one of mutual exclusion and global 
conflict.  It is not that this is altogether a surprise, or that it is altogether 
unwelcome.  Some myths endorse this end of the world as that necessary end 
resulting from an edict of god, on some accounts the exclusive designer of 
natural law.  In terms of the myths of the west, the end of the world is revealed in 
the Christian New Testament book of Revelations.  The inclusion of this extreme 
text in the New Testament is controversial, but that is beside the point.  The end-
time it describes has been called the “apocalypse.” 
Consider the word “apocalypse.”  “Apocalypse” is a word ominus in 
Christian theology because of its association with the destruction which marks 
                                            
370 That is, become an obstacle.  See earlier passages wherein these two meanings of “object” 
are explored, circa pages 139, 170, and 200. 
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the end of the world as described in the New Testament.  It can be traced to 16th 
century Latin meaning “revelation, disclosure.”  But the word appears in the 
history of thought much earlier than the controversial book of Revelations.  
“Apocalypse” is from the Greek, “apo-“ meaning “from” and “kalyptein” meaning 
“to cover, conceal.”  “Apocalypse,” according to its original significance, thus 
merely means to remove from cover or concealment, to reveal.  Apocalypse is 
discovery.  This has nothing necessarily to do with the end of the world.  All that 
is destroyed in an apocalypse is ignorance.  All that is necessarily not is the 
impossible.   
All that apocalypse is is the not not possible.  What we discover depends 
on what we understand.  Discovery makes the impossible possible.  Consider 
this illustration.  Imagine that you live in a primitive society in a desert.  Imagine 
that the desert had not always been a desert.  It had once been an opulent 
forest.  Life was everywhere.  Life was easy.  Resources were plentiful, and your 
society has a history which reflects this change. 
When the weather changed, and drought set in, life got more difficult.  
People went without, expectations went unsatisfied, needs went unmet, many 
starved.  The variability of the environment made some ways of life untenable.  
For instance, living on the water, shellfish are a relatively safe food source also 
easily secured from the shallows.  To live on shellfish is a possibility in this 
situation.  Living in a desert (without refrigeration), however, shellfish are deadly.  
Living in a desert (without refrigeration), shellfish kill.  This happened with 
enough regularity that to not eat shellfish became a rule.  To live on shellfish is 
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not a possibility in this situation; it is a practical impossibility.  It was simply the 
terms of the situation, and the injunction “do not eat shellfish” became the law of 
the land. 
Without an understanding of the mechanisms at work, and without a 
perspective from outside this environment, “do not eat shellfish” became the law 
of god.  This is stronger than the practical reality.  The law says that one either 
not eat shellfish or die.  Practically speaking, however, sometimes people just get 
really sick.  The divine injunction neither reflects this fact nor invites further 
inquiry into the mechanisms which drive the matter at hand.  One either does not 
eat shellfish, or violates the law of god.  There is no middle ground, here.  This 
version of the law fails to represent the natural order.  It is as if religion describes 
an unrealistic virtual world. 
In any event, we find ourselves in a different situation.  It is no longer 
impossible to safely eat shellfish in the desert.  In fact, it is difficult to understand 
the attitude that holds that “do not eat shellfish” remains a law of god, let alone a 
law of nature, today.  We know about bacteria.  We have refrigeration.  Shellfish 
are no longer necessarily deadly.  They might be deadly.  Some persons are 
allergic to shellfish.  They may become ill from its consumption, and even die.  
Some shellfish does go bad, and some people do get sick on it.  But this is now 
the exception, and not the rule.  It is simply not the case that shellfish is either 
deadly, or it is not. 
The L.E.M. does not hold for the divine injunction.  This command could 
be changed: do not eat shellfish (which are far from the water and which have 
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not been adequately refrigerated given that you have no allergy and they come 
from clean waters free of heavy metals, especially if you are pregnant, and other 
things as well some of which we may not as yet be aware).  This is not an all or 
nothing rule.  This line is fuzzy.  There is a lot going on in the middle, but it is 
closer to representing the natural state of affairs.  We are still in the process of 
coming to terms with our places in the changing world.  There is, as yet, no one 
or the other.  The L.E.M. fails to provide for this fact.  Thus, it is not a law of 
nature.  In fact, to adhere to it as a law at all appears to be quite the opposite, 
unnatural. 
To unify the world under one set of laws, either side to conflict must see 
themselves as part of a larger system of which the other pole is an essential part.  
If the pacifist endorses the neglected option extended by the L.E.M., then he is 
both a pacifist and a pest to be controlled.  Thus, he is unified, and the world with 
himself.  By the Law, this is supposed to be impossible.  It is either me, or you.  
How can we make sense of this middle position?  
Let’s consider some thing which all possible parties to conflict share.  For 
one thing, all parties to all conflicts live in terms of the same planet Earth.  Let’s 
consider the current state of this shared situation.  Through the lens of 
technology, with the help of computers and their supporting industries, men have 
a view of the world as a whole as if the world were an object, and the scientist 
were outside of it.  Where before people could investigate one such system or 
another, the whole world can be seen as a network of coordinated ecosystems 
which exist only together.  They do not arise on their own.  The view from outside 
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shows that the global environmental network is faltering.  Good evidence for this 
is that individual ecosystems are failing.  Reefs are dying, wetlands are growing 
over, and ice caps are melting.  
None of these on their own necessarily indicate the failure of the entire 
natural environment.  The best evidence for this is the growing instability of 
global weather patterns.  This instability has been linked with higher 
temperatures.  Heat affects all ecosystems together.  This instability is caused 
by, among other things, the warming of sea water.  For example, hotter water 
has a lower capacity for dissolved oxygen, and other gases, than does cooler 
water.  This stresses the animals and plants which constitute ecosystems like 
reefs and fisheries.  Sea water warming, especially at the surface, evaporates 
more rapidly, and adds water vapor to the atmosphere.  This makes the air 
heavier, and causes stronger winds which lead to more violent hurricanes, larger 
tornadoes, and extremes in rain and drought.  Everyone on Earth, and everyone 
to come, is subject to the resulting violence. 
The warming is due to gases in the atmosphere which insulate the Earth, 
keeping heat from escaping into the vast cold vacuum of space.  Everyone on 
Earth, and everyone to come, shares this atmosphere.  The heat comes largely 
from the sun’s radiation, but some also comes from car engines and electric 
motors and blast furnaces and power plants and the like.  A car, if one looks at it 
in the right way, is simply a big heater with benefits and produces a lot of water 
vapor.  Water vapor, itself, captures and retains thermal energy with incredible 
efficiency, especially in the form of infrared radiation.  Thus, the globe is 
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warming.  This view of the world is made possible only in virtue of the technology 
which is itself responsible for the state of the global system under study. 
This fact presents us all with a great irony.  The irony is that the industries 
responsible for the technology, and so responsible for this view of the failing 
global environment, are themselves responsible for the failure of that global 
environment.  It is only because of the technology through which we view the 
environmental crisis that we have a crisis, at all.  Thus, we are presented with a 
great irony. 
Technology presents us with an objective view of the world.  Meanwhile, 
the subjective view does not match up.  Technology works to increasingly meet 
the terms of individual persons.  Technology works to offset the tensions 
imposed by the global industrial way of life.  By many subjective appearances, 
the situation seems a good one.  For instance, as I write this text, gasoline is still 
less than $2.00/gallon in the U.S.  It seems that, subjectively speaking, things 
have never been easier. 
This is a tragic view.  The objective view reveals that the subjective view is 
mistaken.  With so many lives lived and died in the name of progress, we have 
come only to the edge of self-destruction.  The Earth will warm, flood, and drown 
much of the land on which our current civilization is built.  Science delivers a 
view, as it were, on the promised land.  It is a world in ruin.  If we continue on our 
current path, science promises a tragedy.  This means more than driving a 
smaller car.  This means rethinking the global economy.  This means reordering 
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the world.  This means living to different ends, one life, one day, one action at a 
time. 
Technology has shown that it takes too much from the rest of the world’s 
environmental system to keep the current industrial infrastructure going.  It is not 
sustainable.  This same technology and its supporting industries are dependent 
on one another; without the technology, there is no industry and vice versa.  
These, in turn, are dependent on persons cooperatively living in certain ways 
towards common ends while in different positions within the system of relations 
on which these industries are built.  Thus, technology shows that the current 
social structure is not sustainable. 
These results draw the increasing unification of the human world under 
into question.  Much of the motivation behind the unification is economic.  People 
are getting rich on it.  Without the technological infrastructure required to account 
for the economics, however, globalization could not get off the ground.  The 
industrial base required to produce the machines into which the logic of the 
economy is embedded is expensive.  Without the economics, especially without 
the scale of the globalized economy, the technological infrastructure could also 
not get of the ground.  These two aspects of the situation are inauspiciously 
bound.  Together, they wind around one another trading advances, stair steps of 
progress from past to present.  This progress unifies the world, at least in the 
end.  The lives we lead, along the way, make this all possible.  The Earth’s 
natural environment will collapse.  The industries which provide for technologies 
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will collapse.  The global economy will collapse.  Our ways of life will collapse.  
High tide approaches, and the human world is a castle made of sand. 
Many mythologies hold that human beings are essentially not bound by 
the laws of nature.  Some hold that there is a supernatural realm which is the 
actual otherworldly resting place to which humans are essentially bound, and that 
the Earth’s natural environment is merely a stopover point.  One consequence of 
this way of thought is that human beings are not necessarily bound by the laws of 
nature.  On this way of thinking, laws of nature are obstacles to be overcome and 
not guidelines for environmentally responsible, sustainable, ethical ways of life.  
These guidelines come from above, or below, but assuredly not from the ground 
around us.  So long as we live on Earth, and our children are born on Earth, this 
is not a vantage we can afford to maintain.  This point of view takes mankind out 
of the natural circuit, altogether. 
In the dialogue between man and nature, we are at a crux.  Either we 
return to living in terms of the natural environment, meet nature in the middle, 
and save the world from our own mistaken selves, or we continue on in unnatural 
terms living as if we are exempt from the constraints of the global environmental 
system.  We are either natural, or unnatural.  The poles are already given.  We 
are responsible for the end we seek, either way. 
The current environmental crisis brings the following point to the fore: man 
and nature are inseparable.  Human beings are part of the natural order, not 
separate from it. Though we struggle against it, and may sometimes wish 
otherwise, we live within this natural order.  Humans are simply one node in the 
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global network.  Humans may become absent, but that does not mean that the 
global system is necessarily not human.  It means that people are missing.  This 
is the nature of the world.   
There is no excluded middle in a natural system.  The appearance of 
everyday objects like chairs and tables in fact presumes the unity from which 
they are abstracted.  The global order is not an object like a chair or a table.  It is 
not even a collection of such things.  The world is primarily a whole, and we are 
merely passing parts of it.  The world is not exclusive of us, and vice versa.  It is 
not man versus nature.  To think otherwise is unnatural, as in contrary to nature, 
and has led in practice to a gap between human organizations and their 
sustainability.  This is the crux of the current crisis.  Can technology help to 
bridge this gap, even as it is responsible for it? 
Science presents us with a view on a land of its own promise, and it looks 
familiar.  Warmer, without refrigeration, with heavy metals and pesticides, 
shellfish again become deadly.  But, no single rule against eating shrimp will 
save the world; it would take billions and billions of such rules to affect such a 
change.  It is not practical to compile such a list of commandments, let alone to 
follow them. 
However, science also presents us with a view on our own promise.  The 
preceding text presents this view.  We are free to do otherwise than we have 
done.  We may determine that situation in which we seek rest. 
If not to the preordained apocalyptic end of the world, if not to an 
economically fueled exhaustion of world resources, to which end should we aim?  
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We may begin by conceiving of alternatives to the ends determined by Christian 
mythology, and by global consumerism, and by past habits.  We may begin by 
saying that such ends are impossible, not because they cannot happen but 
because we will not allow them.  They are impossible because we will not pursue 
them as possibilities.  These are simply not ends consistent with the persons we 
wish to become.  
If not the preordained soldier in the army of the Apocalypse, which person 
should one become?  This challenge does not require that one conceive of some 
other end to the world.  One need not conceive of an alternative world as a whole 
and make the world that certain way.  It merely requires that one think of himself 
in ways in which he will not find rest in that tragic end of the world.  To forbid 
environmental catastrophe requires that he conceive of himself as a person who 
is repulsed by the thought of being at home in such a situation.  He merely needs 
to become the person who denies it as an end, at all.  Naturally, he, as all things 
in nature, shall seek rest in terms of another situation. 
This is not an all or nothing affair.  Collectively, we may save the world, or 
not, but this end is far off and along the way change is gradual.  Let’s now briefly 
look in turn at two approaches to getting there.  These come from two preceding 
sections of this text.  The first addresses which sort of person one must become 
if he is to deliver the world to some other than a catastrophic end.  With this in 
mind, the second addresses what an appropriate end should feel like should 
anyone have the opportunity to be so situated.  There should be no surprises, 
here. 
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Let’s return to the potato game introduced in the 5th chapter of this text.  
Think of the whole planet as if it were one big potato, the world-potato. The 
world-potato isn’t simply what we eat, it is where we live, and where future 
persons will continue to live.  It is where we all seek rest in terms of the shared 
environment. 
In this rendition of the potato game, there are billions of hungry mouths to 
consider, not simply one’s own and that of the hungry guy across the table. If we 
think about the game in a certain way, most of the persons most worthy of 
consideration – babies – are yet to be born.  If we do the wrong things, the world 
will become a place where noone will rest.  If we do the right thing, future 
generations will eat, sleep, and play forever. 
In the original version of the potato game, there are two players with two 
essentially different sets of experiences.  Let’s not retain these personalities in 
the current rendition.  Let’s take advantage of what we have learned since then.  
Think of one person on the planet.  Think of yourself. 
Think of your self as having sole access to all the resources of the world.  
You have it all to your self.  Now, consider this.  There are billions of hungry 
persons in front of you.  All of them expect a piece of that potato.  Furthermore, 
there are billions of hungry persons lined up behind these persons.  These are 
the generations of unborn children to come, and they all expect a piece of that 
potato.  What will you do with it? 
In this version of the potato game, to adopt an open or a closed mode of 
being with others is not temporary.  You will not learn from this experience, and 
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gain another opportunity to do otherwise.  This is not an opportunity to develop 
habits towards becoming a person up ahead.  This is the person you will have 
become.  This one action marks you for all time.  What person will you become?  
How will you be seen?   Who will you be?  Socrates or scarecrow? 
Imagine that you close off to all of them.  What could you expect to 
happen next?  Ask yourself: if I were hungry, and my children hungry, and my 
pregnant wife hungry, and someone else denies me food while he has 
everything, how long would it take for me to do something to secure the 
resources necessary to keep them healthy?  They use guns to keep me away 
from what I need to secure my children’s future.  What would it take for me to 
bring guns of my own in order to secure the resources necessary to keep them 
alive?  I say, not long.  Noone wants to become that person who did not do all 
that he could to keep his loved ones alive and healthy.  This is not an end to be 
revered.  It is repulsive.  This is simply an end to which no person willingly 
moves.  I say, resist. 
Imagine, instead, that you open to these others.  You are sensitive to their 
suffering.  You take their situations as if your own.  You have sole access to all 
the resources of the world, and these others are in need of them.  Moreover, 
most of the others in need have yet to be born.  These will become persons who 
will also seek ends to be revered.  These unborn children will take up models of 
others who have shown reverenced ways of life in the past.  Imagine that you 
open to them all.  What life will you demonstrate? 
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You have the option to share.  Open, you do share.  You open the 
opportunity for others to keep their own loved ones healthy and even happy.  
What should happen next?  Ask yourself: if I were hungry, and my children 
hungry, and my pregnant wife hungry, and someone else opened the opportunity 
to feed them, what is this worth?  How will you be remembered, for having done 
this?  Ask yourself, with this example in mind, will others be likely to live 
similarly?  In which world would you rather live?  Who would you rather share it 
with? 
Let’s imagine being in these situations for a moment.  Let’s return to the 
bathtub experiment from section 9.  Let’s imagine either of these two situations in 
turn, from both perspectives. This version of the bathtub experiment is more 
complicated than the basic experiment.  The tensions in this version of the 
bathtub experiment are still felt between one’s own current and one’s own ideal 
situation.  The ideal situation is still that in which one is revered.  The tensions in 
this experiment are also between one’s own situation and another’s, ideal or not.  
In this version of the experiment, the bathtub is the whole world. 
Imagine at first that all of the tensions of life disappear.  This is the ideal 
space of rest, the ideal situation.  You have sole access to all the resources of 
the world.  Your every need is met, but they are met for your self, alone.  Others 
also are in situations, but their situations are otherwise.  Their every need is not 
met.  If we presume a limit to the resources in the world, this means that you 
have, and others have not.  Your position is to be revered, and theirs are not. 
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Imagine that you are closed to the needs of others.  This takes care of the 
tensions.  There is no other situation with which to feel the differences.  Already 
revered, with no contrary determination, you are at rest.  In fact, to open to the 
difference between yours and another’s situation is to invite an obstacle to your 
own object of being revered.  To become open to the other is to invite 
responsibility for his suffering.  This is not to be revered, but to be despised.  This 
is the greatest potential difference between one’s current and ideal situations.  It 
is the greatest obstacle to realizing one’s own ends, or so it would seem.  How 
are we to offset this tension? 
As we have seen above, one avenue is to continue to deny the other, 
including his unborn children.  “They are not me.”  This attitude is that behind 
genocide, slavery, and prejudice.  This way, though one may be responsible for 
suffering, it is not that of another human being whose suffering states are 
essentially mirrored in one’s own experience.  These are not persons; they are 
objects or they are obstacles.  In denying the other, one saves one’s self from 
sharing the other’s suffering.  One may remove the other from the situation, as if 
a broken chair blocking a place at the table. 
This seems to work if there is more than one situation, or more than one 
place at the table.  If this is the case, one can have his, and the others theirs.  
There is no tension because these two situations are not necessarily related, at 
all.  One may note a difference and feel nothing for it.  Insofar as the situation is 
the world as a whole, however, this is untenable.  There is no other situation.  We 
have to share this place.  This is where the differences between the relative 
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situations come to be so significant.  If the situation is shared, their tensions are 
one’s own tensions.  In either case, one’s own situation is the only situation 
which matters, and the other’s is no situation at all. 
Consider the other option.  Imagine again that all the tensions of life 
disappear.  Again, you have access to all of the resources of the world. Your 
every need is met, but it is met for your self, alone.  Others also are in situations, 
and their situations are otherwise.  Their every need is not met.  The difference 
causes tensions.  They need what you have, and may stop at nothing to get it.   
Imagine being open to the needs of others.  This introduces all of their 
tensions as if they were your own.  There is no other situation but this one, and it 
is shared.  Open to the suffering of other persons, one may only rest when they 
do.  This means especially providing for their hungry children as well as for one’s 
own.  After all, who can rest when their children cannot rest? 
Imagine being open to the needs of others and providing for them.  
Imagine being situated in terms of this end.  Imagine that all those around are 
healthy, and happy, and that they are so because of your own way of life.  You 
could have kept it all for yourself and fought those who opposed you.  You could 
have excluded them.  You did not.  You could have been despised.  You were 
not.  You are revered, and for your generosity remembered.  This is the person 
you will have become.  Is this the sort of person you wish to become?  Or is this 
the sort of person you wish you would have become?  One with the world, each 
other, and free. 
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Appendix 1) Phenomenology and the Modern Tradition: 
 
Only living things are ex-static.  Though rocks and water come to terms 
with their environment, seeking equilibrium, taking on heat and losing it to the 
environment, they do not move from the equilibrium states of their own accord.  
Water does not boil when its boyfriend comes home late.  In other words, non-
living things do not choose the terms to which they do come to equilibrium, 
whereas people,371 do.372  Moreover, as people move, they experience new 
things, or old things in different ways, and so, as the phenomenological tradition 
has maintained since the Greeks, they “disclose” the world in their ex-static 
movement from a resting place.373 
This is the “clearing” which in turn reveals things in the world as the things 
that they are.  The things which are discovered are understood in terms of the 
purposes which motivate the action, in the first place.374  Thus, things in the world 
are discovered according to the mode of their disclosure, which turns out to be 
the purposes behind the “clearing” [verb] in the first place.  For instance, imagine 
clearing a field for farming.  In this mode, rich clean soil is good and rocks are 
revealed as obstacles.  Now, imagine clearing a field for geology, in order to 
study rocks; in this mode, it is the soil which is the obstacle. 
                                            
371 Or, at least free people, philosophers, can, and sometimes do, more or less.  As demonstrated 
by Socrates’ fable at the conclusion of the Gorgias. 
372 Glynn (2002) makes this point nicely.  
373 The locus classicus for Western Philosophy’s role this disclosure resides in Plato’s Myth of the 
Cave. 
374 After all, to plow is not to remain in place; that is, effective plowing is not static.  All good 
ploughing proceeds to the end of the row, and then back again. 
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This leads us back to the sense of “clearing” as a noun; after all, the work 
in clearing [verb] is for the sake of a clearing [noun] which is suited for, from the 
beginning, the purposes which discovered the space, in the first place.  So, 
again, clearing farmland means taking out rocks, which, in the end, means 
clearing a space suitable for farming.  Clearings which are rendered suitable for 
farming are called “plots,” or “acreage,” but good farmland is good farmland - the 
same thing under different names.  The purpose in discovery is always for the 
sake of one’s self, on Heideggers account; Dasein is “clearing” as both noun and 
verb. 
There are still a few things about this aspect of phenomenology to clear 
up: which comes first, clearing [verb] or [noun], and what to do when the clearing 
[noun] is no longer suitable for its cleared [verb] purposes, are two question 
which present themselves immediately.  But, for now, we should shelve these 
issues; let’s look a little deeper into the situation which confronts the little space 
of clarity we may have cleared, already. 
In the Modern tradition, there is a radically different starting place.  Instead 
of the disclosure of things being of the constitution of the subject, and so 
irrevocably tied to the mode of the disclosure, and so to the discoverer, himself, 
with the significance of the disclosed only in terms of the purposes of his 
disclosing agency, the Moderns presume the rigid distinction between the 
subject, and the objects of its world. 
Heidegger worked directly against this tradition.  Descartes had thought 
that the mind and body were each a certain different sort of substance, each, in 
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virtue of their being a substance, able to stand on their own.375  From this 
tradition, the mind as substance has been understood as a vessel holding 
representations of things so that the view of the mind is of a thing, able to stand 
alone, with only external relations to other self-standing things.  “But when a mind 
is conceived as a mental substance … the result is that the distinctive character 
of perception and thought as the disclosing of entities in the world is fatally 
obscured and has finally to be dealt with, very inadequately, by means of a 
theory of representation.”376  What such an approach leads to are problems such 
as the existence of the so-called external world, and from this presumption the 
necessary appropriation of some sort of correspondence into all theories of 
truth.377 
Traditionally,378 this notion is exposed in terms like the following: “I am 
standing ‘right here,’ gaping at the object at point blank range.  A distance 
separates me from the object.  I am thus detached from the object.”379 
                                            
375 Which seems to be derived from a scholastic misunderstanding of Aristotle’s theory of the 
separability of some aspect of human soul.  Where Aristotle makes this claim, it is in relation only 
to some aspect of the understanding which rightly does stand on its own, this being the essential 
account of any given thing.  Just as it is the purpose for animals, self-standing unities of an 
organic variety, to produce other self-standing unities – that is have babies – it is the purpose of 
the understanding, Aristotle’s second tier of soul to do the same.  What Aristotle implies here is 
merely that some men are able to render self-standing understandings, of the sort for which 
Socrates would volunteer to serve as mid-wife.  Sadly, superstition and fear of death have likely 
conspired to ruin this ancient insight, and to lead to such wars as we find ourselves in even today.  
As Jefferson had long ago noted, how much we suffer for evils which never existed. 
376 Olafson, page 17. 
377 Even though this inclusion is redundant once the primary mode of truth as revelation and 
discovery is understood phenomenologically.  For a brilliant discussion to the effect that 
correspondence is presumed by all epistemological approaches to bridging the gap as knowledge 
between the radically isolated subject and the external world in terms of the analytic tradition of 
philosophy, see David Lewis, 2001, and subsequent discussion. 
378 Speaking here of the Modern tradition in the Cartesian mold of the isolated self-certain atomic 
subject in an objective world. 
379 Wirt, page 89. 
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To some degree, this attitude is encouraged by a common sense 
understanding of the physical sciences.  Thinking about the famous line of inquiry 
called sub-atomic physics, I can see two ways in which this is the case, both 
theoretically and practically. 
Physicists, for one thing, work at studying ever-smaller particles by 
creating special environments, environments by way of which observations 
thought to correspond with a thing regularly arise.  Physicists, and for that matter 
scientists of almost every sort, might not be successful in making their 
observations and if they do, there is no guarantee that their discovery will have 
any practical bearing on everyday life.  Physics, thus, works at exposing objects 
on their own terms, as-if they were not being disclosed in terms of human 
agency, at all, as if the researcher, himself, was not even there.  This presumes a 
certain detachment. 
Theoretically speaking, Physics pictures things as-if they had presented 
themselves in a vacuum space, unaffected by the mode of the human inquirer, 
and by any other thing which does not suit the sitting there, in that environment, 
on display.  This approach begins with the detachment of the researcher.  Sitting 
behind ever increasing layers of theoretical apparatus, crunching numbers so big 
or so small that neither find representation in everyday experience, awaiting a 
blip on a computer screen, working in a lab can be very lonely business. 
Practically speaking, the sense that the ever smaller objects of physical 
observation are distinct and separate from the human inquirers, themselves, is 
bolstered by the fact that these objects are so tiny as to never meet the human 
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being on the street; no one is going to stub their toes on one of these things.  
That is just not an observation anyone is going to be making, at least, not without 
the help of a lot of equipment, and even then, few will find the work significant.  
Often enough, it is the machine that makes the observation, in any event; the 
scientist may not even be there.  In fact, it is not difficult to imagine that he need 
not be, at least not that particular scientist; this all carries a sense of detachment. 
It is a fact that many of the more theoretical sciences, especially, require 
sometimes huge tools - practical and theoretical -which yield similar results no 
matter who runs the controls.  It is as-if the scientist and his object were not 
related, at all.  Objects of these sciences, whether quarks or ion-channels, seem 
only to show up for the machines, anyways.  They arise in situations in which 
human beings will not, and so no one of us is ever going to be there, in the same 
situation, when they are.  Instead, in between the human being and his object of 
study are hundreds of years of scientific understanding, and perhaps hundreds of 
millions of dollars worth of incomprehensible machinery.  So, in the end, nothing 
guarantees that the scientist at work understands enough about the equipment 
around him to find a personal connection between himself and his study.380 
Now, this is actually a gross mischaracterization of most physical 
scientists I have ever known, but it does clear the way for the following point.  For 
the average everyday man on the street, there might as well be no connection 
between the theoretical scientist and his object of study; the gulf between them is 
                                            
380 Though, originally, historically, the scientist would have had to build for himself his bridging 
equipment, to close the gap between his capacities to discovery and the situation in which his 
object of study reveals itself.  Our current effort is of this form.  In fact, it can be argued that all 
science presupposes this essential tie, and where it is forgotten, it fails as science, but this is 
another story. 
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conceptually unbridgeable.  In turn, this provides further ballast for the notion that 
persons and the fundamental bases of the physical world are fundamentally 
detached.  Either that, or persons are simply not they way that they appear but 
are hidden away in little sections of the brain, as if persons are merely chemical 
“balances” locked away behind special equipment like eyes and voices.  In either 
case, persons seem to respond in terms of different laws than the everyday 
world, altogether, as-if in entirely different situations; these things, these people, 
ourselves, are alien.381 
Why is this thinking so intractable?  Let’s look at the scientific model, 
again.  The object, and the subject, according to this understanding, are 
separate.  Once the equipment is in place, over there, there is only for the 
observer to make the observation, over here, and that takes place inside the 
head of the scientist.  Ideally, he is only the observer; as-if there were two 
entirely different situations.  The idea is to put the physical world on display, and 
the parts of it which interest sub-atomic physicists display themselves in 
environments of which the physicist has no direct experience.382  So, subject and 
object are detached, with a record of one inside the skull-bone of another. 
Sounds simple enough, if not too simple.  In doing Physics, there isn’t any 
problem; to be able to proclaim, “the particle is there” is, after all, the whole point 
of the pursuit!  If the physicist can specify the environment in which certain 
                                            
381 In fact, building bridging concepts has become the focus of unified science, and has taken a 
form conspicuously akin to our own upcoming focus, attunement. 
382 It isn’t always the case.  When the physicist plays baseball, his science has a more practical 
relevance.  I concentrate on the extreme case only to more effectively draw the comparison. 
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observations obtain, then there is the recipe for repeatability; other physicists can 
do the same.  This is the commercial bedrock of science.383 
The problem arises when a similar mode of viewing objects is applied to a 
living being, like a human being. They show up in vacuums, he shows up in air.  
They show up under huge forces near light-speed, he shows up with a bagel and 
coffee.  They are static, not ex-static; they exist in terms of the environment, 
meanwhile the physicist is always trying to change his, for instance in holding out 
for new equipment and better graduate students.384 
Yet, when people think of each other as objects, these essential 
differences are just the sorts of things they deny.385  If they are objects, then they 
are physical bodies, and must obey physical laws, and behave predictably in 
predictable environments.  If this does not describe one’s experience, then 
perhaps persons are immaterial, souls and spirits, ensouled bodies, but this just 
leads to even more difficult problems.  Either way, understanding themselves as 
either material bodies or not material bodies, they deny any avenue of access to 
each other.  It is as-if there were an unbridgeable distance, whereby self and 
                                            
383 And, not all bad: Heidegger insists that even this mode of being with things does provide 
grounds for further insight, just not in the way in which we are interested, and not in a way which 
presumes the special nature of the being under our current purview. 
384 Insodoing, he might meet a brick wall in the administration, perhaps the chair is especially 
dim-witted and cannot see the value of good research and even better undergraduate teaching.  
These two, if they treat each other as-if they were each physical objects of the sort under their 
study, may never reconcile.  The chair, set in his ways, might as well be a rock, and may demand 
a rigidly dogmatic environment all his own, and demand that the researcher meet his proprietary 
terms.  Meanwhile, the researcher, the good physicist that he is, may never understand the 
chair’s dogma, and because he is used to treating the chair like all other physical bodies, as an 
object, over there in a given psychopathological state, an environment suiting only the inhumanity 
of duplicitous officiousness, there may be no room for coming to shared terms with the bigot.  
Sadly, this is all too often the situation, yet not one from which I will run. 
385 The allusion at an ambiguous use of “they” is purposeful.  A case might be made, especially 
considering the neurological evidence, that persons who think of themselves and others like 
themselves as objects are, insodoing, effectively giving up what we might otherwise understand 
as their humanity, and so, by any rule of reciprocity, ask to be treated likewise. 
 263 
 
  
other are essentially detached from the world, from each other, and even from 
those whom they love, whether that be themselves, their significant other, or 
God.386  No matter how much we share, on either view, our worlds can never be 
the same.387 
So long as one conceives of perception and practical contact with 
objects as having to ‘occur’ inside a subject which is closed off from 
the world, his contact with the world can only seem puzzling.  It 
must seem as if each person is locked into his own world of 
“experience.”388 
 
The issue becomes further confused when the same mode of relating is 
applied to one’s own self.  Seemingly, all of a sudden, one comes to the 
realization that he has lost himself.  Then in order to get to know himself, he 
recruits a theorist bursting at the seams with theoretical apparatus; maybe all this 
high-powered equipment can find him?  Of course, the highest-powered tools are 
those of religion; often times, persons turn to religion to find themselves.  
Internalized, the sense of detachment which seems to characterize the surest 
modes of human inquiry results in absurdity.  How many crooked bridges must 
be built between a broken heart and an unmade mind? 
From the traditional phenomenological point of view,389 it is only through 
the exploration of my own agency that any lived body comes to be aware of the 
                                            
386 In fact, this goes doubly for themselves; when people treat them selves as objects like any 
other, expect especially strange results.  For instance, in order to be sure that even he, his own 
self, exists, Descartes has to check with God, first.  To be sure that a given man feels a given 
way, he may run his notions past a psychotherapist.  If the therapist reflexively cites neuroc-
hemical imbalance and prescribes medication, then the man has become equipment. 
387 And so identity is understood as either strict logical identity, or indiscernible difference, in 
either case a third person stipulation.  
388 Wirt, page 89. 
389 At least from Husserl’s distinction of lived body from body as corpse and onward. 
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stuff of the physical world, including other living bodies.390  Our bodies are actual, 
their potentials actualized in our experience, and other things in the world are 
disclosed simultaneously.391  Insofar as a thing is an object, static, they always 
meet the terms of our expectations on the basis of this experience.  Evidence for 
this asymmetry is everywhere: diamonds are hard because we are softer, ice is 
cold because we are warmer, and times are tough because we aren’t up to 
them.392  In every case, good diamonds are consistently hard, good ice is 
consistently cold, and good times are consistently easy. 
If they are understood as objects, evaluations of other persons proceed 
similarly.393  Good persons are consistent.  They stay put, show up on time, and 
                                            
390 The difference between the body as object and as lived underlies Husserl’s analyses of 
“empathy” (“einfuhlung”) as long as we understand empathy in a certain way.  This is well known 
to Husserl scholars, though, probably because Husserl is not so easy to read, to few else.  Our 
discussion presumes this history, as well as the influence which Husserl has on Heidegger in this 
regard in the next section. 
391 Commensurately, Heidegger maintains that understanding is equiprimordial with disclosure. 
392 One might argue that diamonds are hard no matter our experiences of them, and this might be 
correct to the extent that diamonds have consistent crystalline matrices with low bond strain and 
so are an extremely stable structure, resistant to change, and this goes no matter who or what 
does the evaluation.  But, this is not how we come to understand the situation, originally; we do 
not, in fact, experience the strength of this order in these terms, per se.  The structure of diamond 
does not obviate the fact that there is only a qualification, “hardness,” on the basis of our own 
experience of objects in terms of our own constitutions; and, consequently, diamonds will always 
be “hard.” 
393 Persons are “rational,” for instance, when they are consistent with one’s expectations in the 
terms of one’s own prior understanding, and “irrational” when they are not.  Again, though, 
absurdity is the result.  On the basis of this seemingly innocent presumption, persons have moral 
worth when they are responsive to the reasons of the rational other self, and without moral worth, 
or of negative worth – irresponsible, immoral or amoral, and yet still culpable -  when they are not 
amenable to the appeals of reason.  Thus, what we see is a presumptive rationalism which 
procures the moral value of its own orthodoxy, and which at once frees the orthodox practitioner 
from responsibility for the failures of the tradition, for, after all, in retaining fundamental dogmas, 
and in evaluating self and others in terms of the essentially out-of-date, that presumptive 
rationalist is only being “rational.”  Perhaps nothing is more telling of the weakness of such a 
position that the comedy that is watching this same approach attempt to theorize “practical 
reason.”  Without any practical experience to speak of, their efforts fall hard on the concept of 
“reason,” and, so there is nothing practical about the reasoning which attends, at the same time, 
to practical reason.  If you cannot embody the phenomenon, then it is beyond your study; if you 
cannot allow the thing under purview to be realized, then you shall never realize the thing under 
study.  Sorry Peter; you lose, and I do not forgive you for treating me poorly as an orthodox 
extension of your prior presumptions, no matter how reasonable you feel yourself to be in 
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proceed according to our expectations.  Otherwise, they are difficult, so-called 
“free-thinkers,” and defy any traditional classification, unless those be “trouble-
maker,” or “criminal.”  Socrates, himself, fell into these categories, and others.394 
What this discussion thus far shows is that we first experience, then we 
understand, and this process implicitly evaluates: first, we feel out the situation in 
which we find ourselves, and insodoing we come to terms with it.395  These terms 
serve as a resident standard; they provide the high- and low-water marks by 
which further experiences are evaluated.  We find those expereinces which 
confirm our expectations pleasant, like people and diamonds.   We seek pleasant 
experiences, and avoid unpleasant ones; we value things associated with the 
one, and disvalue the other.  But this hamstrings us; learning is hard work, health 
requires sacrifice, and the truth hurts.  Sadly, few people are willing to go against 
the grain; normal people take it easy.  Normal people are, well, normal.  This will 
not give you conscience of the not so everyday sort. 
Heidegger takes a different tact.  
It is in the view of a mortal being, a being for whom time matters, that any 
other relationship matters.  Space matters because it traversing space counts 
                                                                                                                                  
general.  Understanding all of this, in its terms, is, so far as you retain you rationalist ways, 
beyond you.  Yes, you need to be a criminal to know what it is like to be a criminal, just as you 
must actually be a philosopher, Peter, to know what it is to be a Philosopher.  Here is, for you, an 
example.  One is branded “criminal” in error the same way one takes up the moniker 
“philosopher” in error; in either case there is a forgotten relation between “criminal” and 
“criminality,” “philosopher” and “philosophy,” that is the original phenomenal evidence for the 
original branding.  Convention has taken the truth of the matter, and has, so to speak, forgotten 
its own reasons why for the labels in the first place; it applies them with a squint, as-if all striped 
yellow sharp-toothed predators are tigers.  This, of course, explains the difference between your 
position, and my own, on all of the levels available for your interpretation, which is likely one, 
though most obviously this expression demands at least two, so call me criminal for not spelling it 
out any more explicitly. 
394A good friend. 
395 And only further downstream verbalized, which disqualifies “knowledge that” from any sense 
of being a realistically grounded epistemological stipulation. 
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against the time of life, and it is in the traversing as a temporal movement that 
the significance of the world arises.  But, this issue must wait; we will come to 
these terms in fuller detail when we get to conscience and guilt.  For now, it can 
only be alluded to that, for mortal living beings, significance shows up in the 
space of time as temporality; with significance comes urgency.  When time is 
short, short distances seem long; when time is lost, unlike car keys or autumn 
leaves, one’s self is forgotten.  For us, the most important situation is always up 
ahead; the things we count on are those which we anticipate being there, then, 
as before.  Otherwise, unfit for calculation and planning, they may not be such 
good things, as if they had abandoned us.   
 Things are not alone, in the world outside of us; they are with us, and us 
with them, always already together in the space of the situation, which is 
essentially shared with other like ourselves.  We are the things of the world, as 
they are us, and altogether we are the situation. What we care about becomes 
constitutive of our selves; we become “bound up with” our “being toward the 
world taken care of.”396  
Instead of conceiving the relation between self and world in terms of 
spatial relations between objectively given things, as if there were distinct 
substances whose ties are outside of themselves, so to speak, Heidegger 
articulates a view of being which takes ”attunement” as fundamental: the proper 
philosophic study, then, is not of detached beings, with inside, in an external 
world, but being-in-the-world, as an always already present relation.  Attuned is 
how you start, and end, but the terms of this relationship, well, may not be the 
                                            
396 Heidegger, page 115 
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one’s that seem pleasant.  It is on the basis of attunement that things seem 
anyway or anything at all. 
 Attunement is the source of significance; in attunement, certain things 
stand out from the situation.  Certain aspects of the relation overwhelm others; 
yet, this is, also, dependent on something. 
We have simply to come to terms with this situation in order to understand 
our places in it and in opening it up to experience, and this is an ongoing 
process, in fact the ongoing process at the root of living the life of a body in the 
world. 
Even rocks “understand” this; in fact, it is only in coming to terms with the 
situation that rocks become diamonds in the first place.  Rocks though, unlike 
men, have no capacity to do otherwise; in terms of a given situation, a given rock 
will be a given diamond.  Men have a certain freedom; men are able to deny the 
situation, to find significance in some aspects more than others, to impose their 
own terms on the situation rather than to accept the terms of the moment.  Men 
determine for themselves their world, and to change their situations, altogether, 
moving, walking, and as they do, disclosing and discoursing, and pointing only to 
what makes them smile, even if that be another man’s misery. 
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Appendix 2) Why Conscience, Why Now?  Old Religion And The 
Case From The Environment: 
 
 Recently released, a United Nation's Millennium Project report on the 
"Environment and human well-being," dated February 21, 2005, calls for radical 
changes in the ways in which we use the earth's environmental resources.397  
Our alternatives are bleak, indeed: global flooding, disease, famine, and an 
uninhabitable planet are the projected consequences for today's inaction.398 In 
effect, either we will determine what ways of living are best, now; or global, 
environmental catastrophe will change our ways of living and dying, no doubt for 
the worst, later.  In the following paper, I will suggest just what role philosophy 
may play so that changes, of our own determination, in fact take place.  
 We may be on the cusp of the most important ethical problem in human 
history: 
Global-scale environmental problems caused by synthetic toxins, 
climate change, the decline of ocean ecosystems, ozone depletion, 
extinction, and groundwater depletion were largely nonexistent as 
recently as forty years ago and have accelerated so rapidly that by 
many estimates there is little time to lose if we are to avert a 
planetwide catastrophe.399 
 
                                            
397 UN Millennium Project 2005. Environment and Human Well-being: A Practical Strategy. 
Summary version of the Report of the Task Force on Environmental Sustainability. The Earth 
Institute at Columbia University, New York.  This, and other Millenium Project reports are 
available for download at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/reports2.htm#09 
398 In short, extinction. Current energy practices, mismanagement of toxic chemicals, and the 
conversion of natural habitats and related patterns of overproduction, overconsumption, and 
mismanagement of ecosystems have resulted in unsustainable levels of air and water 
pollutants.(U.N., page 26)  By environmental sustainability we mean meeting current human 
needs  without undermining the capacity of  the environment to provide for those needs over the 
long term.(U.N., page 11) 
399 Matthew Orr, “Environmental Decline and the Rise of Religion,” Zygon, Volume 38, No. 4, 
December 2003, page 895.  Even without this information, no one needs an ethicist to tell them 
that selfishness and short-sightedness, conspicuous consumption and littering, are vices; and, if 
they don't already know it, why should they listen?  That's what insurance is for.  Shouldn't the 
scientists take care of the environment? 
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 What can philosophy do about it?  Some Environmental Ethicists have 
argued that they can positively, as they have not grown up in a world which 
recognizes that humankind does not act well in the face of the environment.400   
Few contemporary philosophers are trained well enough in the natural sciences 
to even begin to assess the problems impeding environmental sustainability, let 
alone advise how to manage them, trained as they are to isolate and analyze 
arguments.401 Implementing and designing the mechanisms for an 
environmentally sustainable future do indeed seem to be technical problems 
whose solutions fall to experts outside of the field of philosophy.  Likewise, there 
is no mention of a philosopher king in the recent U.N. report.  We can agree with 
Aristotle that argument alone might lead someone to virtue, but how is argument 
going to help us to overcome our environmental problems? 
 It is no secret, after all, that our current practices are environmentally 
vicious.  Everyone knows that pollution is bad.  Where is the argument?  Unless 
philosophers start building solar panels, it may look like philosophy has no place 
in a solution to global environmental problems, after all. 
 But, philosophy isn't just about argument; part of doing philosophy is 
pointing out the unpopular thing, the hidden truth in the shadow play of our 
everyday puppet show.402  Often enough, it is this pointing out of the unpopular 
                                            
400 For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse. 
401 Likely, these are either not recognized (because they don't know what to look for) as problems 
or at least not recognized as problems for them (as lying outside their specialty; it's someone 
else's responsibility).  I am arguing that these are problems for everybody, and especially for 
philosophy.  I understand that this sentiment runs contrary to many people in philosophy who 
believe that contemporary philosophy requires no knowledge of the natural world at any level of 
sophistication.  A trend, I must note, contrary to every indication about the way the world is going. 
402 "This is because the speeches that I make on each occasion do no aim at gratification, but at 
what's best."(521e)  Philosophy in both the East and the West have traditionally been critical of 
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thing which leads to argument, not the other way around. 
 So, I began by pointing out a very unpopular notion: people must change 
the way they live, now, or the environment may become uninhabitable for future 
generations.  There is, of course, a lot of argument about this, and not just 
amongst philosophers.  We will confront what I take to be the most fundamental 
sticking point in the next section. 
 The unpopular thing to point out to philosophers, specifically, though, is 
that, if it is up to others besides philosophers to do the hard work necessary to 
accommodate the science of global environmental sustainability, where are they?  
The specific changes that the Millennium report recommends are "not new," 
having been under consideration or inconsistently enforced since the early 
1970's.403  That's two generations to adapt to a revealed changing environment; 
still, things are getting worse, not better. 
 Why?  For one thing, according to the U.N. report, no tested institutional 
strategies exist to deal effectively with the sacrifices this generation must suffer 
so that future generations have any future at all.404 
                                                                                                                                  
received traditions, and both have traditionally stressed self-knowledge, and in fact self-
knowledge achieved through critical reflection on language, as the critical component in order to 
live and to die right with the world, not simply according to tradition and habit.  In this way, I am 
arguing, philosophers have played a crucial role as exemplars of a self-critical mode that, in 
practice, provides a social resource for change.  Sadly, this resource, as the others of this Earth, 
has been, especially in the last 40 years, abused. 
403 U.N., page 31. 
404 U.N., pages 21-22.  These "intergenerational tradeoffs" lie at the heart of the challenge to 
adopt environmentally responsible ways of life.  The problems with these sorts of issues are that 
those who suffer by one's own vices are most often temporally and spatially distant, so the ill-
effects of one's own bad actions are masked by the fact that he does not inherit them.  For one 
thing, the negative effects of one person's environmentally destructive way of life are largely 
hidden from them day to day.  Firstly, those who suffer most because of my environmentally 
destructive practices are spatially distant from my self.  The ill-effects often fall on the other side 
of the globe, if not on the other side of the tracks; and, although industrial countries are primarily 
responsible, so-called "developing" countries, and poor people in general, are the most 
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 Which brings us to the focus of this paper; I disagree with this assessment.  
I believe that philosophy offers such a strategy. 
 The problem with the "intergenerational tradeoffs" with which we are faced 
is this: if we continue to satiate our sweet-teeth for luxury at the expense of the 
environment, then we are doing injustice to those who certainly will suffer 
because of it, those who will inherit the ill-effects of our own selfish actions, and 
this is not a popular message, especially for those who are used to things the 
way they are.  But, this is the point; the science tells us that things will not stay 
the way they are.  The warning in the U.N.'s report is just this; sacrifice luxuries, 
now, give up current ways of life, now, or your children will lose everything, if they 
live at all, because current ways of life are changing the world, and for the worse.  
And this just means that giving up your SUV today doesn't mean that tomorrow 
the world will appear to be a better place; evidence of these sacrifices will take 
time.  Having given up the SUV, one will not look out on a renewed environment 
in their own lifetime; likelier, they will look out on a still crashing environment 
through the windshield of a much smaller car.  Intergenerational tradeoffs, then, 
essentially, are concerns about what happens with the world after we are dead; 
which, in turn, appears to be a question, not for philosophy, but for religion.  
 Yet, when we look to religion for guidance on what to do with the world's 
resources in light of the warnings from science, what we find is, not surprisingly, 
an ongoing argument. For one thing, there is a deep tradition of religious 
                                                                                                                                  
vulnerable to these ill-effects.  Secondarily, those who stand to suffer most from today's 
environmentally vicious ways of life are temporally distant, in the future.  For instance, an 
investment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions now imposes a cost on today's generation, with 
most of the benefits of a more stable climate accruing at some future time, and in some other 
place. 
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suspicion of scientific prognostication.  For instance: 
The reknowned theologian Karl Barth warranted against theological 
conclusions based on natural data.  According to Barth, God cannot 
be known by the powers of human knowledge but is apprehensible 
and apprehended solely because of his own freedom, decision, and 
action.405 
 
 God doesn't show up in the U.N. report on environmental sustainability; but, 
from the religious perspective, this absence is the root of our problems.  Dee 
Carter, for instance, argues that science is just one aspect of secularism, and 
further blames secularism for the world's problems in general.  In regards to the 
environment, she argues that the geno-centric rationalism of Enlightenment 
science had, historically, co-opted a politically naive though environmentally 
sensitive Christian religion, and that the resulting, increasing, secularity is in fact 
responsible for the destruction of God's Earth, a secular destruction that we are 
only now understanding scientifically as an emerging environmental crisis.406 
The ecological crisis, wrought by exploitive attitudes toward 
nonhuman life (and, in a wider sense, to some human life) and by 
the careless despoliation of God's world, is surely a manifestation 
of the broader problems of secularism: a loss of the sense of the 
sacred and a lack of respect for divine law.407 
                                            
405 Ilia Delio, Brain Science and the Biology of Belief: A Theological Response, Zygon, vol. 38, no. 
3, September, 2003, page 579. 
406 This is essentially Huston Smith's position.  Further references will focus on Huston Smith, 
"Huston Smith Replies to Barbour, Goodenough, and Peterson," Zygon, volume 36, number 2, 
June 2001, pages 223-231. 
407 Carter, page 359.  By Carter's assessment, the ecological crisis of late modern times must be 
seen as an aspect within the broader "secularity" crisis emerging historically since the 
enlightenment.(Carter, page 364)  She holds secularism responsible for the objectification of 
nature, and she blames modern philosophy for greasing the mechanistic, reductive, objectifying 
wheels of secularism.  She blames Descartes for raising human reason above the rest of nature, 
and other animals.  She blames Kant for finally cementing humanity's opposition to the natural 
order.(Carter, pages 360 and 364, respectively)  She blames modern ethical theory for 
maintaining this tradition in the operating myth of the "rationalist calculator model of the human 
being."(Carter, page 369)  These are all criticisms to which I am especially inclined to endorse.  
Furthermore, Christianity, by Carter's picture, has simply been "unwittingly" duped into 
legitimizing these developments, having "acquiesced in the vested interests of particular power 
groups."(Carter, page 364)  As a result, humanity has set itself against "God's good creation," 
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 Could it be that Carter has a point, that a history of science and 
secularism are responsible for emerging ecological crisis?  Could it be that a 
return to traditional religions is our best hope for an environmentally sustainable 
future?  Religion does appear to have a deep history of confirmation and 
success, thousands of years in as many forms, while the upstart secularism 
seems to have only modern failures in evidence for its faithful adherence.  
Pollution, after all, is not a direct product of traditional religion, but of science.  
Yet, what makes the religious past the right response to emerging crisis, now? 
The seasoned religious person could eventually come to have faith 
in God to sustain him through future trials, as God has already 
demonstrated his real presence consistently in the past.  Thus, to 
rely on God in faith is not an irrational act to the Christian, but a 
perfectly reasonable and justified act, based on empirical 
evidence.408  
 
 So, what gives religion the edge is the depth of the religious experience; 
maybe we should return to traditional ways of life.  A thousand years ago, a lot 
more about the world was taken on faith; and, there was a lot less ozone 
depletion in the dark ages, that much is a fact.  Even though it is unlikely that our 
own age should be so bright, faithful executors of inherited religious practices, by 
their religious experience, do at least appear justified in blaming secularism and 
                                                                                                                                  
embodying "the false ontological status that raises human beings out of the created order and 
that both inhibits our self-understanding as creatures and denies the construal of Christian 
notions such as grace and redemption in ways that establish any commonality of focus within 
which the goods of the human and the non-human might be considered together."(Carter, page 
369)  Accordingly, for our environmental concerns, it appears to be a simple case of one or the 
other, a simple, but irreconcilable, dispute. 
408 Christine l. Niles, "Epistemological Nonsense?  The Secular/Religious Distinction," Notre 
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, Volume, 17, 2003, page 569.  (Such evidence 
must be at least partly the source of Wilson's admirable admission in the late pages of E.O. 
Wilson’s Consilience, regarding his own scientific world-view in the face of religious competitors, 
that "I might be wrong.") 
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scientism for the natural world's emerging ills. 
The secularist or socialist has a limited resource mentality and 
views the world as a pie ... that needs to be cut up so everyone 
gets a piece ... the Christian knows that the potential in God is 
unlimited and that there is no shortage of resources in God's earth. 
... while many secularists view the world as overpopulated, 
Christians know that God has made the earth sufficiently large with 
plenty of resources to accommodate all of the people.409 
 
 Now, this statement embodies the polar opposite of the message that 
there is an emerging environmental catastrophe; according to this view, there is 
no environmental crisis, at all.  Scientists, from this perspective, are simply taken 
as advocates of a contrary religion, a religion with a bad record.410  Faith in 
traditional ways of life, faith in God, appears to have the evidence on its side.  
Scientists, lacking faith in religious experience, instead come to what appear to 
be, from the religious perspective, unwarranted conclusions regarding the 
                                            
409 In a now famous, recent, address delivered while accepting the Global Environmental Citizen 
Award presented by the Center for Health and the Global Environment of the Harvard Medical 
School December 1, 2004, Bill Moyers, himself a Christian, lamented the fact that religious policy 
makers, especially Christians, have been committed to the destruction of the environment.  This 
address is available for public download at http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/april.html#bill.  The 
passage is taken as quoted from Moyer's address.  It is as if God, himself, will replant the forests 
and revitalize the rivers; no worries. 
If we take this passage seriously, it appears that there is no environmental crisis at all!  This 
doesn't describe the world in which I live; indeed, they are assertions without even a basis in 
publication.  For instance, see Roger Lewin's short review appearing in Science, Vol. 228, No. 
4701, May 17, 1985. 
410 If this is the case, then, as Huston Smith has maintained, we must return to so-called 
"traditional world-views."  This implies the wholesale rejection of contemporary scientific thought.  
Smith himself believes that, expecting the scientist to admit that a God-like agency may play a 
role in science, in our present case the science of saving the earth from global environmental 
collapse, is simply asking too much: 
"It would be wrong for theologians to ask scientists to admit supernatural causes into their 
theories; there they would abort their scientific project."(Smith, page 224)  Smith goes on: "But it 
is equally wrong for them to close their eyes to places where proximate, naturalistic causes are 
missing.  For until satisfactory naturalistic explanations come along - and they may be never - it is 
reasonable to believe that causes from outside nature (to wit, God's direct inputs) hold the 
answer."(Smith, page 224) 
So, until science can answer all the technical solutions to environmental problems necessary for 
sustainable human life on Earth, all scientific recommendation for changes in traditional ways of 
life in light of environmental crisis must be rejected?  Apparently, at least, there can be no 
resolution between these two poles if Smith is right. 
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condition of our environment.  
 Together, these two poles work against any resolution to environmental 
problems; as long as they argue, the changes required for global environmental 
sustainability cannot be instituted.  We appear to be in a condition much like that 
in which Socrates finds himself, with Callicles, at the close of the Gorgias: 
For it's a shameful thing for us, being in the condition we appear to 
be in at present - when we never think the same about the same 
subjects, the most important ones at that - to sound off as though 
we're somebodies.411 
 
 To get around this and similar disputes, some religious thinkers have 
asserted that science needs to be conceived anew, theologically.412  Maybe if 
this were to happen religion could give us guidance in regards to the science of 
environmental sustainability.  Until then, it seems that we might be stuck with a 
choice between one or the other.  How could philosophy ever help us to choose 
between a religious and a scientific way of life? 
 Thankfully, it won't have to; the religious experience is as universal as is 
the experience of growing environmental calamity, though in either case the 
understandings of these experiences may differ.  As long as the evidence of a 
religious experience, or evidence of environmental collapse, or evidence of God, 
just is the experience of a human being with a human brain in a certain prepared 
condition, then these experiences are not unique.  If they were, then there truly 
could be no communication between the poles of science and religion, and no 
                                            
411 527d. 
412 Positive work in the Christian tradition channelling Paul Tillich's influence to this end, reciprical 
and productive co-dependence between science and religion, comes under the heading of 
"theonomous science," and is delicately discussed in Ronald B. MacLennan's excellent "Belief-ful 
Realism and Scientific Realism," Zygon, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2001, pages 309-320. 
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way past vicious dispute.  Socrates recognized this fact: 
...if human beings didn't share common experiences, some sharing 
one, others sharing another, but one of us had some unique 
experience not shared by the others, it wouldn't be easy to 
communicate what he experienced to the other.413 
 
 According to Socrates, this is the real issue.  It is the common experience 
which permits communication.  The religious, and the scientific, exist as poles in 
argument only because they exist as poles of human experience, in common.  
There is, in fact, between a life of science and a life of religion, no choice to be 
made.  Of course the scientist uses his terms, and the religious hers, but 
underlying there is common experience, or there is no communication, and no 
understanding, and no hope, at all.         
 It may be objected, immediately, that Socrates knew nothing of 
environmental science, not to mention cognitive science, and was not concerned 
with the malaise from which our modern word suffers; he wasn't even Christian.  
Just because it has been said by a brilliant man, many years ago, before our 
global environmental crisis presented itself, doesn't ensure it is right.  Looking to 
a 2500 year old tradition, especially one largely out of practice, for answers to 
contemporary problems seems like a false start; what about progress, after all?  
Hasn't the world changed so much that whatever his philosophy has to say is 
really just novelty? 
 One thing that hasn't changed is change; the world is changing, and we 
need guidance as to what is the best way of life in light of this fact.  The best life, 
                                            
413 481d.  Notably, these are not nobodies who are arguing with one another over what needs to 
be done about world catastrophe.  Our greatest minds have lined up as champions of opposing 
traditions against one another. 
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according to Socrates, is that which is "adequate to and satisfied with its 
circumstances at any given time."414  In fact, it is a resistance to this way of life 
which motivates the dispute between science and religion over the environment.  
People continue to simply live the way they are used to living, according to 
traditions which, unlike the Socratic tradition, are not adequate to any given time. 
 The fundamental point in this present work is the following: to hold onto a 
way of life which encourages and even inflames tragic conditions is vicious.  It is 
nothing less than hanging the future of life on Earth on an article of faith.  It is as 
if Pascal's wager were extended to the whole of the globe, with an expectation 
that 70 years is long enough a life-span for not just one's self, but for anyone and 
everyone and everything else.  In fact, though, 70 years may be too generous an 
estimate if past practices are continued, on faith, in the face of changing material 
evidence; we may not have even that much time. 
 One's articles of faith might have served for thousands of years, or since 
the enlightenment, but that is no guarantee that they will continue to serve, or 
even that they serve us, now. 
 The fact is that a way of life is not all that we inherit from the scientific and 
religious past; we inherit the effects of these ways of life, as well.    These effects 
need to be weighed - the point of the environmental science is that for the most 
part they have been - and our future practices adjusted accordingly.415  This fact, 
                                            
414 493c. 
415 This fact has been recognized by many other influential contemporary thinkers whose 
concerns are specifically the possibilities for living well, with others, in the upcoming millennia.  
One principle component of these thinkers is the responsible appreciation of the impact that 
consistently applied, that is inherited and faithfully maintained, modes of life have had on our 
resource environment. 
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needless to say, is not popular to point out.  Especially for philosophy.  
 Why?  Consider the inaction at the institutional level to adjust to new ways 
of life; it is not a popular notion to advise that old ways are vicious.  Those 
presently faithful to the ways of life that they have inherited are depending on 
those inherited ways to remain effective, even in the face of ill-effects on the 
changing environment due to those same practices.416    
 And, they may be right to do so; but, once we do understand that we are 
in the midst of a global environmental crisis, in terms of both the scientific and the 
religious experience, themselves simply common poles of human experience, the 
question appears differently.  
 In the face of environmental crisis, new ways of being must be explored, 
invented, and these must become habit, routine, and finally convention as 
replacement for that past convention that has fallen from virtue to vice.  True, 
experts in all fields do have to figure their areas out; but, the change itself takes 
more than simple reassessment.  It takes philosophy.      
 Somehow, though, the institution of philosophy escaped the notice of the 
environmental scientists responsible for the U.N. Millennium Group report.  The 
philosophic solution, the solution I am recommending, is not in the institution of 
philosophy, per se; in this regard, the U.N. report is essentially right to overlook it.  
The philosophic solution that I am recommending is the philosophic life. 
 The tested strategy for dealing with intergenerational tradeoffs, that 
necessary component for an environmentally sustainable future, is philosophy.  It 
                                            
416 On faith in the authority of past actors; and this attitude, when influential on public policy, is, if 
not dangerous, simply irresponsible.  For interesting discussion in this vein, see Niles, page 567. 
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is the demonstration, and willingness, to realize the uncomfortable truth, to 
integrate the wisdoms of past and future in study, and in practice, that is the 
philosophic life.  Of course, this means pointing out the unpopular; and, often 
enough, this leads to argument.  But: 
 For my part, if I engage in anything that's improper in my own life, 
please know well that I do not make this mistake intentionally but 
out of my ignorance.  So don't leave off lecturing me the way you 
began, but show me clearly what it is I'm to devote myself to, and in 
what way I might come by it...417 
                                            
417 488a. 
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